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 This research explores the factors, dynamics and circumstances that 
explain how and why terrorist organisations decide to integrate into political 
systems. The research proposes that such integration is a result of decisions 
and actions taken by a terrorist organisation, the state that deals with it and the 
surrounding international system. 
The research propositions are tested against three cases of terrorist 
organisations that successfully integrated into political systems: the Irgun, the 
Ulster Volunteer Force and Hizballah. The findings determine that the presence 
of certain factors, whether on the organisational, domestic or international 
levels – and preferably all at the same time – provide the necessary conditions 
for a successful integration to occur.  
 The research concludes that the most dominant parameters that 
create the necessary conditions for terrorists' political integration are: (a) 
fluctuation in the level of public support for the terrorist organisation's strategy 
and tactics, (b) internal split in the ranks of a terrorist organisation if one 
faction becomes more moderate than the other, (c) the mix of aggressive and 
accommodating counter-terrorism policies employed by the state, and (d) the 
level and impact of international involvement in the conflict. In situations 
where these parameters are present and have a tangible influence on a terrorist 
organisation's decisions, behaviour and actions, the process of integration into 
a political system by the terrorist organisation is not only more likely, but also 




Ultimately, the research offers a theoretical model that could potentially 
provide a set of guidelines for decision-makers on how to instigate, encourage 
or enhance a transformation process within terrorist organisations, from 
militant strategy and extremist doctrine toward acceptance of political strategy 
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On January 25th 2006, Hamas – a proscribed terrorist organisation1 – 
defied international expectation and won a resounding Palestinian 
parliamentary election victory. Three months later, a Hamas-led government 
was sworn in by the President of the Palestinian Authority. Although there are 
previous cases in which an armed group became involved in politics, Hamas's 
overwhelming triumph is unique – for the first time an active terrorist group 
was democratically elected and gained formal control over a recognised 
political entity.  
The new political environment in the Palestinian Authority sparked an 
extensive debate as to what direction Hamas would take; whether it would 
continue to adhere to its declared strategy aimed at destroying the state of 
Israel and establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in its place, or once in 
control of executive powers and responsible for the people's daily life, Hamas's 
extremist Islamist ideology would be tempered, and it would abandon 
terrorism as a tactic in favour of political accommodation. An unequivocal 
answer to this debate was given by the prime minister of the Hamas-led 
government, Ismail Haniyeh, who stated that: 'We [Hamas] will go for arms and 
a parliament, for there's no contradiction between the two.'2 
Indeed, Hamas has become a paradigm for a recent phenomenon – the 
turn by terrorist organisations to legitimate political process as a parallel 
sphere in which to promote their objectives. Yet, while organisations like 
Hamas and Hizballah maintain a dual-strategy, namely using terrorism whilst 
represented in government and pursuing their interests through political 
institutions, some have not done so. Organisations, such as the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), the African National Congress (ANC) and the Basque Euskadi Ta 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Hamas is proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the USA, EU, Israel, and Canada. Its military 
wing, Izz a-din al-Qassam is designated by the UK and Australia.   
2 Hirst, David. "Arab democracy is exposing the blind spot of US policy", The Guardian 





Askatasuna (ETA), abandoned terrorism as their modus operandi, declared a 
ceasefire and decided to pursue their goals solely through non-violent political 
channels.  
Although every terrorist organisation has distinct ideology and strategy 
and operates within a specific context, the main challenge is to find common 
factors and patterns that could lead its political integration. Therefore, the 
central and hitherto elusive research questions are what factors, dynamics and 
circumstances explain the integration of terrorist organisations into politics 
and why the outcomes are intrinsically different from one another. Providing 
compelling and substantiated answers to these questions may indicate a more 
effective and targeted policy that would support, and perhaps even accelerate, 
terrorist integration into political systems.  
Ultimately, this study aims to provide a detailed analysis of the 
integration process in its entirety and allow the reader to better understand the 
comprehensive set of calculations that lead terrorist organisations to decide to 
take part in a constitutional arena and to integrate into legitimate political 
systems. To achieve this objective, the research will offer an original in-depth 
look into this phenomenon by addressing it through a multilevel analysis and 
testing case studies, in a way that has not been done before.3 Although much 
has been written on specific terrorist organisations and their political wings, 
mainly in the context of local and regional conflicts, it has only touched the 




3 Cynthia Irvin notes that the existing research on the shift in military strategies of 
revolutionary movements and the tendency to add political wings, has been limited, and 
specifically there have been very few studies that reviewed this from a comparative 
perspective. See: Irvin, Cynthia. Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland 




CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Before describing this research, it is important to propose a clear 
conceptual framework that sets the research boundaries and outlines the main 
definitions and terms of reference that will be used throughout this study. This 
is not only a theoretical requirement or an academic imperative, but also has 
practical implications for this study. Therefore, the following section is 
designed to clarify the key concepts: terrorism, terrorist organisation, 
integration and political systems.   
 
TERRORISM 
'Terrorism, one of the most widely discussed issues of our time, is also of the least 
understood.'4 
"Terrorism" is the underlying concept to be discussed in this research 
and, undoubtedly, the most difficult to define. Adrian Guelke noted that 'by the 
1990s, the concept of terrorism had become so elastic that there seemed to be 
virtually no limit to what could be described as terrorism.'5 It is often argued 
that despite the abundance of written literature and professional work, the 
study of terrorism 'has unfortunately not been accompanied by a 
commensurate increase in the understanding of the phenomenon.'6 This 
obscurity stems from the general misunderstanding of what constitutes 
terrorism and how it can be distinguished from other forms of political 
violence. 
In its original context, the term "terrorism" was linked with the ideals of 
virtue and democracy (at the time of the French Revolution), and later in 
history some organisations proudly described their operations as terrorism 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4 Laqueur, Walter. Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977), Introductory Note 
5 Guelke, Adrian. The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System (London: Tauris 
Academic Publishers, 1995), p. 1 




(for instance, the Russian Narodnaya Volya and the Jewish Stern Gang). 
However, nowadays "terrorism" mainly carries negative connotations and 
terrorist organisations 'regularly select names for themselves that consciously 
eschew the word "terrorism" in any of its forms.'7 Due to the complexity of 
"terrorism" and its different variations, discourses and subjective nature, as 
well as the descriptive, normative or polemical contexts in which it is often 
used, there is no comprehensive, objective and internationally-recognised 
definition of terrorism.  
The definitional controversy is further exacerbated, since the word 
"terrorism" itself is politically-contested and hardly ever a value-neutral 
concept.8 Indeed, policy makers and modern media have been using the 
"terrorism" label as a political tool rather than an analytical category to 
distinguish between different types of violence.9 Therefore, in a political 
environment that associates the word terrorism to one's opponent, very few 
individuals, organisations or states 'wish the term applied to their own 
activities,' and likewise their rivals employ it as 'a device to delegitimize the 
group or state with which they are in conflict.'10 Subsequently, terrorist 
organisations attempt to link themselves with other forms of political violence 
that are, generally, perceived as more legitimate, such as guerrilla warfare, 
revolutionary violence, resistance operations and insurgency.  
Scholars and practitioners who deal with terrorism agree that it is a 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
7 Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 21; for a 
useful discussion on the definition of terrorism, see pp. 1-41 
8 For example, the official editorial guidelines of the BBC specifically states that: 'Our credibility 
is undermined by the careless use of words which carry emotional or value judgments. The 
word "terrorist" itself can be a barrier rather than an aid to understanding. We should try to 
avoid the term, without attribution…We should use words which specifically describe the 
perpetrator such as "bomber", "attacker", "gunman", "kidnapper", "insurgent", and "militant".'  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/edguide/war/mandatoryreferr.
shtml (accessed 23/3/07) 
9 Blakeley, Ruth. "Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies", European Political Science 
(6:3, 2007), pp. 228-235 
10 Weinberg, Leonard and Pedahzur, Ami. Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (Oxon: 




form of political violence and therefore 'explicable in political terms.'11 Indeed, 
in the spectrum of political agitation, terrorism is an extreme form of political 
protest that entails the use of violence as a tactic in the pursuit of political 
objectives.12 The notion that terrorism is a political concept is emphasised by 
Bruce Hoffman, who asserts that this is the primary characteristic that 
distinguishes it from other types of violence. In his view, in the contemporary 
usage of the term "terrorism", it is 'fundamentally and inherently political,' and 
necessarily about the pursuit, acquisition and use of power 'to achieve political 
change.'13  
Certainly, the politically-charged nature of terrorism gave rise to the 
common assertion that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". 
However, this much-used adage is conceptually misleading since it combines a 
method – terrorism, with a cause – national liberation, and implies a value-
judgment that terrorism may be legitimate if intended to attain a "just cause". 
However, Boaz Ganor suggests that the difference between a terrorist and a 
freedom fighter is not subjective but rather substantive, by emphasising the 
means employed by the perpetrator, rather than the goals he wishes to 
achieve.14 Brian Jenkins adds that labeling one as a terrorist should be 
dependent upon the nature of his act, and not on the identity of the 
perpetrators or the nature of their cause.15 This view was supported by the 
2004 "UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change", which clearly 
stated in its report 'that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even for the 
most defensible of causes.'16  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
11 Sprinzak, Ehud. "The Psychopolitical formation of extreme left terrorism in democracy: The 
case of the Weatherman", in Reich, Walter (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, 
Theologies, States of Mind (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), p. 78  
12 Thornton, Thomas Perry. "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation", in Eckstein, Harry (ed.). 
Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 71-99 
13 Hoffman, p. 2 
14 Ganor, Boaz. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2005), pp. 1-24 
15 Jenkins, Brian. The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, P-6563, December 1980), p. 2-3 





Most definitions of terrorism include recurring elements such as 
"violence", "political goal", "fear", "threat", "psychological effects", and 
"deliberate".17 Since these elements also characterise guerrilla warfare and 
insurgency, they are often equated with terrorism and widely referred to as 
synonyms. Notwithstanding this definitional uncertainty, there is one 
fundamental element that is frequently overlooked – the identity of the victim, 
namely civilians or non-combatants. Leonard Weinberg asserts that by adding 
civilians or non-combatants as the targets of terrorism, 'we then have a helpful 
definition of the phenomenon, one useful for identifying and analyzing the 
tactic.'18  
A reductionist approach, which disregards the identity of the victim, is 
the principal factor that allows terrorism to be confused with other types of 
"irregular" violence. According to Ganor, while guerrilla warfare and 
insurgency are tactics that, traditionally, involve the use of violence against 
military and governmental targets, the underlying element that distinguishes 
terrorism from other types of political violence is the deliberate targeting of 
civilians.19 This notion received a formal recognition in the above-mentioned 
UN report that recommended defining terrorism as:  
An act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians 
or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government 
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing 
any act.20 
Although the UN's recommendation was never confirmed by the General 
                                                                                                                                                                            
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN Department of Public Information, December 
2004), p. 51; 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf  
(accessed 12/1/06) 
17 In one of the most extensive works in search of a single accepted definition, Albert Jongman 
and Alex Schmid, identified more than 100 definitional variations of terrorism. See Schmid, Alex 
and Jongman, Albert. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, 
Theories, and Literature (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1988) 
18 Weinberg, Leonard. Democracy and Terrorism: Friend of Foe (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 10 
19 Ganor, pp. 16-24 




Assembly, it provides a normative framework that defines terrorism as a 
premeditated use of violence against civilians or non-combatants to achieve 
political objectives.21 Evidently, the definition of terrorism, as stipulated in the 
UN report, does not distinguish between states and non-state actors as the 
perpetrators of violent acts against civilians. Indeed, states and governments 
also employ the same violent tactic against their own citizens or those of 
another country, as a 'means of exercising power and indirectly accomplishing 
policy aims.'22  
However, while non-state actors are not subject to the laws of armed 
conflict, or to any other legally-binding operational limitations, states that use 
terrorism essentially violate international humanitarian law. Clearly, the legal 
and normative framework against states that employ terrorism against civilians 
'is far stronger than in the case of non-state actors.'23 Subsequently, agents of a 
state that use terrorism against civilians are regarded as war criminals 
according to international treaties, and could be prosecuted in international 
criminal courts for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although the 
prohibition against the use of terrorism to target civilians and non-combatants 
should be applied equally to states and non-state actors, in reality members of 
terrorist organisations operate within the framework of low intensity warfare 
(as oppose to armed conflict), over which the international treaties have 
limited reach and effect.24 Cronin concludes that non-state terrorist 
organisations 'do not abide by international laws or norms,' and their acts of 
violence are 'intentionally directed against people who are generally 
considered to be defenseless and illegitimate targets.'25 This study deals strictly 
with terrorism carried out by non-state actors.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
21 For more on the identity of the victim see Stern, Jessica. The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1999) 
22 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 4 
23 "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility", p. 51 
24 Jodoin, Sebastian. "Terrorism as a War Crime", International Criminal Law Review (Vol. 7, 
2007), pp. 77-115 




In conclusion, it would be audacious to assert that this research will 
resolve the definitional dispute as to what "terrorism" is. Nonetheless, it is 
essential to propose an adequate definition of terrorism; one that maintains the 
focus on the investigated research topic without entering into un-resolvable 
theoretical debates. Thus, the working definition of terrorism that will be used 
throughout this research is: the deliberate use, or threat to use, violence against 
civilians or non-combatants to create fear and public disorder, in order to achieve 
a political objective.   
 
TERRORIST ORGANISATION 
There is a wide array of different types of non-state organisations that 
employ terrorist tactics, ranging from hierarchical to network approaches.26 
Yet, a common definition is provided by Richard Shultz, who characterises a 
terrorist organisation as the 'formalized structure utilised for the planning, 
coordination, and application of extranormal forms of political violence.'27 John 
Horgan elaborates that terrorist organisations are 'relatively small, (semi) 
clandestine collectives built on anti-establishment political or religious 
ideologies…using violence or the threat thereof to carry influence.'28 Another 
dimension is addressed by Fred Halliday, who asserts that contrary to other 
types of organisations, a terrorist organisation challenges the state-centric 
system and seeks to topple a government or to destabilise the political and 
social foundations of a state.29  
For the purpose of this research, a terrorist organisation will be defined 
as a hierarchical and clandestine non-state body that systematically employs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
26 Mishal, Shaul and Rosenthal, Maoz. "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of 
Islamic Terrorist organizations", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (28:4, July/August 2005), pp. 
275-293  
27 Shultz, Richard. "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology", Journal of International 
Affairs (32:1, 1978), p. 12 
28 Horgan, John. The Psychology of Terrorism (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), p. 1 
29 Halliday, Fred. "The Romance of Non-State Actors", in Josselin, Daphne and Wallace, William 




terrorism in order to influence a political process.30 This study adopts a 
qualitative perspective over a quantitative one, in order to avoid subjective or 
politically-loaded assertions that determine the type of organisation according 
to the number of violent attacks.31 Hence, once an organisation has employed 
terrorism, 'it has broken a normative rule and regardless of the type of goals it 
champions and other methods it uses to realise those goals, it should be defined 
as a terrorist organisation.'32  
In principle, this research deals exclusively with terrorist organisations 
that had an active political wing whilst using violence, or formed one before 
deciding to take part in legitimate political process. Although, political and 
military wings of a terrorist organisation can be officially separate entities, in 
most cases the former is subordinate to the latter or emerges from it, as 
suggested by Anthony Richards.33 
 
INTEGRATION INTO POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
This thesis focuses entirely on integration in the context of participation 
in conventional party politics activity on a national level.34 Since terrorist 
organisations are rarely allowed to participate directly in institutionalised 
politics, they seek to expand and acquire power through the establishment of a 
political party. Its aim is to rally broad support for the terrorist organisation's 
objectives by 'building a network of members and activists and working toward 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
30 It is known that international terrorist networks, such as Al-Qaida, are largely decentralised 
and non-hierarchical, and are comprised of covert cells spread around the globe. 
31 An example for using the quantitative index is of Dr. Rola El-Husseini of Yale University, who 
refers to Hizballah as a resistance group rather than a terrorist organisation. She relies on the 
fact that 'in recent times the group has only conducted attacks on Israeli Defence Forces in the 
Shebba Farms area, a disputed strip on the border between Lebanon…[and] has not 
participated in any suicide bombings or other attacks aimed at Israeli civilians since the 1980s,' 
and therefore it cannot be designated as a terrorist organisation. Joudi, Steve. "Hizballah: 
Political Party or Terrorist Organization", Center for Near Eastern Studies (UCLA, 27/4/2005);  
http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=23750 (accessed 24/3/07) 
32 Ganor, p. 23 
33 Richards, Anthony. "Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA, Sinn Fein, the Peace 
Process and Democracy", Terrorism and Political Violence (13:4, Winter 2001), pp. 72-89 




mobilizing the target community for eventual political action.'35 As such, the 
party becomes the terrorist's central platform for political integration. 
In effect, according to Peter Neumann, by forming a political party and 
integrating into a political system the 'terrorists acknowledge the authority of 
the existing institutional framework,' even though ideologically they negate the 
regime or its policies.36 Normally, integration itself grants a degree of legitimacy 
to the organisation's activity and allows it to become a lawful political actor, 
even if it does not fully adhere to the common rules of the "political game". 
However, the mere participation in politics does not constitute an integration, 
unless it is accompanied by an active involvement 'that goes above and beyond 
simply casting a ballot.'37 
Yet, it is important to note that there is a notional spectrum of terrorist's 
political integration (see figure 1); the higher the level of integration the more a 
terrorist organisation is embedded in the state's political system and required 
to adhere to its laws and procedures. Moreover, moving upward through the 
different forms of integration necessarily indicates deeper involvement in the 
political system.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
35 Siqueira, Kevin. "Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and 
Organizations", Journal of Conflict Resolution (49:2, April 2005), p. 219 
36 Neumann, Peter. "The Bullet and the Ballot Box: The Case of the IRA", Journal of Strategic 
Studies (28:6, December 2005), p. 945 
37 McVeigh, Rory and Smith, Christian. "Who Protests in America: An Analysis of Three Political 
Alternatives - Inaction, Institutionalized Politics, or Protest", Sociological Forum (14:4, 




Participation in municipal elections
Participation in national elections
(with or without taking the seats)
Participation in a 
governmental coalition
 
Figure 1: Levels of terrorist integration into political systems  
The most basic form of terrorist integration is participation in municipal 
politics, which often provides an ideal stepping stone in moving forward to 
state-level politics (such as Fatah's and Hamas's control over local councils in 
the Palestinian Authority). A higher degree of integration is taking part in 
parliamentary elections, either by accepting or refusing to take the seats in case 
of a successful campaign (as with Sinn Fein's policy of abstentionism). Terrorist 
representation in a governmental coalition is usually the next level (for 
example, Hizballah's participation in Lebanon's governmental coalition). 
Ultimately, the two highest levels of integration, which equally indicate the 
organisation's willingness and readiness to become an integral part of the 
state's political system, are forming a government after winning elections (as in 
the case of Hamas's triumph in the Palestinian legislative elections) and 
members' incorporation into institutionalised armed forces (for instance, the 
absorption of Irgun members into the Israel Defence Forces in the late 1940s). 
Once a terrorist organisation has reached the peak of political integration, it 
may decommission its arms and surrender them to the state.  
By political systems, this study is concerned with the organised 
structures of power and authority within a state and their interaction with civil 




link civil society to government, notably political parties. More specifically, a 
political system could be regarded as a pluralist one, yet not necessarily 
democratic in the common Western sense, which manifests sovereignty over a 
territory and people, when it exhibits fragmentation and dispersion of political 
power and so enables organised groups to raise their demands and take part in 
public debate.38 Such a political system provides legitimacy and stable 
procedures, norms, and processes for the achievement of one's objectives. 
Roland Pennock notes that it has the capacity to 'convert power into authority, 
to secure the popular acceptance of its acts as legitimate and to channel order-
threatening struggles for power through the political machine.'39 Therefore, this 
study deals with the integration of terrorist organisations into the 
representative elected bodies that operate within a pluralist political system, in 
order to obtain the ability to 'influence the way in which authoritative decisions 
are formulated and executed for a society.'40 
Political systems that in their nature may be classified as authoritarian 
or totalitarian will not be examined in this study, as they are not 'constrained in 
their ability to deploy military force domestically,' and often they are more 
inclined to 'eradicate insurgent terrorism from below by employing state 
terrorism,' instead of reaching an understanding or a compromise.41 These 
practices characterise regimes that often prohibit the formation of political 
parties, prevent a genuine opportunity for organised groups to voice their 
ideology and use ruthless methods to tackle any form of opposition. This is 
particularly important since generally the common instrument for terrorist 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
38 Miller, Nicholas. "Pluralism and Social Choice", The American Political Science Review (77:3, 
September 1983), pp. 734-747 
39 Pennock, Roland. "Political Development, Political systems, and Political Goods", in 
Kabashima, Ikuo and White, Lynn T (eds.) Political System and Change (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), p. 77 
40 Easton, David. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", in Kabashima and White 
(eds.), p. 24 
41 Art, Robert and Richardson, Louise (eds.) Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the 




integration into politics is the establishment of a political party.42  
In contrast to the inherently violent and revolutionary nature of a 
terrorist organisation, a political party has traditionally been the platform that 
provides the legal means to participate in and to influence the political system, 
win public office, gain control over a government, serve the interests of the 
state and address the needs of the people.43 Indeed, many of the terrorist 
organisations that had some degree of political integration have done so by 
forming political parties to focus their efforts on engaging in a legitimate 
political process to accomplish their long-term objectives.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The electoral victory of Hamas in 2006 is probably one of the most 
recognised examples of terrorist integration into a political system, but it is 
certainly not the only one. Since the 1960s, there have been approximately 40 
cases of terrorist organisations that joined political systems and became 
legitimate actors in their respective political entities (albeit not all of them 
abandoned violence whilst engaged in politics).44 The majority of terrorist 
organisations that integrated into political systems are located in South 
America (the most notable examples are Uruguay's Tupamaros and Colombia's 
M-19). However, some of the other prominent cases are located in the Middle-
East (the Irgun, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Hamas and Hizabllah), 
Europe (various organisations in Northern Ireland and ETA) and the African 
continent (the ANC).45  
Certainly, the raison d'être of terrorist organisations and political parties 
is fundamentally different; while 'parties provide a peaceful way to resolve 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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conflict, terrorist groups represent the opposite, a way of getting what they 
want through the bomb and the gun.'46 Nonetheless, the limited number of 
terrorist organisations turning to politics (as oppose to 154 instances in which 
political parties created, promoted or supported terrorist groups), suggests 
that choosing to participate in institutionalised politics is by no means a natural 
decision, since it challenges the terrorists' revolutionary nature.47 Typically, 
from the perspective of a terrorist organisation, a political system is perceived 
as part of an illegal order and a representative of a hostile regime, which they 
are fighting to replace by undermining its legitimacy. Cynthia Irvin notes that 
members of terrorist organisations who reject political integration often argue 
that involvement in political activity 'only legitimates the institutions of the 
incumbent regime and leads not to victory but to mere reformism.'48  
Despite the existence of various terrorist organisations that had some 
level of integration into political systems, the body of literature dealing with 
this phenomenon has not attracted as much scholarly attention as other 
disciplinary developments (such as the causes of terrorism, the profile of 
terrorists, the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies, etc.). Therefore, to 
provide a satisfactory explanatory framework there is a need to examine 
related factors and processes, through which one can derive relevant insights 
for this study on the reasons for political integration. One process that is often 
linked and can shed light on terrorist integration into political systems is the 
study of how and why terrorism declines and the available alternative paths. 
What follows will examine the converging internal and external processes that 
eventually induce terrorist organisations to consider politics as a substitute or 
a complementary tactic to violence. This proposition is supported by the work 
of Audrey Cronin, who argues that a change in the application of terrorism is 'as 
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much determined by innate factors as by external policies or actors.'49 
The principal rationale for abandoning terrorism is that it has failed as a 
strategy for achieving a particular organisation's objectives. Paul Wilkinson 
notes that 'terrorism is a faulty weapon that often misfires,' and only rarely 
successful in achieving the organisations' strategic goals.50 Martha Crenshaw 
elaborates that 'few organisations actually attain the long-term ideological 
objectives they claim to seek, and therefore one must conclude that terrorism is 
objectively a failure.'51 Consequently, when a terrorist organisation faces a 
strategic junction in which it acknowledges that the use of violence is no longer 
effectively promoting its objectives, other alternatives may come to the fore, 
ranging from abandoning terrorism, disbandment and political 
accommodation. Kevin Siqueira best describes this strategic junction that is 
often followed by a decline in terrorism and preference for a political course: 
At certain times, political movements and organisations must feel 
like they are being confronted with the hard choice of 
determining which type of activities they should stress and 
emphasise the most, the political or the militant.52  
It seems that in the last thirty years, transition to legitimate political 
engagement is more common than disbandment, as it is perceived as a 
substitute strategy to promote the terrorist organisations' ideological and 
political goals. This assertion is supported by a comprehensive research, 
conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2008, which examined how terrorism 
ends and showed that one of the two major reasons why terrorist organisations 
abandon violence is that they view politics as a more effective strategy to 
achieve their objectives. (The second major reason is the use of police and 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
49 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups", 
International Security (31:1, Summer 2006), p. 11 
50 Wilkinson, Paul (2nd ed.) Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 49 
51 Crenshaw, Martha. "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in 
Rapoport, David (ed.) Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass, 1988), p. 15   




intelligence to destroy terrorist organisations).53     
Robert Ross and Ted Gurr examined internal dynamics that led to a 
decline in the level of political terrorism in the US and Canada. They claim that 
whether an organisation embraces a strategy of terrorism or the alternative of 
peaceful means is largely determined by its success or failure in achieving its 
core objectives. In times when a terrorist organisation fails to advance its 
objectives by using violence, it will be more inclined to resort to other means 
that might assist in accomplishing its goals, including political participation. 
They also suggest that the strength of the organisation's military and political 
capabilities – ability to use force and the credibility of their threats, as well as 
the commitment to the cause and the degree of public and political support – 
affect the likelihood of using violence. Finally they offer two organisational 
processes, which they coined as burnout – a decline in members' commitment 
to the organisation and its objectives, resulting in defections, factionalism and 
resistance to the existing leadership, and backlash – loss of public support for 
the terrorist organisation's activity and objectives. These two internal dynamics 
may reduce the operational capability of a terrorist organisation, thus 
damaging its military strength whilst contributing to the possibility of adopting 
alternative means, other than terrorism.54 
Other intrinsic processes that contribute to the decision to participate in 
political systems were offered by Weinberg and Pedahzur. They noted that 
constant need for terrorist organisations to operate in extreme secrecy could 
lead to isolation from the outside world.55 The clandestine nature of terrorist 
activity has negative effects, which essentially prevents the organisation from 
conveying its messages and cuts off its links to the public and access to the 
mass media. Therefore, restoring the terrorists' link to their targeted 
constituencies can be achieved through operating in the political domain that 
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provides legitimacy and strengthens public support.  
Alex Schmid and Jenny de Graaf offer a different approach by 
emphasising that the lack of access to media can in itself lead to increased 
terrorism. They claim that by granting terrorists a legitimate channel of 
communication to publicise their grievances, a state could assist in reducing the 
level of violence and promoting political engagement.56 Political expression is, 
undoubtedly, a vital factor in a terrorist organisation's realisation that its long-
term objectives are better accomplished by forming an overt political wing. In 
doing so, a terrorist organisation can develop a sense of its public standing 
within particular constituency, and to legally raise further funds and recruit 
members.57 Indeed, the ability to take part in elections and opinion polls is 
essential to any organisation, including the political wings of terrorist 
organisations that wish to assess their political power and find new ways of 
gaining more popular support.  
Another process, which is not necessarily internal but rather cross-
organisational, that has an impact on the transition from terrorism into politics, 
is referred to as the "competitive environment" in which terrorist organisations 
operate. According to Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, splintering is a common 
phenomenon among terrorist organisations, and it often occurs when terrorists 
'calculate that they have a better chance of reaching their objectives if they join 
a stronger group or start a new one.'58 In such cases, the new faction could opt 
to use political means to accomplish its ideological objectives, while the older 
may choose to maintain violence as the preferred method. Crenshaw suggests 
that when there is a rivalry between terrorist organisations with similar 
strategies and objectives that compete over resources and the support of the 
same public, a decision to participate in the political arena is more likely.59 
Siqueira describes another type of internal divide in which dissident factions 
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advocate contradictory interests and methods, while still claiming to support 
the organisation's common ideological and strategic objectives. Consequently, a 
political wing is formed to engage in overt activities aimed at mobilising public 
support and enhancing the level of commitment among members and 
sympathisers. The terrorist wing, however, continues to operate clandestinely 
and carry out violent attacks aimed at achieving the organisation's political or 
ideological goals.60  
To complete the various dynamics and processes that contribute to 
terrorist integration into political systems, it is essential to introduce a set of 
important external factors that may drive terrorist organisations to integrate 
into political systems. References to external factors are primarily applied to 
the behaviour and actions of institutionalised entities that operate outside the 
organisational realm and deal with terrorist groups (namely states), and the 
relationship of the international system to the conflict.61 
The supposition that both states and the international system have a 
significant impact on the level of violence has been gaining ground in the past 
decades. Crenshaw suggests that policies implemented by external actors may 
increase the cost or decrease the reward for terrorist organisations, and 
therefore make the use of violence less likely, and indirectly enhance the 
probability of integration into political systems.62 Ganor argues that the 
primary objective of any governmental counter-terrorism policy is often to 
persuade the terrorists to modify their ideology and strategy, thus effectively 
increasing the likelihood of them choosing politics as a platform to advance 
their objectives.63 General Sir Charles Guthrie, former commander of the British 
Army, supports this assertion by stressing that terrorist organisations can be 
tamed by state's policies 'if the proper mix of carrot and stick is judiciously 
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The assumption of external actors' influence is also endorsed by Ross 
and Gurr, who argue that the shift from violence to politics is an outcome of 
terrorists' decisions, which are 'made at least partly in response to changes in 
the larger social and political environment in which they act.'65 More 
specifically, they describe two counter-terrorism strategies that when 
undertaken by legitimate authorities can affect the terrorists' decisions to 
adopt political accommodation. The first is preemption, which actively counters 
terrorists' operational capabilities and denies their possibility to respond (such 
as targeted killings against potential terrorists aimed at thwarting future 
attacks). The second is deterrence, which increases the costs and reduces the 
benefits of terrorist action and renders joining or supporting terrorism highly 
risky (such as tougher anti-terrorism laws which entail more stringent 
penalties).  
Donald Horowitz suggests that in conflict-ridden regions in which 
societies are divided and are saddled by intense feelings of animosity and 
hostility, a state can offer political incentives to accommodate differences that 
go a long way towards reducing the overall level of violence.66 He emphasises 
that the primary aim is not to make people love each other, but to produce 'an 
electoral system that creates some incentives that reward moderation.67 In 
other words, a state that confronts a terrorist organisation can establish 
devices and mechanisms that create incentives and promotes cooperation 
towards political integration, through which terrorist organisations can 
redesign their ideology as well as strategy. 
The notion that integration into political systems has a moderating effect 
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on terrorist organisations has been gaining ground over the last years. Dipak 
Gupta asserts that terrorist organisations that decide to join a democratic 
political process and become mainstream participants may lose their 
motivation for being a revolutionary force.68 Benedetta Berti suggests that once 
terrorist organisations join political systems they become more interested in 
their own preservation and survival and pay less attention to promoting their 
original objectives through violence. As such, participation in a political system 
through a political party 'serves as an "accommodation-seeking tool".'69 Marina 
Ottaway supports this assumption and argues that 'there is ample evidence that 
participation in electoral process forces any party, regardless of ideology, to 
moderate its position if it wants to attract voters in large numbers.'70 Moreover, 
accountability and transparency, not the usual attributes of any terrorist 
organisation, become instrumental in gaining more political power and public 
support. Needless to say, an extremist ideology and the use of violence do not 
go hand-in-hand with such political objectives. Yet, examining examples of 
terrorist organisations taking the road to politics did not provide empirical 
support for the position that political engagement necessarily entails 
moderation, as noted by Neumann.71  
Another type of state behaviour discussed in the literature includes 
presenting amnesty or reduced sentences for repented terrorists, and 
providing them with 'an opportunity to reconstitute themselves as a peaceful 
political party.'72 Franco Ferracuti writes that 'in order to encourage dissent 
within the terrorist group and then defection from it, the state must provide a 
way out,' by offering safe and legitimate place in society 'in exchange for a 
renunciation of terrorism.'73 In addition, Crenshaw notes that offering clemency 
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not only encourages a shift towards legitimate political action, but can also 
create internal discontent and suspicion that may lead to organisational 
disintegration and to contemplating political integration as an option.74 She 
writes that 'the task of the government is to encourage disintegration without 
provoking the escalation of violence,' through a consistently repressive hard-
line policy aimed at damaging the organisation's operational capability and 
undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters. 75 Incidentally, whether 
the government policy is repressive, coercive or lenient, it should be 'offering 
new, non-violent incentives, and increasing opportunities for exit to non-
political methods.'76 
Similarly, in the past decade several states broadened their counter-
terrorism policies to include discussion and dialogue as means to convince 
terrorists, mainly driven by Islamist ideology, to abandon violence. This 
relatively new approach, which often involves rehabilitation or de-
radicalisation initiatives, is aimed at facilitating an exit from terrorist activity 
based either on social and economic assistance or ideological and theological 
re-education.77 According to Rohan Gunaratna, states that adopted these 
measures, primarily in Western Europe, the Middle-East and Asia, invest 
substantial resources in 'building community-based programmes that aim to 
engage indoctrinated extremists and rehabilitate operational terrorists,' hoping 
that they would lead to disengagement from violence.78 Despite the potential 
benefits, ranging from full amnesty, job training and economic subsidies, John 
Horgan and Kurt Braddock emphasise the difficulty of evaluating the success in 
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securing a long-term sustainable disengagement from terrorism.79 Nonetheless, 
community engagement and de-radicalisation measures could, undoubtedly, 
encourage rehabilitated terrorists to lose faith in their militant ideology and 
espouse a more peaceful agenda. 
The polar opposite state behaviour is an aggressive governmental 
response to terrorism that may force the organisation into inactivity and to 
look for a substitute strategy. A suitable alternative that can sustain the 
organisation's survival is the formation of a political wing to pursue its 
ideological objectives through peaceful means. According to Crenshaw, there is 
ample evidence for tough governmental counter-terrorism policy that was 
instrumental in a terrorist organisation's decision to end terrorism and to 
resort to substitute channels.80 On the other hand, there are cases in which lack 
of strong governmental response also resulted in a decline in the level of 
terrorism. For example, preferring lenient and flexible judicial mechanisms that 
offer reduced sentences and facilitate collaboration with the police, instead of 
repressive counter-terrorism measures, can also prove profitable in persuading 
terrorists to adopt peaceful measures.81 Gupta concludes that a state has 
significant influence on terrorists' disengagement from violence, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily. He emphasises that giving up arms through a 
negotiated settlement with the target government may result in 'some sort of a 
direct power-sharing arrangement,' or even in becoming an integral part of a 
democratic political process.82    
Another motivation for integration into political systems may include 
the formation of a new political order, which allows terrorist organisations to 
establish an overt political wing, and to become a certified political actor. A 
newborn democratic system provides several opportunities for terrorist 
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organisations to integrate into the recently consolidated institutions, such as 
joining of the military cadres into the army ranks, and the establishment of a 
political party by the organisation's leadership. However, Brendan O'Leary and 
Andrew Silke argue the opposite, namely that democratic regimes lift some of 
the pressure on terrorist organisations and allow them more freedom to 
organise and operate, and conclude that democratisation 'offers no immediate 
prospects of pacification and may facilitate more evenly matched contests for 
power.'83  
All the above mentioned external processes and dynamics can indirectly 
influence or promote, but not necessarily force, a terrorist organisation's 
decision to integrate into a political system. A different and more 
straightforward alternative is to initiate some level of negotiations with 
terrorist organisations, which can serve as a catalyst for convincing them that 
their objectives are better achieved through legitimate political action. Daniel 
Byman favours this approach by arguing that 'beginning a dialogue with 
terrorists is often a necessary first step on the road toward a political 
settlement and an end to violence.'84 Although talking with terrorists can 
persuade their constituencies to renounce violence and to empower the 
moderates within the organisations, it can also be very risky and is frequently 
counter-productive. Crenshaw asserts that due to the violent nature of 
terrorism and its indirect psychological effects on the public, 'governments may 
thus be more reluctant to enter into negotiated settlements with groups using 
terrorism.'85 Moreover, negotiating with terrorists may grant them legitimacy 
and reward them for their violence. Byman asserts that the 'price of recognition 
might be worthwhile if there was a guarantee of success in the end.'86 Yet, this 
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assurance cannot be provided in advance and the negotiations may backfire. 
In conclusion, despite the growing academic research dedicated to 
understanding the relations between terrorist organisations and the factors 
that influence them in seeking political accommodation, the existing literature 
is still limited. The work of scholars and practitioners has remained focused on 
the reasons for ending violence and the factors that shape the behaviour and 
actions of a terrorist organisation after it joins a political system.87 The purpose 
of this study is to provide insights and contribute to the understanding of the 
internal and external factors, dynamics and circumstances that lead terrorist 
organisations to integrate into political systems.  
    
RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
It has been argued that 'the study of terrorism is often narrowly 
conceived and full of gaps,' and that existing models for its analysis and 
conceptualization are largely inadequate.88 David Brannan criticises this 
theoretical deficiency by observing that terrorism has become 'an enemy to be 
engaged in combat rather than a social phenomenon to be understood.' In his 
view, 'theorizing about terrorism has always been problematic as a 
consequence of the diverse nature of the groups and individuals that are 
categorized as “terrorist.”'89 Peter Neumann and M.L.R Smith are even more 
critical when suggesting that 'the gap in the scholarly literature must be 
addressed urgently because the lack of a theoretical framework in which to 
understand terrorism leads to questionable assertions about its practice.'90  
In face of this epistemological predicament, this research explores three 
specific propositions from the perspectives of terrorist organisations, states 
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that have to deal with them, and the surrounding international system. 
According to Robert Yin, the purpose of propositions of this sort is, on one 
hand, to direct the reader's attention 'to something that should be examined 
within the scope of the study,' and on the other hand to maintain it 'within 
feasible limits.'91 Consequently, the propositions are intended to serve as a 
basis for the development of a theoretical model that would allow scholars and 
practitioners to test future case studies of terrorists' integration into peaceful 
politics, as well as to draw broad generalisations about the characteristics of 
this phenomenon.   
The research propositions encompass a range of factors that 'are not 
arranged in a neat equilateral triangle, but have different effects as 
circumstances vary,' and thus they play different parts in the integration of 
terrorist organisations into political systems.92 As such, while some factors are 
more likely to have an impact on a terrorist organisation, others could relate 
more to states or the international system. The factors employed in this study 
were derived from the terrorism literature and are considered to be the most 
significant pillars in the trilateral relationship between terrorist organisations, 
states and the international system that influence political integration. 
Consequently, they will be explored and their efficacies tested against specific 
case studies. The presence of a single factor will not, by itself, necessarily point 
to an inclination by a group to integrate into a political system, but the presence 
of a number of them will provide a substantive evidence of a potential political 
integration. 
The first proposition refers to terrorist organisations and holds that a set 
of internal factors (separated from other external influences) impact a terrorist 
organisation's actions, judgments and decisions and eventually lead to political 
integration. The factors examined under this perspective are part of any 
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terrorist organisation's DNA and, by and large, determine its outlook towards 
political integration. Accordingly, these factors may well indicate a situation in 
which terrorism is not serving the organisation's purposes anymore, that there 
are better and less costly means in hand, and that the use of violence is 
undermining other vital organisational or ideological interests.93  
The central interlinking factors are the role of violence and the general 
perception of the opponent. These two characteristics, which are manifested in 
the ideology and strategy of the organisation, according to Neumann, can 
illuminate its level of extremism or moderation and the likelihood of its 
participation in existing political institutions.94 For example, if the use of 
terrorism is intended to accomplish specific strategic objectives and is limited 
both in its scope and its choice of targets, this can be viewed as a sympathetic 
world view. Moreover, in cases where a terrorist organisation accepts its 
opponent's right to exist as a legitimate actor, although not its claim for power 
or place in the political order, it would be reasonable to argue that given 
appropriate rewards and assurances political integration is indeed a feasible 
outcome. However, when a terrorist organisation is strongly committed to the 
complete annihilation of its opponent or its expulsion from a certain territory, 
political integration is not likely to take place.    
The next factor is the occurrence of an internal split in the ranks of a 
terrorist organisation. More often than not, ideological and strategic divisions 
within a terrorist organisation takes place and result in a split and the 
formation of a more radical and competing dissident organisation. Lawrence 
Freedman supports this proposition and determines that 'radical movements 
tend to fragment into competing factions,' and disagreements over political 
views or methods 'can quickly be magnified into fundamental differences of 
principle.'95 When an original faction has to distinguish itself from an 
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adventurist splitting group, either to maintain the commitment of members or 
to mobilise more funds and public support, it is likely to endorse different 
methods of action or substitute strategy, which in turn points toward a degree 
of readiness to become a legitimate political actor.96 
The last factor is the level of public support that is provided to a terrorist 
organisation by members of its own constituency and by sympathizers 
worldwide. The material, political and morale support is the life-line for any 
terrorist organisation. Bart Schuurman suggests that in the study of terrorism 
and particularly of terrorist organisations, public support 'can be both a potent 
ally and a deadly foe,' and it can also contribute to the onset and escalation of 
violence or to the termination of hostilities.97 Although it is socially isolated and 
bound to operate in clandestine, without popular support the organisation's 
ability to recruit, raise funds and receive logistical support is significantly 
curtailed.98  
The level of political and material support given to a terrorist 
organisation can affect its position, choice of strategy and goals. Although 
public support can be an outcome of or be influenced by other domestic and 
international factors, it is largely determined by the organisational policy and 
actions intended to mobilise people and promote their interests. Thus loss of 
public support and dwindling resources for the armed campaign may temper 
the actions of a terrorist organisation and presumably lead to an understanding 
that a different approach has to be taken in order to survive as a political 
entity.99 Furthermore, according to Jones and Libicki, it seems that terrorist 
organisations with a 'more-ambivalent support network may be more likely to 
compromise.'100 This assumption is supported by the notion that integration 
into political systems provides not only official recognition for a terrorist 
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organisation, but also broadens its level of support and enables it to mobilise 
parts of the community that had not been involved or aware in the past.101  
There is a wider range of factors that could have an impact on the 
integration of terrorist organistions into political integration (such as the 
nature of the leadership, cultural considerations, duration of the conflict, etc). 
However, the selected factors have been identified by scholars and 
practitioners as the most dominant in the process of terrorist's political 
integration. Therefore, testing them against the case studies can assist in 
determining the scope of their influence. Ultimately, if any influence is to be 
found in any given terrorist organisation, it would be reasonable to conclude 
that, at least from an organisational perspective, it is ready to undergo political 
integration. However, this process is subject to the presence of other factors, 
standing simultaneously or separately, at the state and systemic levels.   
The second proposition relates to the domestic sphere where the 
conflict takes place, in which states (or semi-official sovereign entities) combat 
terrorist organisations. It suggests that their counter-terrorism policy has 
considerable impact on the likelihood of political integration. More specifically, 
the willingness of states to offer non-violent incentives to or negotiate with 
terrorist organisations is instrumental in their decision to integrate into 
legitimate political institutions.  
Essentially, there are three types of policies that a state can implement 
to induce terrorist organisations to take the path of political integration. The 
first policy is to offer incentives, such as reduced prison sentences, clemency 
and financial rewards, to adhere to legitimate political activity. Crenshaw 
explains that using financial, legal or political incentives may convince terrorist 
organisations to adopt peaceful means without forsaking their ultimate goals.102 
The second policy is to bring a terrorist organisation to its knees by 
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employing an unyielding and forceful counter-terrorism policy against it. A 
strong response to terrorism is intended to completely eradicate the terrorist 
threat, to minimise the damage caused by terrorism or to prevent escalation in 
the level of violence.103 To accomplish these goals, states, especially after the 
9/11 attacks, have invested vast resources in strengthening their counter-
terrorism capabilities, both military and legal, hoping that these steps will 
diminish the threat of violence and persuade terrorist organisations to adhere 
to peaceful political activity. However, this repressive approach may prove 
counter-productive and generate a more hard-line terrorist strategy that 
suppresses the organisation's readiness to compromise and consider political 
accommodation.104  
A third policy, which in a way combines the two previous ones, involves 
negotiating with terrorist organisations whilst fighting their violent campaigns, 
which are kept in reserve as a viable option should the talks render futile. This 
policy was famously adopted by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who 
declared that he would 'fight terrorism as if there is no peace process; [and] 
pursue peace as if there is no terrorism.'105 This approach entails a state holding 
talks with terrorists and at the same time executing an aggressive counter-
terrorism strategy against them. According to Joshua Sinai, in doing so a state 
would be setting 'a mix of military and political measures, with the crucial 
component being a political resolution of the conflict's underlying causes.'106 
According to this view, it is not sufficient for a state to deal militarily with the 
terrorist activity and infrastructure, but rather it is necessary to concentrate 
efforts and resources to address the political roots of terrorism as well. William 
Zartman fully supports this notion, and argues that for any state that wishes to 
resolve its terrorist problem, 'the key to handling terror is not simply in 
countering it with effective counter-terrorism tactics but in undercutting it with 
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effective offers that remove its support and its cause.'107 
The last proposition relates to the international system, and asserts that 
events and processes that occur on a global scale affect terrorist considerations, 
calculations and attitude towards a peaceful settlement. This assertion is 
supported by Cronin, who argues that the 'international context directly affects 
the degree to which terrorist campaigns are "ripe" for resolution.'108 The 
systemic influence can be broadly divided into three main sub-categories: (a) 
pivotal events that entail global magnitude and implications on power-politics 
and world order, (b) decline in state sponsorship for terrorist organisations, 
and (c) the involvement of international institutions. 
The first sub-category holds that international events that generate 
overwhelming global implications can, directly and indirectly, give way for 
preferring peaceful settlements over armed struggles. To demonstrate this 
argument one can look at the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks, as 
critical events that positively contributed to terrorists' adoption of political 
action. Contrary to the hostile international environment that dominated the 
Cold War, it is often argued that in the post-Cold War period, 'more conflicts 
ended in negotiated settlements than in the defeat and destruction of the 
violent challenger.'109 Statistical studies from 1999 indicating a significant 
downward trend in the number of terrorist attacks in the post Cold War period, 
strengthen the notion that the end of the Cold War also had a moderating effect 
on terrorists' willingness to use violence.110  
To emphasise the influence of key international events on terrorists' 
approach towards political integration, one can look at the 9/11 attacks as 
another landmark with immense implications. Essentially, the attacks 
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'transformed our understanding of the threats posed by terrorist and 
paramilitary groups,' and had significant impact on the international attitude 
and tolerance towards political violence.111 Although terrorist integration into 
political systems in other contexts may have occurred in any case, the 9/11 
attacks made it far more likely as it 'did much to delegitimise all groups who 
use violence for political purposes,' and eventually led to 'widespread revulsion 
against political violence...[and] pressure to negotiate instead of fighting.'112 The 
9/11 attacks also led to more hard-line counter-terrorism policies employed by 
states. The attacks convinced numerous Western governments that some of the 
terrorists' demands are in effect non-negotiable. Consequently, many 
governments became more aggressive in their dealings with terrorists and 
adopted more interventionist foreign and security policies. Primarily, they have 
increased their counter-terrorism efforts to thwart attacks 'by improving 
intelligence, infiltrating terrorist groups, securing vulnerable points, and 
augmenting antiterrorist forces.'113  
The second sub-category deriving from systemic impact is the decline in 
state sponsorship for terrorist originations. States and terrorist organisations 
enjoy a symbiotic relationship. According to Byman, states use terrorist 
organisations as proxies to serve their strategic interests, and in return 
terrorist organisations enjoy generous ideological, military, financial, logistical 
and diplomatic support.114 Despite the significant changes in international 
power-politics since the early 1990s, state sponsorship 'still plays a major role 
for many terrorist groups today.'115 Nonetheless, after 9/11 the international 
perception of states that directly or indirectly provide any kind of support for 
terrorists changed and they have since become targets of a forceful 
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international effort to fight terrorism. Shortly after 9/11, US President, George 
W. Bush declared that 'From this day forward, any nation that continues to 
harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile 
regime.'116 Evidently, the US, and many of its allies, chose to 'adopt a policy of 
preemption against both state and non-state actors who pose immediate 
threats,' as seen in the military campaigns in the aftermath of 9/11.117 Although 
states that actively and passively sponsor terrorism still exist, chief amongst 
them are Iran, Syria, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the number of such states is 
declining.118 The immediate effect of severing the relations between terrorist 
organisations and their patrons is the realisation that without state-support a 
terrorist organisation is not likely to survive for long unless it chooses an 
alternative course of action. 
The last systemic sub-category is the significant role of international 
institutions or other third-party mediators in encouraging moderation and 
promoting a peaceful settlement to conflicts between terrorist organisations 
and states.119 The focus of this sub-category is primarily, but not exclusively, on 
the UN as the international body responsible for maintaining international 
peace and security. In addition to its recognition as a collectively neutral 
organisation, UN involvement provides a degree of legitimacy to the actors with 
which it is dealing. By operating peacekeeping missions, administering free 
elections, and granting official status to political entities, UN active involvement 
can serve as a crucial catalyst for terrorist political integration. In recent years, 
the UN has held a much more active role in mediation and peacemaking in 
many conflicts, and this trend does not go unnoticed when it comes to its 
influence on the actions and behaviour of terrorist organisations.120 
Additionally, dominant states or international institutions that maintain global 
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interests can play a constructive role in brokering a political settlement with 
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Figure 2: Parameters for analysis of terrorists' political integration  
In conclusion, exploring and analysing the three research propositions 
and the respective case studies will provide a solid theoretical framework to 
describe and explain how and why terrorist organisations decide to integrate 
into political systems (see figure 2). Ultimately, all of them will feed into the 
principal argument that suggests that it is possible to identify terrorist 
organisations that are likely to take part in a legitimate political process, to 
analyse how this transformation might take place, and to suggest the likely 
form it will take.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this research is to explore how and why terrorist 
organisations integrate into political systems, by employing a comparative 
multiple case study approach. Although, there is potential confusion between 
"comparative" and "case study" methods, Alexander George and Andrew 
Bennett, in their seminal work on the use of case studies in social science, stress 
that 'there is growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing 




and cross-case comparisons.'121 Such qualitative method is common in 
contemporary research relating to peace and war studies that aim to 'produce 
casual explanation based on a logically coherent theoretical argument that 
generates testable implications.'122   
To achieve the research objectives, the author will use the levels of 
analysis comparative approach to investigate the observed phenomenon 
through organisational, state and international system standpoints. Originally 
used by Kenneth Waltz as a structural-realist theory to examine and explain the 
nature of world politics from three interdependent, yet different, perspectives: 
the state-system, the state and the individual, this approach offers an analytical 
concept to explore the behaviour of physical or social phenomena through 
looking at both the macro as well as the micro levels.123 This approach can 
provide a broad understanding of terrorist integration into political systems, by 
focusing on several objects of analysis and exploring the links and possible 
interdependence between them.  
To test the central propositions, this research will employ a case study 
design that has become a popular concept used in the social sciences. This 
approach is defined by Colin Robson as a 'strategy for doing research which 
involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence.'124 A case study 
method is based on an in-depth examination from multiple perspectives of a 
phenomenon of scientific interest, to generate, develop or test explanations, 
policies or actions that may be generalised to other events.125 Robert Yin points 
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out that although case study research 'remains one of the most challenging of 
all social science endeavors,' this explicit methodology has the ability to answer 
why and how research questions, as well as the potential to explain or evaluate 
a particular phenomenon.126   
Formulating a research design that involves multiple case studies of 
terrorist organisations that have had different levels of political integration has 
the potential to produce more precise and valid findings that make sense 
beyond a specific case. Such method is well suited to 'make an assessment of 
the comparability of the cases much more systematic and defensible.'127 George 
and Bennett highlight the advantages of the multiple-case studies method in 
testing propositions; amongst them is the high conceptual validity and 
usefulness in examining causal mechanisms in detail.128 Similarly, Yin stresses 
that the 'evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and 
the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust.'129   
   
CASE SELECTION 
The purpose of this study is to make sense of the most dominant factors, 
circumstances and dynamics of how and why terrorist organisations integrate 
into political systems by using comparative multiple case study analysis. 
Despite the apparent strengths of such method, there are several limitations, 
most common of which are selection bias and the challenge of making 
generalisation, which could undermine the validity of any qualitative research, 
and particularly one that deals with terrorist organisations. Weinberg agrees 
that 'generalising about terrorist groups is virtually impossible,' yet he argues 
that by moving from the micro to the macro 'observers lose details but derive 
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benefit from understanding what is usually true about the subject under 
investigation.'130  
To overcome these limitations, George and Bennet assert that the 
chosen cases 'must all be instances of one phenomenon,' and emphasise that 'a 
well-defined research objective and an appropriate research strategy,' should 
guide the selection process and the analysis of the case studies.131 Furthermore, 
Alexander George and Timothy McKeown acknowledge the difficulty in making 
causal inferences in case studies analyses, yet they argue that if 'sensible 
methodological criteria are applied to the performance of cases, the risks 
inherent in such inferences can be reduced to a manageable level.'132 The 
importance of a solid theoretical framework for case selection is also stressed 
by Yin, who argues that when cases have different settings and contexts it is 
necessary to state the conditions under which a particular phenomenon – in 
this case terrorist integration into political systems – is likely to be found.133 
Following the development of precise and specific research 
propositions, three case studies of terrorist organisations which had different 
degrees of political integration were selected. Evidently, there is no agreement 
in the existing literature on the number of cases that should be selected in a 
multiple case study design; rather that they should reflect a 'trade-off between 
the breadth and depth of the case study inquiry.'134 In his latest work, Yin 
explains that selection of three case studies is sufficient for the establishment of 
replication and to providing compelling support for the initial set of the 
propositions.135 Furthermore, the author considers that an in-depth analysis of 
three cases to be a sensible number given the study's word limit and the need 
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to trace common patterns and key factors that explain how and why terrorist 
organisations integrate into political systems.   
The three case studies are, therefore, selected on the basis of the 
presence of the following criteria: 1) no direct influence of one case on another; 
2) not part of the same conflict; 3) different religious, cultural and political 
contexts; 3) variation in the period in time; and 4) different geographical 
location; 5) variation in ideological and strategic objectives; 6) degree of 
political integration; and 7) success in achieving strategic objectives.136 The 
guiding rationale for formulating these criteria is to cover, as widely as 
possible, various independent variables that most effectively reflect different 
cases of terrorist's political integration. In addition to the qualitative criteria, 
the author also took into consideration the access to potential data and amount 
of previous scholarly works as factors that affect the selection of cases.  
From an initial list of approximately 40 incidents of terrorist 
organisation that underwent political integration, only the major ones were 
considered (in terms of the scope of available information) and eventually 
three cases were selected to be presented in greater depth. Although each of 
the three case studies entails its own unique characteristics, the above 
mentioned criteria 'adequately reflect the research objectives and the 
theoretical focus of the study,' and enable to test the research propositions and 
to provide enough commonalities to present a robust set of general principles 
and conclusions.137 On the basis of these criteria, the following case studies had 
been chosen (see figure 3): 
A. The Irgun 
A secular Jewish terrorist organisation that was established in 1937, and 
whose primary ideological objective, to drive out the British forces from 
Palestine and establish an independent Jewish state, was successfully achieved 
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in 1948. Although theoretically there was no longer justification for its 
continued existence, its leaders wished to maintain a separate military wing 
and initially rejected the possibility of political integration. Subsequently, only 
after aggressive response by the newly-created regime, changes in the 
surrounding political framework and international recognition, the Irgun 
agreed to abandon its separatist strategy, to decommission its arms and to form 
a legitimate political party, which years later won the national parliamentary 
elections. 
Perhaps because the Irgun was completely dismantled long ago, and its 
commander during its terrorist days, Menachem Begin, served as Israel's Prime 
Minister between 1977 and 1983, it is often overlooked in the existing 
terrorism literature. Likewise, its contribution to the establishment of the State 
of Israel has been marginalised in the Israeli narrative and collective memory. 
Therefore, there is significant potential merit in investigating a terrorist 
organisation that operated during the time of the Second World War, fought 
against the forces of the British Empire and ultimately continued to promote its 
ideology and objectives exclusively through its political wing.    
B. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)  
A Protestant-loyalist terrorist organisation that was active since the 
1960s and advocated against the unification of Northern Ireland with the 
Republic of Ireland. Although the UVF's stated objective has been successfully 
accomplished with the revival of self-rule in Northern Ireland, the electoral 
success of its political wing was at best marginal. Due to the diminishing public 
in its violent campaign and the determination to remain a vital and constructive 
actor in the Northern Ireland politics, the UVF had no other choice but to 
announce in May 2007, that it will cease to exist as a terrorist organisation, 
store its arms and continue its operations through its political party, thus 
completing its process towards political integration.  
While studies of the violence during the Northern Ireland conflict largely 
focus on the Catholic IRA, an understanding of the strategy and actions of the 




Western Europe, that on one hand supported the UK but on the other was 
equally persecuted by the British security forces as the IRA, a study of the UVF 
could underscore new insights that are relevant for terrorist political 
integration.      
C. Hizballah 
A religious Shiite-Lebanese organisation that was established in 1982 
and nowadays is undoubtedly the most formidable terrorist organisation 
operating in Lebanon and possibly the strongest non-state actor active today. 
The organisation is committed to spreading the Iranian Islamic revolution, 
destruction of Israel and the foundation of an Islamist state in Lebanon. 
Although Hizballah joined Lebanon's political system in 1992 and it serves as a 
legitimate political actor, it still holds independent weapons arsenal and 
continues to be involved in terrorist and military actions. Over the past two 
years the organisation has been heavily involved in the Syrian civil war, which 
has eroded its military and political powers and may impact its future decisions 
and standing in Lebanon. Since Hizballah's power struggle still continues today, 
the scope of this study is limited to the period from the establishment of the 
organisation until the beginning of 2013.   
Certainly Hizballah has been a subject for countless of academic and 
professional writing, mainly due to the magnitude of its terrorist attacks and its 
political and military prowess. However, of the three terrorist organisations 
that were selected as case studies, Hizballah is the only one that is still active 
and that its political integration has yet to be completed. Indeed, Hizballah 
represents a dual-strategy model in which a terrorist organisation chooses to 
advance its interests through agitation in both the political and armed conflict 
arenas. Therefore, a research dealing with terrorist political integration must 
include an in-depth analysis of Hizballah's dual strategy, in order to explore 
why it still maintains a separate armed wing and whether and it is likely to 
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FIGURE 3: CRITERIA FOR CASE SELECTION 
Clearly there are other prominent cases of terrorist integration into 
political systems, most notably are the IRA and Hamas. These organisations 
received extensive publicity in local and international politics, academia and 
media, and due to objective and subjective constraints they will not be 
examined individually in this research. In the case of the IRA, indeed it attracted 
massive scholarly and media attention, and almost every organisational aspect 
of its activity, including its political transformation, has been already explored 
and widely discussed. Therefore, given that the main objective of this research 
is to shed new light over the phenomenon, the IRA will not be explored as a 
separate case study. As for Hamas, it represents a relatively new development 
(since January 2006) and its political integration is still ongoing. Moreover, in 
light of recent events in the Israel-Palestine conflict, namely the latest military 
confrontation between Israel and Hamas and the Palestinian acceptance as a 
non-member state at the UN (both took place in November 2012), as well as the 




2013), it is still premature for Hamas to be evaluated and conclusions to be 
drawn. There is a need for more extended timeframe.  
Additionally, the author is aware of other cases of terrorist integration 
that had different levels of political integration, but would not be discussed in 
this study, each for its own reasons, such as: the Colombian M-19 that 
conducted several violent campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s but in the face of 
dwindling public support and military defeats accepted the government's offer 
and replaced the gun with the ballot box; the Uruguayan Tupamaros that 
transformed from a violent group into a peaceful political party and whose 
members were elected for public office; the powerful ETA that was responsible 
for the deaths of hundreds of people but ultimately decided to use the Spanish 
democratic system to pursue its demand for Basque independence; the 
Palestinian Fatah movement that was committed to the destruction of Israel, 
yet in the 1990s signed a peace treaty with Israel (through its umbrella 
organisation the PLO), which enabled the formation of a Palestinian Authority 
in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; and finally the ANC that carried out 
terrorist attacks through its military wing the "Spear of the Nation" and in the 
post-Apartheid democratic system became South-Africa's ruling party.138  
A comparative multiple case study design also raises the 'question of the 
extent to which the research findings can be generalised to a wider population 
beyond the case study itself.'139 To this end, the author is fully aware that a 
researcher who studies a case in one context 'must resist the temptation to 
make any kind of general claims about its relevance and applicability.'140 Since 
every terrorist organisation that would be explored in this study operates in 
different historical, geographical, social, cultural and political circumstances, it 
is clear that lessons learned from one complex and protracted conflict cannot 
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be deployed in their entirety to another.141 In general, it is difficult to argue that 
one terrorist organisation can be representative of another. Therefore, the 
purpose of the study is to examine three case studies and formulate analytic 
generalisations to establish a logical understanding of the process that might be 
applicable to other terrorist organisations.142 Jack Levy supports this objective 
and asserts that there is a growing consensus among qualitative researchers 
that the case study approach incorporates multiple and complementary 
methods and therefore serves as a primary vehicle 'for constructing and 
supporting broader theoretical generalisations.'143     
In particular, the author is aware that two of the selected case studies 
are involved in conflicts in which Israel has some part of, and this may raise, 
again, the issue of generalisation. However, a wider look reveals that the 
organisational and international contexts, as well as the ideologies and 
objectives are fundamentally different and that in each case Israel had 
employed a different counter-terrorism approach.144 More specifically, in the 
case of the Irgun, Israel was not yet an official state but a mandate and the 
Irgun's main protagonist was the UK; regarding Hizballah, Israel consistently 
implemented an aggressive counter-terrorism policy, although at times it held 
tactical negotiations with the Lebanese terrorist organisation. 
Overall, this study cannot claim to present a universal analysis of every 
terrorist organisation's integration into political systems, but it does seek to 
identify the dominant patters and common conditions that may lead to such an 
outcome. To that end, the selection of case studies is 'guided not by their 
representativeness of some wider group, but for their potential to contribute 
information in their own right: their ability to provoke new insights, 
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understandings, connections and explanations.'145 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
This study bases its findings on both traditional literary research as well 
as electronic sources, in order to have a complete overview of the available 
scholarship on the topic. The variety of sources, that includes both primary 
texts such as archival material, official documents, and intelligence reports, 
together with secondary sources, provide an insight that has not been 
presented in a similar fashion. A wide range of sources, almost entirely but not 
exclusively in English and Hebrew, is used to establish solid research 
propositions. The majority of the sources are either institutional or 
documentary, mostly books, journal articles, reports and other material 
produced by mass media. Occasionally, primary sources, such as personal 
documents (diaries, memoirs, letters and autobiographies), as well as 
governmental and other official texts, will be also examined. Distinctively, in 
researching and analysing the case studies, the author will use primarily 
archival material, memoranda, newspapers, biographies and original texts 
published by terrorist organisations, governmental and institutional reports. 
Another significant primary data collection measure employed is 
individual interviews with members in the observed terrorist organisations or 
state officials that dealt with them. This method enables researchers 'to see the 
world through their [the interviewees] eyes,' and to better understand 
processes and events from a personal account.146 The conduct of interviews is a 
supplementary research technique, intended to test the research propositions 
and to provide greater data through personal reflections and perspectives on 
issues that previously did not receive sufficient emphasis. The interviews were 
timed and designed as unstructured and informal sessions to create an open 
and relaxing environment. Furthermore, all interviews were audio-taped and 
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could be later transcribed for accurate quotation purposes.  
As for the ethical considerations, the research has been conducted in 
accordance with the ethical principles of King's College Research Ethics 
Committee (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/ethics/crec/) and the rights of the 
interviewees and their anonymity are fully protected. Their names will not be 
disclosed unless previously approved by the individual participants. All 
interviewees have been asked to sign a standard consent form that legally 
serves as contract, ensuring their rights and the author's ethical responsibility.   
 
LIMITATIONS  
Throughout this study there are four primary limitations; three 
objective and one subjective, which pertain to the validity of the research. The 
objective limitations relate to the wealth of written sources, access to and 
availability of interviewees and language barrier. As discussed earlier, despite 
the breadth of literature written on terrorism issues, the specific phenomenon 
in the heart of this study is surprisingly under-researched. As such, not all 
information has been disclosed and some aspects and processes have not yet 
been discussed. Moreover, the author is consciously aware of the fact that his 
nationality served as an obstacle in gaining access to relevant locations such as 
Lebanon. The challenge of access to data sources and availability of 
interviewees is accurately described by Cronin:  
Conducting primary research on contemporary terrorist groups is 
difficult because making contacts with operatives or their targets 
can be dangerous for both the researchers and their contacts. In 
addition, governments may restrict access to relevant written 
sources.147 
In addition, a case study analysis of Hizballah requires at least some 
reference to Arabic sources. However, the author has access to primary 
sources, such as governmental databases and personal documents that 
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compensate for the territorial access and bridge the information gap.     
The subjective limitation is linked with the Jewish background and 
Israeli perspectives instilled in the author, specifically with regards to Hizballah 
which is committed, at least rhetorically, to the destruction of Israel. In order to 
achieve greater validity and to minimise the damage of biased views, 
particularly in interviews, special attention was given to the formulation of 
clear questions through pilot testing of the research tools, in order to minimise 
the possibility that they will serve to support the author's preconceived 
conceptions and notions.148 Indeed, the author is fully aware of the problem of 
subjectivity, and although not much can be done to neutralise it, the study will 
uphold, as much as possible, an unbiased and balanced approach. Ultimately, 
the author believes that no research can be entirely objective, and that readers 
should take this into account.   
 
RESEARCH OUTLINE 
This study is structured with two parts; a thorough examination of the 
three underlying propositions followed by case studies review. This combined 
method was primarily chosen because of previously under-researched issues 
related to the subject of analysis, and the need to uncover new data and 
conclusions from existing and relevant models. Furthermore, to substantiate 
the findings, the study includes interviews with figures representing both the 
examined terrorist organisations and states, who either played an active role or 
influenced terrorist integration into political systems.  
The research will comprise a total of five chapters – one introductory, 
three substantive case analyses and finally a concluding chapter. Following the 
first introductory chapter that outlines the conceptual framework and the 
research methodologies to be used throughout the study, chapters two to four 
provide an in-depth analysis of three distinct case studies aimed at testing the 
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research formulated propositions. These chapters assist in understanding the 
organisational, domestic and international processes and dynamics, and the 
way they affect terrorist organisations' decisions to integrate into political 
systems. The concluding chapter synthesise the findings and identifies the 
factors that could be used as a guide for discerning future terrorist's political 




CHAPTER 2: THE IRGUN 
The Irgun, the principal Jewish terrorist organisation was 
active in Palestine during the 1930s and 1940s, and officially 
disbanded four months after the creation of the State of Israel 
in May 1948.149 Despite the fact that a sovereign Jewish state 
had been established, and thus the Irgun’s primary objective 
achieved, it was not at all clear after Israel’s independence that the group would 
be dissolved—after all, goes the aphorism, terrorist organisations 'are often 
more difficult to dismantle than construct.'150 Indeed, some elements in the 
Irgun wished to maintain its political status as well as its autonomous military 
capabilities and refused to decommission, even after Israel was established as a 
democratic state.151  
The final stage in the progressive process during which the Irgun 
decided to abandon its violent strategy in favour of peaceful settlement was a 
violent clash, known as the Altalena incident, in June 1948 that led the Jewish 
community to the brink of civil war. After this momentous event, the Irgun was 
forced to end its independent military operations, to yield its arms to the 
incumbent government and to incorporate its separate units into the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF). Furthermore, the Irgun formed a legitimate political wing 
that participated in the first legislative elections under the new democratic 
regime and won 14 out of 120 seats. In May 1977, twenty-nine years after the 
Irgun ceased its violent operations, its party won the parliamentary elections 
and the leader, Menachem Begin, was appointed as Prime Minister of Israel; the 
transition from underground violence to legitimate political activity was 
completed.   
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For nearly two decades the Irgun dealt with three different protagonists: 
the British mandatory administration in Palestine,152 the official Jewish 
institutions commonly represented by the Jewish Agency,153 and the 
Palestinian-Arab militants that perpetrated terrorist attacks against Jews; each 
was perceived and treated differently. The mandatory administration was seen 
as a temporary enemy separated from the British Government and public as a 
whole. Distinctively, the official Jewish authorities were largely seen as political 
rivals but at times also as partners. In contrast to the attacks on the British, 
violence against the Jewish authorities and their affiliated organisations was 
strictly forbidden despite the ideological and strategic disagreements. 
Palestinian Arabs were perceived as a permanent enemy, and when the armed 
campaign against the mandatory administration was temporarily frozen, 
attacks against Arabs continued at full pace. All together, the multiple actors 
that the Irgun had to deal with simultaneously made the transition from 
violence to politics more complicated.  
 
THE IRGUN – ALTERNATIVE AND OPPOSITION 
Before delving into the Irgun's transition from violence to legitimate 
politics, it is essential to provide a brief description of the ideology and 
historical background, leading to its February 1944 declaration of revolt 
against the British mandatory administration (see map 1). 
The Irgun was the outcome of ideological and strategic disagreements 
within the Jewish community in Palestine, mainly over the appropriate 
response to Arab violence. In 1931 a group of commanders in the Jewish semi-
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military organisation, the "Haganah",154 that opposed the powerlessness in 
response to the Arab riots in 1929, decided to form a new militarist 
organisation, the Irgun, to protect Jews against Arab violence and to promote 
the establishment of "Greater Israel" – an independent Jewish state on both 
sides of the Jordan River.155 The political thinking of the Irgun rejected 
territorial minimalism and advocated militant operations for instantaneous 
solutions.156  
 The Irgun's underlying ideological conception was active Zionism,157 
calling for Jews to take destiny into their own hands by fighting for their rights 
and creating for themselves the conditions necessary for the re-establishment 
of their homeland. This philosophy was applied specifically to the situation in 
Palestine 'where we [Jews] face the entire world and demand our rights. No one 
can defend his rights unless he himself believes that this right is invincible.'158 
This proactive notion was in stark contrast to the Jewish Agency's belief that 
the creation of homeland for the Jews, as stipulated in the 1917 "Balfour 
Declaration",159 could only be realised by a policy of self-restraint against Arab 
violence and maintaining good relations with the British Government in 
London.160  
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Map 1: British Mandate of Palestine (1923) 
The Irgun's Supreme Commander and main Revisionist ideologue, Ze'ev 
Jabotinsky,161 challenged the political wisdom of the official non-retaliation 
policy and encouraged the formation of a Hebrew military that would protect 
Jewish life and property.162 He also established a new Zionist youth movement 
in Europe, "Betar", to serve as an educational platform for creating a new type 
of a Jewish archetype – self-reliant, disciplined, and powerful – in contrast to 
his characterisation of the "ghetto Jews" of European Diaspora who were seen 
as weak, diffident, and submissive. "Betar" would later become a source of 
future immigrants to Palestine and new recruits for the Irgun.163 Indeed, in 
criticising the passiveness of the recognised Jewish institutions and calling for 
active operations, Jabotinsky offered a viable – albeit more aggressive—
opposition political ideology.  
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Until the outbreak of World War II, the Irgun and the official Jewish 
bodies assumed that the British Government would fulfil its promise to 
establish a Jewish national home. Therefore, they were mostly preoccupied 
with Arab violence and assisting Jewish immigrants to safely reach the shores 
of Palestine. However, due to the eruption of the 1936 Arab Revolt in Palestine 
as well as events in Europe that ultimately led to a world war in September 
1939, Britain decided to adopt a pro-Arab policy to appeal to the large Muslim 
population in the Middle-East. The new policy that was published in a 1939 
"White Paper" included anti-Jewish measures, such as limited land purchase by 
Jews and severe restriction on Jewish immigration into Palestine.164 The "White 
Paper" restrictions, which were compared by the Irgun to the Nuremberg Laws 
imposed on Jews by the Nazi regime in 1935, resulted in the imprisonment or 
deportation of thousands of Jews who escaped Europe and were caught by the 
British authorities.165  Subsequently, many Palestinian Jews felt that the British 
political and moral commitment in support of the Zionist cause had been dealt a 
devastating blow.166 In response, the Irgun decided to adopt a more militant 
attitude towards the mandatory administration that, for the time being, was 
mainly non-violent and included demonstrations, strikes and illegal 
immigration. 
Although both the Jewish Agency and the Irgun were publicly committed 
to defending the infringed Jewish rights, the beginning of WWII and Britain's 
declaration of war against Germany, presented the Jewish community with a 
deep conflict. On one hand, it was steadfast in helping those who escaped 
Europe to enter Palestine by evading the British restrictions. On the other hand, 
it reasoned that fighting the British would indirectly assist the Nazi military 
effort, thus threatening Jewish hopes for a homeland in Palestine. Days after the 
beginning of WWII and intense deliberations, the Jewish Agency announced 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
164 The 1939 White Paper limited Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 people over the 
next five years. After that, the quota would depend upon Arab approval. 
165 JIA K4-1.2, 28/2/1940  





that Palestinian Jews will stand by Britain in its war against Nazi Germany. It 
also decided in favour of cooperation with Britain against the common enemy, 
announced a complete cessation of all Jewish resistance and recruited Jewish 
soldiers to fight alongside the British army in Europe.167  
Irgun leaders were confronted with a similar dilemma; they felt that 
supporting the British effectively recognised the "White Paper's" restrictions 
and betrayed the organisation's defining objective. Nevertheless, Jabotinsky 
decided to back Britain in its efforts to stop the German advance. The rationale 
behind his decision was 'the nature of the Nazi enemy that left the Jewish 
people no choice in the Second World War,' thus the Irgun 'had to be on the side 
of whoever was fighting Hitler.'168 Consequently, on 9 September 1939, the 
Irgun issued its own statement that read: 'In order not to interfere with the war 
against Germany and to devote as many forces as possible to help England and 
its allies, the Irgun has decided to stop its offensive actions in Palestine.'169  
The Irgun's cooperation with Britain, despite the fact that immigration 
and land purchase restrictions were still in effect, was not merely a rhetorical 
statement – it was translated into actions when 3,500 Irgun members joined 
the British army.170 The Irgun commander at that time, David Raziel, at the 
request of the British military command, even led a sabotage and intelligence-
gathering mission against the pro-Nazi elements in Iraq.171 The Irgun's 
realisation that it would be 'mad to oppose Hitler's most effective enemy,' is a 
prime illustration of its rational and pragmatist perspectives.172  
Since the cessation of the armed struggle against the British rule in 
Palestine the Irgun had fallen into disarray. The calculated decision inflicted 
dire consequences on the Irgun's political stature, public image and operational 
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capability. Binyamin Eliav, a senior Irgun activist, wrote that apart from Raziel's 
mission in Iraq, the British authorities assumed that the Irgun ceased to exist 
since it was no longer operational.173 Samuel Katz, the Irgun's spokesperson 
and member of its High Command, admits that although choosing to support 
Britain was the right thing to do under the circumstances, it 'was the central 
source of our political weakness and of our sustained political defeats during 
the war.'174 Despite the Irgun's grim situation, the truce was firmly kept and no 
violent attacks were perpetrated against British personnel between September 
1939 and February 1944. 
  The first evidence of the Nazi systematic extermination of European 
Jewry reached Palestine in late 1943. Although it was clear that Germany's 
defeat was just a matter of time, the British Government refused to revoke the 
immigration restrictions desperately needed to save the Jewish people. 
Consequently, the Irgun's ranks began to show their discontent from the 
decision to side with Britain. In December 1943, a new Irgun High Command 
headed by Menachem Begin was formed. Although Begin had no formal military 
training, Bruce Hoffman argues that he:  
...possessed an uncanny analytical ability to cut right to the heart 
of an issue and an intuitive sense about the interplay of violence, 
politics and propaganda that ideally qualified him to lead a 
terrorist organisation.175 
 Under Begin's leadership, the Irgun decided to break the temporary 
solidarity with the Jewish Agency and to re-establish its independence and 
more confrontational posture vis-à-vis the mainstream Jewish community. On 1 
February 1944, the armistice with Britain ended when the Irgun officially 
declared a revolt against the mandatory administration stating that:  
There can no longer be a truce between the Hebrew nation…and 
the British administration of Eretz Israel, which is betraying our 
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brethren to Hitler. Our nation will fight this regime, fight to the 
end! Every Jew in our homeland will fight!176  
In his memoirs, Begin explained that the circumstances leading to the 
revolt were the Holocaust and the continuing British anti-Jewish policy 'coming 
simultaneously and in their very coincidence threatening to strangle the hopes 
of Israel and utterly to destroy the Jewish people – determined the moment for 
its outbreak.'177 In ordering an armed campaign against the British presence in 
Palestine, Begin calculated that the mandatory administration would be 'forced 
to negotiate with the rebels and to transfer the country to "its Hebrew 
owners".'178 Subsequently, shortly after the revolt declaration the Irgun carried 
out terrorist and guerrilla attacks against British civilian and military 
infrastructures in Palestine, inflicting numerous casualties.  
The armed campaign provoked anger and animosity towards the Irgun 
among the official Jewish institutions, fearing that it would gravely damage 
both the relations with the British Government and the Zionist cause. The 
British had their own reasons to oppose the revolt, as they were concerned that 
the Irgun's violence could spark a much larger Jewish rebellion. Therefore, by 
February 1944 the Irgun faced two formidable powers; both the Jewish Agency, 
via its military wing the Haganah, and the British Empire, who were willing to 
do whatever was necessary to destroy it, employing either negotiations or 
coercive measures. 
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ROLE OF VIOLENCE 
In correlation with the Irgun's activism and militancy, violence was to 
become a central method in accomplishing the principal objectives that were 
described in details in the "Commander's Briefcase"; an authoritative 
guidebook for every commander that portrays the organisation's ideological 
objectives: the return of the Jewish people to its homeland, the creation of an 
independent and sovereign Jewish state, and the establishment of a Hebrew 
regime that upholds civil rights and social justice.179 According to this raison 
d'être, the Irgun saw violence as instrumental and the most effective way to 
achieve its objectives. The Irgun embraced violence so strongly because of its 
utility, but at the same time, the organisation was ready to abandon violence if 
it ceased to advance its objectives. This pragmatic nature is much-needed for a 
terrorist organisation to renounce violence and adopt legal political activity. 
The ideological source for the use of violence appears in the second 
chapter of the "Commander's Briefcase" that deals with the Irgun's strategy and 
provides the justification for violence: 
We realised that the only way to liberate our country is with a 
sword…there is no other way but liberation war…a national 
liberation war is a just war, conducted by an oppressed people 
against foreign occupier that has enslaved it and its country…the 
Irgun is the liberation army of the people of Israel.180 
Clearly, the Irgun's ideology legitimised violent operations against the 
British mandate, targeting not only its symbols of governance but also non-
military infrastructure and civilians. Shlomo Lev-Ami, former deputy 
commander of the Irgun who was interviewed for this research, believes that 
'human beings were neither created to kill nor to be killed,' but since the British 
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repression was arbitrary the 'Irgun had no other choice than to respond 
violently to defend the Jewish community.'181  
The willingness to use violence by itself is not indicative of any 
prospects for political integration. However, contrary to other modern terrorist 
organisations, the Irgun's attitude towards violence reveals a great deal of 
moral reservations and self-restraint that was typical in its operations.  
When it was required to address the issue of using violence against 
civilians, the Irgun published numerous broadsheets aimed at convincing the 
Jewish community and the international public opinion that its members are 
not terrorists. One of them read: 'We are not terrorists; we are workers, 
farmers, students, doctors, lawyers; our belief is Zion and our way is war but 
not killing; human life is sacred for us.'182 Lev-Ami recalls that although some 
members advocated extreme measures, he imposed moral boundaries that 
strictly prohibited deliberate killing of civilians, to distinguish the Irgun from 
other revolutionary organisations: 'we risked our lives but we did not target 
civilians…for the world to accept us and not interfering by declaring a total war 
against us it was necessary to act as true idealists.'183  
In the "Commander's Briefcase", an entire chapter is dedicated to the 
personal virtues required from Irgun members. Amongst them are nobility and 
courtesy, generosity, integrity and incorruptibility, courage, self-sacrifice and 
respect.184 Also, in order to avoid random fire-fights and clashes with British 
forces, in which civilians might accidentally get hurt, Irgun members were 
forbidden to carry personal weapons unless in operational roles.185 The Irgun's 
distinctive moral thinking illustrates that it appreciated the gravity of the 
decision to employ violence to achieve its ends, and when there was a risk of 
innocent casualties its members did their best to avoid them. Katz points out 
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that 'one of the basic rules of Irgun operations was to avoid bloodshed 
wherever possible. This was fundamental to the timing and tactic of every 
operation.'186 Begin also explained the Irgun's view on killing civilians: 'We did 
not want to hurt one living soul. The ethics of the Irgun demanded every 
possible precaution to prevent civilian casualties.'187 Accordingly, he ordered 
his men to make every effort to ensure that the number of casualties would be 
minimal, and instructed to issue advanced warnings. His guiding rationale was 
that the evacuation of the British administration following the warning would 
send the message that the Irgun's goal was not to kill British soldiers or 
civilians but to gain independence.188  
As shown above, the Irgun openly advocated violence but at the same 
time it also went to great lengths to preserve the public image of a virtuous and 
responsible organisation. Yet, it differentiated between British nationals and 
the general Arab population in Palestine; while against the former the main 
method was guerrilla warfare, the only method against the latter was 
terrorism. Evidently, the Irgun did make genuine efforts to avoid British civilian 
casualties; however it did not make any such efforts with regard to targeting 
Arab civilian casualties. The Irgun used terrorist tactics to inflict dozens of 
casualties among Palestinian Arabs; it threw bombs into their markets, coffee 
shops and restaurants, raided Arab villages and ambushed their public 
transportation.189  
Through its actions, the Irgun demonstrated that it was in effect a 
terrorist organisation and regardless of the victim's nationality or motives, by 
targeting civilians it had crossed the normative threshold between terrorism 
and other types of political violence. Although Irgun senior commanders who 
were interviewed for this research strongly rejected this inference and argued 
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that the innocent casualties inflicted as a result of Irgun's operations were 
unintentional and regretful, they reluctantly admitted that it was hard to avoid 
the killing of civilians, whether British nationals or Arabs, when targeting train 
stations, immigration offices, restaurants and other non-military targets.  
Ironically, the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on 22 July 
1946, that accounts for the Irgun's deadliest terrorist attack in which 91 people 
were killed and another 476 were injured, is also the best example for its 
reserved attitude towards violence. Originally the operation was intended 
against the mandatory headquarters that resided in the southwest section, 
while the remainder continued to function as a hotel. It would be difficult to 
argue that those who devised the attack realistically thought that there would 
be no casualties, yet historical evidence shows that the Irgun was concerned 
with the chance of innocents being at the wrong place and time. There are 
numerous accounts detailing the extensive efforts of the Irgun to warn the 
British and to save the lives of the people inside and outside the hotel.190 The 
official British investigation of the attack concluded that warnings were indeed 
issued by the Irgun, but they were either given minutes before or after the 
explosions, leaving no time to evacuate the hotel.191 In any event, Irgun 
warnings went unnoticed and no action was taken based upon them. 
Ultimately, the explosion cost the lives of British, Jews and Arabs alike and 
following the high death toll and the heavy damage, many believed that the 
attack shattered the 'last hopes of attaining some measure of reconciliation 
between Britain and Palestinian Jews.'192 
The Irgun's post-explosion behaviour further supports its stated respect 
for the value of human life and reticent attitude towards the employment of 
violent tactics. Seeing the massive carnage caused by the attack, Begin 
expressed his sadness for the innocent lives taken by the bombing and stated 
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that 'our satisfaction at the success of the great operation was bitterly marred. 
Again we went through days of pain and nights of sorrow for the blood that 
need not have been shed.'193 Katz adds that 'the effects of the damaging blow 
we had dealt the British were overshadowed by the tragedy.'194 In today's 
world, in which terrorist organisations take pride in their violence and refuse 
to denounce the killing of civilians, Begin's and Katz's confessions stand as 
illustrations of genuine grief. Another indication of the Irgun's hesitancy 
towards the use of violence is the fact that during the revolt it 'avoided attacks 
against installations required for the war against Nazi Germany, concentrating 
its attacks directly against British rule in the country.'195 The selectiveness in 
choosing the targets was also a feature of Begin's limited approach towards the 
use of violence, that reflected the Irgun's reasoning and pragmatic adaptation 
to real-time events and circumstances. Nonetheless, it should be emphasised, 
that despite the Irgun's compunctions when inflicting casualties among British 
citizens, targeting the Arab citizens of Palestine was not treated with the same 
humane attitude.   
  
PERCEPTION OF THE OPPONENT 
Although the Irgun perceived the British mandatory administration as 
an existential yet temporary enemy, it lacked the revolutionary element that 
often characterises terrorist organisations. While it wished to prompt British 
withdrawal from Palestine and permitted the use of violence to achieve this 
objective, the Irgun did not seek to change the existing Jewish political order 
and accepted the leading role of the recognised bodies in the politics of Jewish 
Palestine.  
Evidently, the Irgun's central objective was the establishment of an 
independent Jewish state, but equally important was to prevent deterioration 
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into civil war in the process of achieving the end-goal. The risk of a full-scale 
war between the rival Jewish factions was always the greatest fear, and 'from 
beginning to the end, the Irgun exerted itself to avoid such a conflict.'196 In an 
interview with the author, Yehiel Kadishai, Begin's Chief of Staff both as 
commander of the Irgun and later as Prime Minister of Israel, notes that the 
Irgun understood that hostility and enmity could threaten the national unity 
within the Jewish community and jeopardise the accomplishment of the 
common objective. Therefore, it went to the greatest lengths to maintain a unity 
and avoid internal strife.197 Moreover, the Irgun refused to incite against or 
spread hatred towards the Jewish Agency or the Haganah; on the contrary, the 
Irgun treated its political opponents with respect. Lev-Ami rhetorically asks 
how he can hate the official Jewish institutions and Haganah members, whom 
he saw 'as Jews like us that because of misguided education held a twisted 
perception of Zionism and followed a different leadership.'198  
 However, the Jewish Agency often did not share the same view as the 
Irgun, and questioned the authenticity of its lack of desire for political power 
and insistence on maintaining unity. Following the 1944 revolt declaration, 
David Ben-Gurion, head of the Jewish Agency, decided to utilize the escalation 
to isolate and destroy the Irgun as a political force, and thus announced a 
military campaign, known as  the "Hunting Season", 'to liquidate the Irgun and 
its supporters.'199 Leading commanders in the Haganah, amongst them Moshe 
Dayan (who later served as IDF supreme commander and Israel's distinguished 
Minister of Defence), rushed to Begin to convince him to forsake the revolt. 
Dayan told Begin that the Irgun attained an historical achievement by 
successfully proving that the British were vulnerable, but argued that it is now 
the time to stop its terrorist activity. Begin replied that since there was still no 
Jewish state at sight, nothing had changed and he rejected Dayan's offer.200 In 
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October 1944, days before authorising the persecution against Irgun 
operatives, the commander of the Haganah's national headquarters, Moshe 
Sneh, was sent by Ben-Gurion to a secret meeting with Begin in a last attempt to 
persuade him to stop the Irgun's revolt. In the minutes of their meeting, that 
were confidential until recently, Sneh reveals that Begin admitted that the Irgun 
had neither leadership aspirations to rule the Jewish community nor intention 
to change the existing political order.201 Begin later confessed that after 
Jabotinsky's death the Irgun was 'prepared at any moment to accept the 
discipline of Ben-Gurion if he would take the lead in the struggle for national 
liberation.'202 Nonetheless, Begin rejected Sneh's request claiming that 'our 
people is under foreign rule and there can be only one policy for an oppressed 
people: a struggle for liberation.'203  
For a terrorist organisation to acknowledge its political opponent's 
leadership and authority and agree to being placed under his command is, by 
all means, an unusual standpoint. Therefore, Begin's acceptance of Ben-
Gurion's supremacy and statement that the Irgun had no political aspirations 
whatsoever should not be disregarded when analysing the Irgun's political 
integration. Begin explained the logic of his decision: 
We dissented in order to fight for our people, not in order to rule 
them…Good or bad, justified or mistaken, the fact is that 
throughout our underground struggle we did not think of power 
nor strive for it, and in our hearts we agreed that with the victory 
of the revolt and the liquidation of foreign rule, the government of 
our country should be taken over by the official leadership.204  
Typically, in recognising the authority of the Jewish Agency, Begin was often 
accused by his sympathisers of handing Ben-Gurion a free-pass to power. 
However, Irgun leaders knew perfectly well that, as Katz comments, 'the 
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alternative was a fraternal bloodbath which might destroy the hope of any 
Jewish state at all.'205  
By October 1944, the Irgun's High Command stood before a critical 
crossroad – a resolution to violently oppose the Haganah's imminent 
operations could have resulted in an internal war, but a decision to hold back 
carried a risk that the Irgun would be rendered irrelevant and dissolved. 
Among the Irgun ranks there was a strong demand to retaliate, but Begin, loyal 
to his conviction that Jewish bloodshed must be prevented at all costs, ordered 
against responding to the "Hunting Season". He insisted on showing restraint 
and published an article in the Irgun's bulletin "Freedom", that stated: 'In this 
country there will be no war of Jew against Jew!...We did not insult rival 
institutions and persons. We did not disrespect achievements of others nor did 
we attack Jewish bodies.'206 Katz notes that Begin profoundly believed that 'the 
prospect of fighting in unity, with an accelerated march to freedom, demanded 
that the Irgun should now suffer and wait.'207 In his decision, Begin 
demonstrated that in order to protect the Jewish community from deteriorating 
into a civil war, to maintain unity and to prevent a violent power-struggle, he 
was willing to sacrifice not only the lives of Irgun members, but also its 
existence.  
Although the Irgun was the second largest political movement with a 
strong armed wing, it had practical aspirations neither to oust the leaders of the 
governing Jewish institutions nor to control them. Apparently, the Irgun was 
aware of its place in the existing political order in the Jewish community and 
the division of power between the main parties. Furthermore, the Irgun's 
recognition that it simply 'did not have the power and public support to rule the 
Jewish community,' reflects its pragmatic view and willingness to reach a 
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political compromise that would enable it to become a legitimate actor in the 
Jewish political system.208  
 
SPLIT IN THE RANKS 
Shortly after the outbreak of WWII internal divisions arose regarding 
the Irgun's ideology, strategy, and extent of their success. In the ensuing 
debates Avraham Stern, a charismatic military commander who could not 
conform to the Irgun's compliance with the continuing British presence in 
Palestine, held a simplistic but convincing view that the entire British Empire 
was the foremost enemy of the Jewish people, whose future would be decided 
by the struggle for independence in Palestine.209 In the summer of 1940, Stern 
was able to persuade the majority of the Irgun senior cadre to split off and to 
establish the more militant Lehi (that was more commonly known as the Stern 
Gang).210 Naturally, the formation of Lehi as a competing dissident organisation 
had significant implications on the Irgun's policy and behaviour.  
The new radical Lehi strongly rejected the Irgun's truce with the British, 
that in its view effectively meant a cessation of the Jewish fight for 
independence, and it pursued an almost messianic passion that justified 
murder and other violent tactics. This passion was best articulated by Lehi's 
last commander (and future Israeli Prime Minister), Yitzhak Shamir: 'a man 
who goes forth to take the life of another whom he does not know must believe 
only one thing - that by his act he will change the course of history.'211 The 
extremist outlook and the conviction that Britain was the archenemy of the 
Jews, resulted in Lehi's split not only from the Irgun and the Revisionist 
movement but also from the mainstream Jewish community as a whole.212 
Indeed, in a world dominated by realpolitik, Lehi's "sacred" objective even 
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justified approaching Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in an attempt to set up 
cooperation with the Axis States against Britain in return for recognition of a 
Jewish state.213  
Inspired by its radical ideology, Lehi did not feel bound by the Irgun's 
self-imposed moral and political restrictions to avoid unnecessary casualties 
when using violence. Since it primarily targeted highly placed British officials, 
Lehi members were once described as 'lacking even a spark of humanity and 
Jewish conscience.'214 John Bowyer Bell, the American historian who 
specialized in the Irgun, further describes Lehi's terrorists as 'men without a 
state who fought across conventional territorial boundaries to transform by 
violence existing national structures.'215 The radical image of its members and 
the unbounded strategy led to the belief that Lehi was 'the most violent and 
unrestrained terrorist organization of the modern era.'216 Pinchas Ginosar, 
senior Lehi officer, admitted that it was invariably more extreme than the Irgun 
and adamantly refused to accept any political compromise with Britain.217 
The Lehi also publicly belittled the Irgun and 'nourished an 
understandable resentment at the scope of the Irgun operations,' that, by any 
standards, did not match its potential capabilities.218 A senior Lehi commander 
added that 'the Irgun were only attacking buildings. And we were laughing at 
them…We thought it more effective to aim at the lives of the British.'219 As 
would be expected, Lev-Ami, saw things differently; based on his account, Lehi 
hated the Irgun and felt contempt and jealousy towards it, and since 'they could 
not perform more sophisticated attacks, they were limited to murders.'220 
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Indeed, Lehi's favourite tactic of individual terrorism, which was used without 
any inhibitions, led to its notorious reputation in the history of violence as the 
'epitome of terrorist vocation, a tiny group of men without restraint, driven by 
dreams and fantasies, rebels beyond compromise, demented gunmen in pursuit 
of the impossible.'221  
Lehi's fanatic image was reinforced after it unleashed a vindictive 
terrorist campaign following Stern's assassination by the mandatory police 
force in February 1942. In August 1944 the British High Commissioner of 
Palestine, Sir Harold MacMichael, narrowly escaped death when Lehi terrorists 
ambushed him in Jerusalem.222 The next attempt came three months later, in 
what is known as the apex of Lehi's terrorism.  On 6 November 1944, Lehi 
assassinated the British Minister-Resident in Cairo, Lord Walter Moyne. A 
senior Lehi commander explained that Moyne was chosen as a target because 
'he symbolized the British Empire in Cairo,' and further noted that 'we weren't 
yet in a position to try to hit Churchill in London, so the logical second best was 
to hit Lord Moyne in Cairo.'223  
In 2011, the British Security Service (commonly known as MI5) released 
confidential files suggesting the Lehi in fact plotted to target British politicians 
in the UK. It was revealed that in March 1946 Lehi terrorists were 'training 
their members for the purpose of proceeding to England to assassinate 
members of His Majesty's Government.'224 In particular, the MI5 believed that 
the list of targets of prominent British politicians included Winston Churchill, 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the new Prime Minister Clement Atlee. 
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Therefore, Zionist terrorism became 'the most immediate, and urgent, threat 
facing British national security,' and was rated as top priority.225  
Despite the apparent differences in ideology and strategy, the Jewish 
Agency made it clear that in their eyes Irgun and Lehi were the same. 
Consequently, the Irgun initiated a widespread propaganda campaign in an 
attempt to distinguish between the two and explain the fundamental 
differences.226 After the killing of Lord Moyne, the Irgun expressed its dismay 
with Lehi's use of terrorism and its belief that it was immoral and did more 
damage than good as it led the British to retaliate more aggressively. In order to 
uphold some sort of public order, Irgun decided to temporarily act against Lehi 
by tipping off British police regarding the whereabouts of its members.227 In 
response, Lehi murdered the Irgun's intelligence commander, in an act that 
symbolised the almost unbridgeable ideological and strategic gaps and 
represented the nadir of Irgun-Lehi relations.228  
In light of Lehi's brutal terrorist campaign that threatened to tear the 
Jewish community apart, the Irgun decided to take responsibility and to repair 
the chaotic situation in Palestine. In accordance with its moderate view of 
violence and commitment to Jewish unity, the Irgun sought a resolution that 
could rehabilitate its relations with Lehi and bring together the dissident 
organisations under one political movement. Irgun was pressing for re-
unification with Lehi, not only to contain its independent operations and 
eliminate a rival that nonetheless stained the Irgun's public image, but also to 
overcome technical difficulties such as operational coordination.229 With the 
Irgun's declaration of revolt, an opportunity emerged in which the interests of 
the two terrorist organisations converged. Despite the fundamental differences, 
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a merger seemed to be beneficial for both due to 'their heritage, their mutual 
enemy, their basic agreement on strategy, and their joint detractors within the 
legitimate institutions.'230 However, the initial meetings between 
representatives from both organisations were futile, as there were ideological 
and strategic divides that could not be bridged, despite the existence of a 
mutual end-goal.231 Lehi members argued that the Irgun lacked the necessary 
courage to directly confront the British forces and therefore resorted to 
explosives instead of individual terrorism.232 In response, Katz proudly admits 
in an interview with the author that the Irgun distinctly preferred 'to blow up 
buildings rather than killing people.'233 Lehi further claimed that the Irgun was 
willing to establish some sort of cooperation with the British authorities, and 
were not fully committed to their expulsion from Palestine.234  
In late 1944, Irgun suggested forming a shared headquarters with Lehi, 
conditional upon Begin's authority as unified commander. Lehi rejected this 
offer as well, fearing that it would be subsumed into the larger and better-
equipped organisation and as it did not want to risk the possibility of losing its 
independent status and capabilities. The most it agreed was coordination in 
attacking British targets and exchanging information about the enemy.235 Even 
so, Irgun still hoped to achieve a degree of unification for the benefit of the 
entire Jewish community. In July 1946 the Irgun undertook another attempt to 
bring Lehi under its auspices. Interestingly, this time an agreement was within 
reach, but before the union could be cemented, Lehi backed out. In a secret 
memorandum of the Irgun's High Command reporting on the negotiations, it 
was noted that Lehi accepted military attack as the only mode of operation 
instead of terrorism and assassinations. The deal-breaker, however, was 
Irgun's demand that the future unified resistance would recognise Jabotinsky 
as its "ideological father". The memo concluded that Lehi representatives 
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rejected this demand and both sides agreed that there was no point in 
continuing the discussions. Yet, there was a necessity to continue, driven by 
practical needs, with the military cooperation for accomplishing the shared 
objective.'236   
In the aftermath of the failed negotiations, Lehi continued its 
indiscriminate attacks against British and Arab targets. These attacks alienated 
the Jewish community, and provoked general distaste with their tactics, 
thereby denying Lehi the solid popular support which it hoped for.237 Such 
extremism disturbed the Irgun and directly contributed to its restrained 
operations and to its adoption of a more moderate strategy in attempt to 
establish itself as the responsible and level-headed opposition to the official 
Jewish authorities.  
 
LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT  
Another factor crucial for the Irgun's political integration was the level 
of public support it enjoyed among Jews in Palestine and in the Diaspora, that 
was contingent not only upon the Irgun's actions but also on processes within 
the domestic environment in Palestine and international events. The 
recognised Jewish institutions led by David Ben-Gurion advocated a socialist 
ideology espousing the creation of a secular-democratic Jewish state, which 
appealed to the majority of the Jewish people in Palestine and abroad. 
However, the public support for the Irgun's Greater Israel philosophy and the 
militarist approach was marginal, and its political success peaked long before 
the terrorist days. In the 1931 elections for the 3rd Jewish Assembly in 
Palestine, the Revisionist party won 22% of the votes (16 out of 71 
delegates).238 Despite the relative success in the polls, the nationalist agenda 
remained insignificant and the Irgun had to become accustomed to life as an 
opposition movement.  
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In his vision, Jabotinsky hoped to establish the Irgun as the military 
branch of the Revisionist movement, and to introduce both as a viable 
alternative to the socialist Jewish leadership.239 As an experienced politician he 
knew all-too-well the importance of public support to the ongoing operational 
and political power of any organisation. Nevertheless, he was unsuccessful in 
his endeavours as long as the British Government was the foremost 
international ally of the incumbent Jewish leadership. At the outbreak of WWII, 
Jabotinsky saw an opportunity to realise two objectives; backing the war effort 
against Germany while mobilising public support for the Irgun by moving 
closer to the official Jewish political stance. In an attempt to appeal to Jews 
world-wide, he issued a statement that read: 'England decided to make their 
fight her own; and we Jews shall…never forget that for twenty years, until 
recently, England was our partner in Zion.'240 Jabotinsky's charisma and 
political wisdom to side with the Jewish Agency, prompted an historic joint 
statement calling for a general draft that led 20,000 Jews from all sides of the 
political spectrum to enlist into the British army.241  
Soon after the Irgun's image as a responsible and calculated 
organisation was beginning to infiltrate the hearts and minds of the Jewish 
people, Jabotinsky died in August 1940.242 With his disappearance and without 
a designated successor, the Irgun lost its spirit, symbol and political compass 
and descended into chaos. Yitshaq Ben-Ami, a senior Irgun political officer, 
described the feelings and the impact of Jabotinsky's death on the organisation: 
'Losing him was, for all of us, like losing our father…his death created a vacuum 
in our hearts that we knew could not be filled. He had died when we needed 
him more than ever, and we felt a kind of desperate abandonment.'243 Seeing 
the turmoil inside the Irgun and believing that in the face of the 'new challenges 
from within and without…Revisionism had reached a dead end,' the public that 
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was previously sympathetic withdrew its support.244 Clearly, following 
Jabotinsky's death the Irgun was in a state of ideological uncertainty and on the 
verge of collapse. 
Furthermore, the war cut off the connections between Palestine and 
Europe, a fact that had critical implications for the Irgun's financial resources 
and international support. Since the Irgun was excluded from the political 
consensus it did not have access to national funds, and had to finance itself 
from contributions, membership fees and subsidies of the global Revisionist 
movement.245 With the Nazi "final solution" well underway, the Irgun had to 
rely on its dwindling financial reserves for survival. Yet, support for illegal 
immigration still continued on a small-scale and some limited funds did get 
through thanks to American Jews sympathetic to the Irgun's ideology and 
objectives, who enlisted to replace Europe as a base of support.  
The "American Friends of a Jewish Palestine", originally established in 
June 1939 as a charitable organisation to raise funds for immigration 
operations and for propaganda purposes, began also to mobilise American 
political support for the Irgun.246 The organisation successfully recruited 
prominent American figures who openly supported Irgun's objectives, and 
provided it with arms and supplies.247 Katz, however, is more critical of the 
assistance given by American Jewry to the Irgun, claiming that their money was 
spent mostly on their own initiatives and projects, and was not given directly to 
the Irgun. According to his calculation, American Jews who supported the Irgun 
did not give more than $100,000 in total.248 Additionally, for a brief period the 
Irgun also received support, arms and training from the Polish government 
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which encouraged immigration of Polish Jews to Palestine hoping to abolish 
anti-Semitism in Poland by clearing from it the Jewish presence.249  
The decline in the public support for the Irgun could have been 
detrimental to its existence. The British insistence on implementing the "White 
Paper" restrictions in face of the Jewish plight in Europe, ironically, saved the 
Irgun from total oblivion. The decision to resume the attacks against the British 
indirectly elevated the Irgun's public stature. At that time, the Jewish 
community deeply desired that someone take a firm stand against the British 
policy, especially when it was obvious that the Jewish Agency did not want to 
risk its relations with the British Government by openly opposing the "White 
Paper". To back the military campaign, the Irgun decided to launch an intensive 
propaganda effort to mobilise additional public support for its military 
operations. Consequently, pamphlets and broadsheets were distributed and 
every morning Irgun members 'posted up on the walls and shop windows in 
the towns, communiqués on the previous night's operations, analyses of the 
political situation and exhortations for support.'250 Another important element 
in the battle for the hearts and minds was the operation of a secret radio 
station, "The Voice of Fighting Zion", which began regular broadcasts 
addressing the Jewish community and propagating the Irgun's ideology.  
The Jewish Agency's decision to hunt down Irgun members, in the 
autumn of 1944, was not made purely out of fear that Irgun's operations would 
jeopardise the community's relations with Britain. Rather, Ben-Gurion could no 
longer discard the Irgun as a marginal organisation and felt it was imperative to 
diminish its mounting public support in order to eliminate the threat it posed 
on his own authority. Begin, despite being fully aware of the Irgun's rising 
popularity, decided against retaliation for the "Hunting Season". His decision 
was primarily led by the conviction that it will further enhance the Irgun's 
image as a restrained organisation whose top priority is the unity of the Jewish 
community. Although the Irgun was inactive for almost a year, its behaviour in 
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response to the "Hunting Season" resulted in all-time-high levels of sympathy 
for the persecuted opposition.251 Hence, in the period between February 1944 
and July 1946, the Irgun's public support within Palestine and abroad reached a 
zenith.   
Following the King David bombing, the Irgun was accused of being too 
extreme, and as a result began a steep descent in its popular standing from 
which it would never completely recover. The attack brought almost at once a 
halt in the gradual increase of support for the Irgun's military operations. 
Denunciations were published by a majority of the Jewish parties, and the 
public perceived the Irgun as a group of cold-blooded murderers second only to 
Lehi. Despite the strategic success of the Irgun's armed struggle against the 
British and the deep belief of its members that their operations directly assisted 
the creation of a Jewish state, it failed to generate matching public support, 
since the 'majority of the Jewish community was vigorously opposed to 
terrorism.'252 The Jewish press in Palestine joined the communal effort to de-
legitimise the Irgun, describing its members as 'criminal lunatics who were 
deeply despised by every member of the Jewish community.253 The decline in 
the Irgun's public standing was also reflected in its thinning financial resources. 
As a result it had to find alternative methods to raise funds, and resorted to 
robberies, burglaries and extortion that 'have always been revolutionary 
means,' and mostly characterised gangs and thieves more than well-organised 
ideological movements.254  
Indeed, the Irgun never enjoyed 'the support of the vast majority of the 
Jewish population in Palestine and was, for much of the period, fiercely 
opposed by the Haganah,' and by the end of 1946 it suffered dramatic political 
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damage.255 Since it was never perceived as the formal representative of 
Palestinian Jews, it is not surprising that Irgun leaders looked for other 
channels to increase its public support. While the violent operations continued 
for almost another two years after the King David attack, the Irgun became 
more attentive to the community's demands and needs and looked for ways to 
elevate its public image. When the opportunity of a political accommodation 
became feasible, the Irgun was more prone to adopt a peaceful solution; one 
that would accomplish its ideological objective.  
  
DOMESTIC FACTORS 
 This section focuses on the policies of the institutionalised opponents 
that challenged the Irgun from the 1944 revolt until it finally became a legal 
political party; on one hand the British Government in London and its 
mandatory administration in Palestine, and on another the Jewish Agency and 
the Haganah. Although the latter was not officially a state representative, it was 
recognised as the basis for a government in a future Jewish state and acted 
accordingly. The first part of this section will examine the British policy 
towards the Irgun and the impact on its strategy. The second part will review 
the complex relations between the Irgun and the Jewish Agency, and how they 
eventually led the Irgun to disintegrate and turn to legitimate political activity 
within the new democratic regime of Israel. 
 
BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE IRGUN 
The British policy towards the Irgun can be divided into two main 
periods: September 1939-November 1944, during which the Irgun was 
committed to its self-imposed truce with the British who in turn implemented a 
restrained military response against it, and November 1944-September 1947, 
during which the British army was given permission to act freely to suppress 
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the Irgun's operational capabilities. Throughout both periods, the British 
Government and the Irgun diverged over issues ranging from Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, the acquisition of arms and military training and the 
political future of Palestine.256 The last issue, which naturally was the most 
important one for the Irgun, was addressed in 1937, when the British 
Government proposed to divide Palestine into two separate Jewish and Arab 
states, in what is known as the Peel Commission Partition Plan. Although both 
Jews and Arabs rejected the plan, each side for its own reasons, the idea of 
partition would become the most prominent solution for the Palestine question 
and the one that would ultimately terminate the British mandate.257 Yet in 1937 
it still seemed an impractical idea, and therefore British policy focused on using 
the civil and security apparatuses as primary instruments for maintaining 
public and political order.  
The 1917 "Balfour Declaration" stated the British Government's view in 
favour of 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people.'258 This was the first formal indication of the policy towards Palestine 
that expressed Britain's commitment to the Jewish people. It was later 
embodied in the League of Nations' decision establishing the Mandate stating 
that:  
The Mandatory shall be responsible for putting into effect the 
[Balfour] declaration originally made on November 2nd 1917 by 
the Government of His Britannic Majesty…and whereas 
recognition has thereby given to the historical connection of the 
Jewish people with Palestine and to the ground for reconstituting 
their national home in that country.259  
Despite the assigned responsibility and the written pledge, the British policy in 
Palestine until the outbreak of WWII was based on 'an analysis of British needs 
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in the event of a European war, the relative strategic assets of Arabs and 
Zionists, and the impact of such a course elsewhere.'260 The rise of the Nazis to 
power in Germany eventually led to a British retreat from its initial 
commitment to the Jews. The British Government feared that its pro-Jewish 
attitude would upset the Arab majority in the Middle East, thus threatening 
Britain's vast commercial and strategic interests in the region and risking vital 
alliances.261 The shift in the British policy was aimed at appeasing the Arabs 
'because of their capacity to cause trouble near to Britain's communication 
route and oil resources.'262 Formulating this policy in writing, the British 
Government published the aforementioned 1939 "White Paper", that effectively 
determined that an Arab state would be created in Palestine. Undoubtedly, the 
new British policy enraged the Jewish world and together with the suspension 
of Jewish immigration, it was the central impetus behind the Irgun's military 
strategy against the British administration in Palestine.263  
Nevertheless, the outbreak of WWII defused the Jewish community's 
plan to politically and violently confront the "White Paper" restrictions. At that 
time, the Jewish leadership still believed that the British pro-Arab stand 
reflected a realist wartime-approach, and once the war was over the British 
Government, again, would support a Zionist solution in Palestine.264 
Consequently, between September 1939 and 1944 the political situation in 
Palestine was fairly calm and a relatively high degree of cooperation between 
the mandatory administration and the Jewish institutions was in place. Since 
Britain wished to maintain the status quo in Palestine, its policy against the 
Irgun was restricted to occasional arms searches, small-scale arrests, and 
imposing fines on Jewish settlements.265  
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Following the German defeats on most battlefronts, the Jewish anti-
British sentiments were revived, and the Jewish Agency decided to join the 
opposition to the "White Paper". In May 1943, Chaim Weizmann, President of 
the World Zionist Organization (and later the first President of Israel), 
announced that 'we do not and will not accept the White Paper...our choices are 
to establish Israel or to lose our way.'266 His intention was to contest the 
implementation of the "White Paper" through political channels and not 
through violent resistance. The leading Jewish institutions were, in fact, 
powerless to do much to repeal the "White Paper" or to convince the British 
Government to rescue European Jewry.267 The Irgun, however, took the 
community's struggle one step further and resumed its armed campaign 
against the British. In the early months of 1944, Irgun attacks against British 
installations were not met immediately with force, as the mandatory 
administration did not want to drive the majority of the Jewish public into the 
hands of the Irgun. Fearing that an aggressive response would provoke an all-
out armed resistance, the British troops in Palestine were ordered to exercise 
restraint. The commander of the British forces in Palestine criticised this 
decision arguing that 'our forces were under extreme tension. They were 
veterans of battles in Europe in the last war. They were taught to kill and were 
now placed under irritating restrictions.'268   
Additionally, in an attempt to peacefully resolve the conflict with the 
Irgun before the situation became uncontrollable, the option of a negotiated 
settlement was carefully explored. An archival report of the Irgun's High 
Command, that was only recently disclosed, reveals that on 2 August 1944, a 
senior commander suggested to reply positively to an initial contact made by 
the British and to open negotiations. However, a majority of the Irgun's High 
Command doubted the possibility of engagement with Britain, explaining that 
the timing was not right and that such a dialogue should be handled by a more 
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representative body, such as an underground government.269 Six days later, this 
issue was raised again during a meeting of the High Command. Begin said that a 
letter was received from a senior officer in which he reported that a source in 
the British Government wished to examine the likelihood of negotiations. The 
officer suggested that should negotiations commence the Irgun must demand to 
have control over immigration into Palestine in return for the full cessation of 
all violent attacks, without publicly declaring this intention. Yet again, the 
majority of the High Command questioned the reliability of the British source 
and their sincerity to explore negotiated settlement.270 In an interview with the 
author, Katz dismissed the viability of negotiations with the British on the 
grounds that the mandatory administration always preferred to deal with the 
Jewish Agency and labeled the Irgun as strictly a terrorist organisation. The 
Irgun, on the other hand, believed that a dialogue with the enemy could only 
result in tactical benefits not in a comprehensive political compromise.271 
The above evidence is probably the only indication of a serious debate 
within the Irgun about engaging with the British Government, and its failure 
can be explained primarily by bad timing. By August 1944 the Irgun had been 
inactive for almost five years and that, together with the split of Lehi, had 
eroded the manpower and morale. Moreover, there were hardly any weapons 
and explosives available and almost no financial resources. The remaining 600 
members were 'a core of dedicated and competent men' with a strong desire to 
justify the Irgun's existence as the National Military Organisation.272 They 
supported military attacks against the British not only as a means to achieve 
the Irgun's objectives but also as a way of building a reputation as a fighting 
opposition. Consequently, heavy pressure was put on the High Command to 
order a more intensive armed campaign, to which Begin responded positively. 
Ultimately, the Irgun's quick dismissal of the alternative of engagement and the 
refusal to further explore the credibility of the British offer also signify that the 
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it was both unready to deal directly with the enemy and immature in its 
understanding of the political ramifications of such a dialogue. In reality, the 
fact that negotiations did not materialise and the Irgun opposed any chance for 
a peaceful settlement meant that violence and counter-violence would be the 
defining strategy of the years to come.  
The assassination of Lord Moyne in Cairo, in November 1944, and the 
terrorist attacks that followed, were the turning point in the British attitude 
towards the Irgun. If until then the British policy was aimed at containing the 
Irgun's violence and sustaining the fragile status quo, from November 1944 
onwards military power was perceived as the only solution to the "Zionist 
terrorism".273 Although the attack on Lord Moyne was perpetrated by Lehi 
members, the British authorities considered the Irgun as potentially more 
dangerous and used the assassination as a justified reason to respond more 
vigorously to squash it. Two days after the assassination, the British Colonial 
Secretary, Oliver Stanley, claimed that the Irgun's terrorist attacks and the 
assassination of Lord Moyne, provided 'ample justification before the world for 
the most rigorous action,' that was displayed in the suspension of Jewish 
immigration. He also admitted the concern that a lenient response to the 
escalation in violence would damage Britain's international reputation and 
'effect not merely upon Palestine but upon the Middle East and the whole world 
in general.'274  
By early 1945, as the war in Europe was nearing an end, the British 
army was able to deploy more forces to Palestine and was unbound by the 
wartime considerations that previously limited its operations. Hence, the army 
wanted to implement a draconian policy that included extreme tactics ranging 
from attacking infrastructure that was supposedly used for terrorist attacks, 
collective punishment, and confiscation of arms. The Irgun was not indifferent 
to the escalation in the British military posture. Believing 'that the White Paper 
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could not be abolished without the use of force,' the Irgun accepted that it must 
enhance its violent attacks on British targets and 'launch war at the end of the 
war,' in response to the repressive policy.275  
Soon it became clear that the British strategy, which succeeded in 
repressing popular uprisings in other British colonies, was inept against the 
Irgun's violent surge. General Bernard Montgomery, commander of the 
Imperial British Army who visited Palestine in 1946, invigorated his 
commanders to implement a get-tough policy and prepared them for the 
possibility that this 'would lead to war against the Jews: a war against a 
fanatical and cunning enemy who would use the weapons of kidnap, murder 
and sabotage.'276 At the same time, he blamed the government in London for 
failing to restrain the Jewish terrorists in Palestine. He suggested to Prime 
Minister Atlee that 'if we are not ready to enforce law and order in Palestine – 
we should better leave.'277 In early 1947, after a period of bloody clashes in 
Palestine, General Montgomery urged the Government to ease the restrictions 
imposed on the British Army. He complained that 'the whole country was in the 
grip of lawlessness, and the Army, who conceived it to be their duty to support 
the civil power, were not being allowed to do so,' and further insisted that the 
'shooting should be left to the Army.'278  
Although the British army regularly explained that its inability to put an 
end to the Irgun's violence lay within the restrictions imposed by its politicians, 
Bruce Hoffman, who studied the Jewish underground resistance movements, 
thinks differently. He asserts that the British strategy 'failed to recognise the 
inherent differences,' between other colonial uprisings and the Irgun's armed 
campaign, and 'adopted a strategy that was inappropriate to conditions in 
Palestine between 1945 and 1947.'279 David Cesarani shares Hoffman's view 
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and stresses that despite the deployment of British reinforcements in Palestine, 
military operations and martial law failed in preventing attacks on the security 
and civil authorities as well as curbing illegal Jewish immigration.280 For 
example, the Irgun was operating in urban surroundings, and therefore 
destruction of infrastructure was unacceptable as it could cause numerous 
casualties. Also, since Irgun members were assimilated within the Jewish 
community, making them effectively indistinguishable from the rest of the 
population, the army and police could not identify the terrorists and as a result 
arrests, arms searches and deportations were largely inefficient. Lastly, 
executing collective punishments such as curfews and fines proved counter-
productive as they generated extensive support for the Irgun.281  
By late 1944 the British Government was convinced that Palestine was 
no longer a political-humanitarian problem, but had rather deteriorated into a 
military quagmire.282 Consequently, the mandatory administration decided to 
add to its tough military strategy a direct and indirect pressure on the Jewish 
Agency to cooperate in the fight against Irgun's terrorism. The idea to mobilise 
the Jewish community was first introduced in a telegram from the British 
Colonial Secretary to the High Commissioner in Palestine in which he proposed 
that the suspension of immigration of Jews to Palestine was a sufficient 
'incentive to the Agency to assist the Government in tracking down the 
terrorists in order to secure the removal of the ban.'283 The idea was further 
discussed in a telegram from the Minister-Resident's office in Cairo to the 
Foreign Office in London, in which it was claimed that the Jewish Agency will 
act according to what is best for its position and objective and that the Jewish 
leaders are 'afraid of extremists gaining control…[and] have every reason for 
wishing to be rid of extremists.' The telegram mentioned that in order for 
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collaboration to take place, the Jewish leadership 'must be forced into it by 
conviction that we have made up our minds to act firmly and resolutely.'284  
The strategy of cooperation with the Jewish Agency, which resulted in 
the "Hunting Season", proved successful for the British mandatory 
administration. The number of attacks against British targets decreased 
dramatically and hundreds of Jewish terrorists and supporters were arrested as 
a result of intelligence provided by the Haganah. Particularly, by spring of 1945 
the Irgun was forced to defend itself by going underground, suffered a 
significant drop in its ranks, and its financial resources were scarce. Yet, the 
cooperation between the British security forces and the Jewish Agency ended 
abruptly when WWII was officially over, largely because there was no apparent 
progress in the establishment of a Jewish state and the British Government 
remained indifferent to the Zionist cause.  
Shortly after the "Hunting Season" was called off, the Irgun quickly 
regained its strength, filled its ranks with new and devoted recruits, and 
opened a more intensive violent campaign against the British forces in 
Palestine. The peak of the Irgun's more hard-line strategy was the King David 
attack, after which General Barker, the British army commander in Palestine, 
denounced the Jews:  
The Jewish community of Palestine cannot be absolved from the 
long series of outrages…I am determined that they will suffer 
punishment and be made aware of the contempt and loathing 
with which we regard their conduct…[the troops] will be 
punishing the Jews in a way the race dislikes as much as any, by 
striking at their pockets.285 
Following the horrific bombing, the British top priority was to tackle the 
Zionist terrorist organisations that contemplated all sorts of attacks including 
assassinations of senior politicians on British soil.286 For example, a declassified 
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MI5 extract from August 1946 states that 'several agents have reported that 
Jewish terrorists have had assassination of Mr. Bevin under consideration for 
some time, and that they have prepared a plan for carrying out the outrage, if 
necessary, in the United Kingdom.'287 Therefore, the British Government 
responded with unparalleled punitive measures ever to be used in Palestine, 
such as collective fines, longer imprisonment sentences, military curfews, and 
hangings.  
The mandatory administration ordered massive military raids, amongst 
them was "Operation Shark", in which a four-day curfew was imposed on Tel 
Aviv, where it was believed the majority of terrorists resided. During the 
operation 20,000 British soldiers questioned 102,000 Jewish residents, and 
arrested 762 (among them was the commander of the Lehi, Itzhak Shamir). 
Hundreds of rifles, pistols and other weapons were confiscated, and the 
financial damage to property was enormous.288 Moreover, martial law was 
declared in the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem, severely disrupting every aspect of 
civilian life. Despite the operational success, the British strategy proved to be 
counter-productive as instead of convincing the public to cooperate against the 
Irgun, it mainly 'alienated the Jewish community because of the inconvenience 
and disruption to commerce and daily life that the operation caused.'289 
Evidently, the forceful British military response had little effect on the 
Irgun's operational capability and the terrorist attacks continued almost 
unabated. On the contrary, the Irgun and Lehi stepped up the scope of their 
violence and targeted scores of British military and civilian installations in 
Palestine, killing 338 British subjects.290 Furthermore, the Irgun proved that the 
British fear of extending Zionist terrorism to areas outside Palestine was 
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correct, as it bombed the British Embassy in Rome and sabotaged 
transportation routes in occupied Germany.291 
 By early 1947, the situation in Palestine worsened rapidly, and stability 
was even more difficult to restore. The British public and press began to 
question their government's ability to control Palestine, thus pressuring it to 
evacuate the territory. Newspaper headlines titled "govern or get out", "time to 
go" and "clear out of Palestine", were common until the last British troops 
finally left Palestine in May 1948.292 Encouraged from the British public's 
response, Begin commented: 'at last the British people realised the folly of 
opposing the birth of a nation.'293  
Ultimately the public demand was effective and the British Government 
recognised that the army and police could not enforce order and maintain 
political stability in Palestine. While the mandatory administration blamed its 
inability to stop terrorism on the lack of sufficient military personnel, the 
government in London accepted the fact that the Palestine question could be 
resolved only through political settlement and agreed that 'the only reasonable 
hope seemed the UN.'294 Additionally, Britain after WWII suffered a severe 
economic depression that reflected on the mandatory administration, which 
was effectively bankrupt and could not sustain a proper military activity to 
adequately counter Irgun's violence.295 By February 1947 it was clear that 
Britain could no longer control the mandate and the government desperately 
sought an appropriate way out of Palestine. 
By May 1948 the British forces in Palestine were no longer the primary 
concern of the Irgun. Instead, its attention was diverted towards the Arab 
armies that threatened to invade the Jewish state immediately after the 
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completion of the British withdrawal. Katz admits that since Palestine was 
under UN discretion, the Irgun was 'concentrating on fighting against the 
Arabs…and so our concern with the British as far as the military action ceased 
to exist.296 On 15 May 1948, the day of the official termination of the British 
Mandate, the Colonial Office jointly with the Foreign Office, issued a summary 
of Britain's rule in Palestine. This candid report articulated the failure of the 
British policy to secure law and order and acknowledged the role of Jewish 
terrorism in driving the British out of Palestine:  
His Majesty's Government had now striven for twenty-seven 
years without success to reconcile Jews and Arabs and to prepare 
the people of Palestine for self-government…84,111 troops, who 
received no co-operation from the Jewish community, had proved 
insufficient to maintain law and order in the face of a campaign of 
terrorism waged by highly organized Jewish forces equipped with 
all the weapons of the modern infantryman. Since the war 338 
British subjects had been killed in Palestine, while the military 
forces there had cost the British taxpayer £011 million…in view of 
His Majesty's Government's decision not to enforce the partition 
of Palestine against the declared wishes of the majority of its 
inhabitants, the continued presence there of British forces and 
officials could no longer be justified.297 
Indeed, the contribution of Irgun's operations to Britain's decision to 
evacuate Palestine in 1948 should not be undervalued. Despite the fact that in 
its peak years the Irgun did not consist of more than a few thousand 
operational activists its 'strategy was sufficiently ingenious so that it played a 
big part in getting the British to withdraw.'298  
 
THE JEWISH AGENCY'S POLICY TOWARDS THE IRGUN 
The policy exerted by the Jewish Agency against the Irgun, before and 
after the establishment of Israel, had the greatest contribution to its political 
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integration. If the British policy was based mostly on military means, it did not 
foresee any long-term political compromise and eventually led the Irgun to 
adopt a more violent approach. The Jewish Agency, however, had employed a 
multifaceted approach that ultimately brought a successful end to the Irgun's 
armed campaign. This approach included three elements: aggressive response 
to Irgun's terrorist activity, temporary cooperation in which for a brief period 
the Irgun was recognised as a legitimate resistance organisation, and finally 
using the establishment of a democratic regime both as a justification for 
disintegrating the Irgun and as an incentive for it to form a legitimate party in 
the new political system.  
As noted earlier, the Irgun took a calculated risk in joining the Jewish 
community's ceasefire since it was not as well-equipped and financed as the 
official Jewish leadership. Consequently, the Irgun froze its operations and 
almost disappeared from the Jewish political scene. The 1944 declaration of 
revolt under Begin's command brought the Irgun back to life, but at the same 
time upset the Jewish Agency. Despite the Irgun's effort to provide 
reassurances that its armed campaign against the British was not intended to 
challenge his leadership, Ben-Gurion thought otherwise. The prevailing stand 
within the Jewish Agency, and specifically after the assassination of Lord 
Moyne, was that the revolt could lead to more repressive measures against 
Palestinian Jews that would ultimately jeopardise the positive progress 
achieved through the official negotiations with the British Government. 
Furthermore, the Jewish Agency was under growing pressure from the 
mandatory administration to assist in crushing the Irgun's revolt.299 The British 
Government made it clear that failure in restoring order and inactivity against 
the Irgun 'would soon be viewed as disloyalty, guilt by association.'300  
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Following the unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement, 
the Jewish Agency 'had to consider more stringent measures against the Irgun, 
for the revolt seemed to be gaining momentum.'301 The preferred method was 
to openly cooperate with the mandatory administration and to call for the 
Jewish community to unite against the Irgun. Days after Lord Moyne's 
assassination, Ben-Gurion published a statement:   
The Jewish community is called to spew forth all the members of 
this harmful, destructive gang, to deny them any shelter or haven, 
not to give in to their threats, and to extend to the authorities all 
the necessary assistance to prevent terror acts and to wipe out 
[the terror] organization, for this is a matter of life and death.302      
Ben-Gurion believed that there were two choices facing the Jewish 
community, 'terrorism or a Zionist political struggle…if we want a Zionist 
political struggle…we must rise and take action against terrorism and terrorist 
organisations. It is necessary to act, not just to talk.'303 In a meeting that took 
place in October 1944 between Begin and Eliyahu Golomb, the military 
commander of the Haganah, Golomb used a mixture of compliments and 
threats: 
I do not deny that there is a spirit of self-sacrifice among you, but 
it must now be directed into another channel…you proved that 
when Jews start fighting in Eretz Israel they are prepared to go on 
to the end and even to die. But if this was your purpose, what you 
have done is quite enough. You have proved what you set out to 
prove. Now you must stop your activities.304  
Golomb admitted that the Jewish Agency did not want to start a civil 
war, however it would be willing to do so if necessary. Golomb, who was sent 
on behalf of Ben-Gurion, threatened that although the Haganah was not looking 
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to physically destroy the Irgun, events might develop in a way that would lead 
to the Irgun's annihilation.305 
Ben-Gurion hoped that by putting constant pressure on Irgun members 
they would be forced to invest time in surviving rather than on planning 
operations against the British. He authorised the Haganah to use almost every 
available means at its disposal: kidnappings and extensive interrogations, 
sometimes accompanied with torture; expulsion from work places, schools and 
homes, and even worse handing over Irgun members to the mandatory 
police.306 In Weizman's letter to British Premier, Winston Churchill, from 18 
December 1944, he commends the satisfactory cooperation and reports that 
500 names of Irgun members had been passed to the police and that 250 were 
already arrested (during the "Hunting Season" a total of 1,000 names of Irgun 
members were given by the Haganah to the British police).307 Ben-Gurion also 
expected that the Jewish community would deny the Irgun the necessary public 
support which was most-needed in those times of despair.  
Begin, Ben-Gurion's chief adversary, did not want to play into the hands 
of the British enemy who expected the Jewish community to be drawn into a 
civil war, which 'would assure him of peace and mastery.'308 Katz explains that 
although some members pressed for hitting back and despite the fact that the 
vast majority of the Irgun's High Command was captured by the British (and 
some were sent to exile in Africa), Begin ordered his remaining followers that 
'there must be no civil war.'309 As Prime Minister, almost forty years later, 
Begin said that he hopes to be remembered not as commander of the Irgun or 
as a peace maker, but as the one who prevented civil war.310 Begin's order, 
'which ran counter to the very spirit of natural resistance,' and had rarely been 
adopted by any terrorist organisation, was fully honoured without any 
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breach.311 He intentionally preferred the non-retaliatory approach since he was 
certain that eventually the British would reveal their true intentions in regards 
to not fulfilling their promise of a Jewish homeland, and the Jewish Agency 
would then join the Irgun in its fight against the British enemy.  
The "Hunting Season", despite its limited success, failed to smash the 
Irgun as a fighting force and Begin himself managed to evade capture.312 It did, 
however, result in an internal struggle that 'left open wounds and polarized 
opposing camps,' and the tensions that it created would later resurface 'to do 
harm at several decisive moments during the struggle for a Jewish state.'313 
Reality, however, was stronger than any personal or ideological rivalries, and 
out of the frustration and disappointment from the new British Labour 
government that came to power in July 1945, and had traditionally been in 
favour of the Zionist movement, the idea of a united Jewish front was born. Ben-
Gurion, who realised that the Jews could no longer cooperate with the 
mandatory administration, called off the "Hunting Season" and in October 1945 
invited the dissident organisations to join a United Resistance Movement to 
fight against the British. Begin admitted that one of the primary reasons for the 
Irgun's self-restricting nature in the use of violence 'had been the belief in the 
inevitability of a united front,' and thus was willing to show a degree of 
flexibility and to accept the Haganah's authority in the joint operations.314 As 
ever, he was also aware that the Irgun's 'continued separate existence in 
wartime was unpopular,' and therefore he agreed to join forces with the Jewish 
Agency.315 Furthermore, as someone who fought constantly for Jewish unity 
and aspired to be part of the political consensus and receive public recognition, 
Begin wrote in his memoirs that he regards the 'short period of the United 
Resistance Movement,' during which the Irgun was no longer an outcast, 'as the 
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happiest days of my life.316 Nonetheless, he refused the Haganah's proposal to 
merge all the armed organisations, and explained that although the Irgun was 
willing to fight with the Haganah, it was not ready 'to dissolve under the cloak 
of 'unity'...[we] cannot give up our independence, certainly not in the first stage 
of joint action.'317 
It seems that Begin's insistence on maintaining the Irgun as an 
independent organisation paid off, as the joint struggle did not last long. The 
Irgun's bombing of the King David Hotel was the pretext for ending the United 
Resistance Movement. Although the operation was coordinated with and 
authorised by the Haganah (as agreed when the united movement was 
created), after the explosion, the Jewish Agency, not wanting to share any 
blame, firmly condemned the Irgun's militant ideology and use of terrorism. 
The Irgun was accused of treason and murder, and following British pressure 
Ben-Gurion declared that 'the Irgun is the enemy of the Jewish people.'318 He 
later referred to the Irgun as the 'Fascist Devil' and to the Revisionists as 
'members of a Nazi party.'319 Despite the harsh words, the Irgun, once again 
operating separately, did not yield to pressure and further increased its attacks 
against the British that retaliated with hangings of Irgun members. When the 
Irgun responded with reciprocal hangings, the Jewish Agency issued an 
unprecedented statement that read: 'If there were such a thing as a Streicher 
[an infamous Nazi official known for his anti-Semitic views] Medal, the Irgun 
leaders would surely deserve it for services rendered to anti-Semitism.'320 This 
language, never used before in reference to a Jewish organisation fighting an 
oppressor, best sums up the discourse that prevailed within the Jewish 
community in Palestine and the perception the Irgun had in the eyes of the 
Jewish public opinion.  
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By the spring of 1947 the Jewish community was suffering not only from 
the military pressure of the mandatory administration but also from increasing 
Arab violence, and the public demanded the unification of forces against the 
two intertwined fronts. The outside intervention and the UN partition plan 
(adopted in November 1947), gave both the Irgun and the Jewish Agency the 
necessary excuse to stop fighting each other and concentrate their efforts 
against the Arabs militants that rejected the partition plan. Subsequently, with 
the exception of one attack (in April 1948) on a British train that was aimed at 
confiscating weapons, the Irgun stopped its attacks against British targets in 
Palestine.  
However, attempts to begin negotiations between the Irgun and the 
Jewish Agency were foiled by Ben-Gurion, who in a press conference in late 
1947 announced that 'there will be no dialogue with the dissidents...if they will 
dissolve their organisations and lay down their arms, they could volunteer to 
the defence of the community, just like any other Jew if they will be found fit.'321 
Ben-Gurion's contempt towards the Irgun was demonstrated in his speech 
during a Zionist congress that was held in Zurich in August 1947: 'the moral 
and political danger posed by the Irgun's terrorists' lies not only in their actions 
but in their very existence.'322 In Katz's opinion, Ben-Gurion simply abhorred 
Jabotinsky and Begin and thus rejected any opportunity to even talk with the 
Irgun. Had he not hated the revisionists so much, Katz believes that 'we might 
have got much further.'323  
When it was apparent that a Jewish state would be proclaimed as soon 
as the British forces would leave Palestine, Ben-Gurion's attention was entirely 
directed at uniting the fragmented Jewish community in which 'sectional 
interests were put above the interests of the community as a whole.'324 He 
devoted his time to outlining the democratic nature of the future Jewish state 
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and to bring about the dismantling of the Irgun. Abba Eban, the Jewish Agency's 
liaison officer to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) 
and future Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote in his memoirs that when 
he met Ben-Gurion to announce the partition plan, he found him 'rumbling with 
anger about the independent military actions' of the Irgun and the 'necessity to 
liquidate dissident organizations so as to affirm the national discipline.'325 By 
early 1948 Ben-Gurion assumed the position of head of the Provisional 
Government, and since the security of the new democratic state was the most 
urgent concern, he insisted that all official and dissident armed organisations 
had to be put under one central authority, since without it there would be no 
security at all.326 Accordingly, he notified the Irgun that there is only one way 
for it to become a legitimate part of the future state – to disband the 
organisation and to integrate into the Haganah.  
Ben-Gurion was determined to announce the establishment of the State 
of Israel on the same day the British evacuated Palestine. However, since it was 
clear that the surrounding Arab states would invade immediately upon the 
declaration of independence of a Jewish state, some members of the Provisional 
Government wished to postpone the proclamation of the state to a time in 
which security could be better guaranteed.327 In light of Ben-Gurion's political 
problems in achieving the necessary majority to pass a vote on declaring 
independence, Begin quickly published a counter statement intended to 
pressure Ben-Gurion that read:   
The Hebrew government will be established. There is no "maybe". 
It will. If the official leadership will establish the government – we 
will stand behind it in full force. But if the leadership will 
surrender to the threats or influenced by temptations – the force 
of the majority of the Hebrew youth will stand behind the free 
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government, that will rise from the underground to lead the 
people to the war of freedom and victory.328 
Ultimately, Ben-Gurion managed to get the necessary vote for the 
proclamation and on 14 May 1948, the establishment of Israel was announced 
and the declaration of Independence was signed. No one from the Irgun was 
invited either to the ceremony or to sign the declaration. Evidently, the Irgun 
was boycotted and its instrumental contribution to the British withdrawal from 
Palestine was ignored. Remembering Begin's explicit threat, Ben-Gurion 
treated the Irgun as rebels who threatened the cohesion of the state and used 
the apparatus of government to shun the Irgun. Ben-Gurion's perspective 
remained resolute even though Begin himself announced in a radio broadcast, 
on the same day, that the Irgun no longer perceived itself to be a separate 
fighting force in the new state and accepted the authority of the Israeli 
government: 
The Irgun is leaving the underground inside the boundaries of the 
Hebrew independent state…Now, for the time being, we have 
Hebrew rule in part of our homeland. And as in this part there will 
be Hebrew law – and that it the only rightful law in this country – 
there is no need for a Hebrew Underground. In the State of Israel 
we shall be soldiers and builders. And we shall respect its 
Government, for it is our Government.329 
To exercise Israel's democratic regime, the government opened 
negotiations on the incorporation of the Irgun and Lehi into the IDF, which was 
formally established on 26 May 1948. By then Lehi was left with only a small 
number of activists and weapons, hence it quickly announced that its arms 
would be handed over to the state and its members would join the national 
army.330 An interim agreement was also reached between the government and 
the Irgun stipulating that Irgun members would join the army in separate 
homogenous units and all operations inside Israel would cease. It was also 
agreed that Irgun's weapons would be decommissioned and that a senior Irgun 
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commander would take part in the new IDF's Chiefs of Staff. Another important 
clause stated that all independent purchases of arms by the Irgun were 
prohibited.331 On 27 May 1948, the Irgun's High Command announced that now 
that a Hebrew army has been established, the Irgun's battalions are ready to 
join the IDF and to be of service to the state in its war against the enemies.332 
Despite the Irgun's clear message, several senior Haganah commanders 
opposed any cooperation with Irgun members under the auspices of a national 
defence army. Among them was David Shaltiel, IDF district leader who 
commanded several Irgun battalions. He explained that if he had the authority 
he would have put Irgun members in a concentration camp, yet he followed the 
order given to him by the IDF's headquarters.333   
It is widely believed that Begin agreed to the terms arranging the Irgun's 
incorporation into the IDF, and opposed 'any effort to continue the Irgun as an 
expatriate organization.'334 However, Sasson Sofer argues that Begin, in effect, 
was not 'able to impose his instructions on the Irgun command and rank and 
file to enlist in the IDF and hand over their arms.'335 Apparently, some elements 
in the Irgun were not ready to give up independent armed capabilities, 
explaining that not all objectives have been achieved. The central objective that 
they referred to was the liberation of Jerusalem, that was under international 
trusteeship and was not officially proclaimed as part of Israel. Therefore Irgun 
members in Jerusalem maintained their separate arms and units and continued 
to fight outside the authority of the government.336  
Although within the state borders Irgun members joined the IDF, Ben-
Gurion used the Irgun's refusal to give up their arms in Jerusalem to stress that 
it was violating the agreement. Obviously, the Israeli Government could not 
acquiesce in such activity that was undermining its power. Ben-Gurion issued 
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threats to use force against the Irgun and when the possibility of a 
reconciliation meeting between the two arch-rivals was suggested, Begin 
refused to meet with 'the informant who collaborated with the British.'337 Ben-
Gurion, as well, refused to meet Begin and grant him the legitimacy and 
recognition he yearned for. He was constantly looking for an opportunity to 
dissolve the Irgun and such an opportunity presented itself when he received 
information that the Irgun was bringing a ship to Israel carrying weapons for 
its own units. 
The story of the ship – Altalena – is most vital for understanding the 
Irgun's abandonment of violence and the degree of influence that a state-policy 
could have on a dissident organisation. It all began four months before the 
independence of Israel, when Irgun supporters in Paris planned to send arms to 
their comrades fighting in Jerusalem. Evidently, when Begin approved the 
agreement with the Israeli government on the incorporation of the Irgun into 
the army, he failed to mention Altalena. Due to technical problems, the ship set 
sail to Israel one month after the state was proclaimed. At that time, the UN 
brokered a ceasefire between Israel and the invading Arab armies, during 
which no arms or recruits could be delivered to any fronts. However, onboard 
the ship were 920 men and women and the cargo included millions of bullets, 
thousands of rifles and many tons of military equipment and explosives, that 
could, undoubtedly, help the young state in its war against seven better 
equipped Arab armies.338 Therefore, the Irgun decided to continue with the 
plan and to covertly unload the ship upon arrival at its destination.  
It is now known that Begin notified the government about the arrival of 
the ship and offered a settlement in which the IDF would get the majority of the 
weapons, while 20% of them would be allotted to Irgun members in Jerusalem 
and to Irgun army units.339 But Ben-Gurion rejected the offer and demanded a 
full compliance with the agreement and handing over the ship and its cargo to 
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the IDF. Bell explains Ben-Gurion's refusal in years of suspicion and enmity that 
could not be lifted easily and his perception of Begin and the Irgun as 
untrustworthy.340  
Understandably, in a democratic state that upholds the rule of law there 
was no room for a separate army in any shape, form and place. Eban explains 
that Ben-Gurion understood that the main issues were not the weapons and 
how they would be allocated, but rather sovereignty and authority; 'if a 
government does not have a monopoly of armed forces, it has no way of 
carrying out its international obligations or maintaining its internal 
authority.'341 Ben-Gurion saw Altalena as an attempt to defy the democratic 
authority of the state, and he ordered the IDF to gather a substantial force on 
the beach where the Irgun was planning to unload the cargo.342 When a 
government minister warned that this could escalate into battle, Ben-Gurion 
answered: 'A threat is meaningful only if it is backed up by a willingness to 
carry it out.'343 He warned the government that 'if the head of the Irgun will not 
be humiliated once and for all, he [Begin] will create two separate armies in 
Israel…therefore either you hand the government over to Begin or you tell him 
that if he will not stop these actions – we will shoot!'344 Subsequently, the 
government issued a statement that it: 
…decided to take all necessary measures to prevent the Irgun 
from unloading those weapons. The Government regards this 
attempt by an independent group to bring in arms, particularly 
during the truce period, as a grave violation of Israel's law and of 
her international obligations.345  
Clearly, by aggressively opposing the Irgun, Ben-Gurion saw an 
opportunity to consolidate both the authority of his government and the Israeli 
democratic regime. Indeed, he 'had no intention to stand idly by while the Irgun 
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became a military threat to the new state,' and Begin would have 'to recognize 
the legitimate authority or pay the consequences.'346  
When the ship finally anchored on the shores of Kfar Vitkin, on 20 June 
1948, it became clear that the primary threat was not the violation of the UN 
ceasefire but rather the danger of civil war. Shortly after Irgun members 
serving in the IDF began to unload the cargo, they were surrounded by six-
hundred fellow soldiers. The military district commander delivered Begin with 
a ten-minute ultimatum to hand the weapons over to the army. Begin rejected 
the ultimatum as he thought that this is a complicated matter that could not be 
settled in such a short time and asked to meet with the officer.347 Begin refused 
to believe that IDF soldiers would open fire on their brothers and reassured his 
men that there was nothing to worry about since 'Jews do not shoot at Jews.'348 
After quick consultation on the shore, it was decided that Begin would board 
the ship and sail to Tel Aviv; an Irgun stronghold where foreign officials and 
journalists resided. But before Begin boarded the ship the IDF was given an 
order to open fire on Irgun members resulting in 32 Jewish casualties.  
The bloodshed on the beach shocked Begin, and threw him into an 
emotional turbulence. Overwhelmed by grief and disbelief, he quickly boarded 
the ship that set course to Tel Aviv escorted by two IDF naval destroyers. Upon 
reaching Tel Aviv, air force combat planes flew over the ship and a great crowd 
gathered on the beach to witness the event. Ben-Gurion used the arrival of the 
ship to Tel Aviv to further inflame the situation. He telephoned the IDF 
commander on scene and told him: 
We are being faced with open revolt. Not only is Tel Aviv in 
danger of falling to the rebel forces, but the very future of the 
state is at stake…Your new assignment may be the toughest one 
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you've had so far. But I'm depending on you to do what is 
necessary for the sake of Israel.349 
Onboard the ship, Begin spoke to the soldiers on the beach asking them 
not to open fire, informing the crowed that they brought weapons for everyone, 
and promising that the Irgun's intentions are to fight alongside the IDF not 
against it.350  Nonetheless, Begin misinterpreted Ben-Gurion's determination to 
crush the Irgun's operations. Loyal to his conviction that 'there would be but 
one center of civil and military authority in the state and that no dissident 
action would be tolerated,' Ben-Gurion ordered the IDF to bomb the ship.351 In 
the heavy artillery barrage and the exchange of fire that followed, 16 Irgun 
members and two IDF soldiers were killed with another 70 injured. Moreover, 
hundreds of Irgun members were arrested, their headquarters were raided and 
a curfew was imposed on Tel Aviv. According to Ehud Sprinzak, the scene of the 
burning ship and the clashes between Irgun members and IDF soldiers 'would 
haunt Israeli collective consciousness for many years to come.'352 
As the ship was about to sink, a ceasefire was negotiated and all the 
casualties were evacuated. Begin insisted on leaving the burning ship last. Yet, 
even at the face of civil war, Begin could not bring himself to order retaliation. 
Ever loyal to his conviction that national unity must be maintained, later that 
evening, moved to tears, he broadcasted: 
Irgun soldiers will not be a party to fratricidal warfare, but 
neither will they accept the discipline of Ben-Gurion's army any 
longer. Within the state area we shall continue our political 
activities. Our fighting strength we shall conserve for the enemy 
outside.353 
To Begin's annoyance, Ben-Gurion announced before the government 
that 'blessed be the gun which set the ship on fire – that gun will have its place 
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in Israel's war museum.'354 To this provocative language, the Irgun responded 
with its most radical pamphlet that reflects the loathing and contempt towards 
Ben-Gurion's government following the Altalena affair: 
The Provisional Government and its leader committed yesterday 
the most horrific crimes against the nation. Under Ben-Gurion's 
order, a Hebrew arms ship was bombed with the intention to 
destroy the men onboard and its priceless cargo…wounded 
people could have been saved unless the behaviour of the "insane 
dictator". A government that is capable of doing such things…is 
not worthy to lead…it is now clear that Ben-Gurion's government 
is leading a rule of intimidation and mass murder.355 
After Altalena the Irgun's disbandment was only a matter of time, and it 
seemed that Ben-Gurion's decisive and daring response had taken its toll on the 
Irgun's resilience. Two days after the incident, the Irgun stated that it would 
commence its activity as a political movement.356 Afterwards, Begin and other 
Irgun senior leaders 'made their peace with reality, lowered their sights, and 
turn[ed] their attention elsewhere.'357 They mainly channeled their activity 
through the Irgun's new political party, Herut that was officially formed after 
Israel's declaration of independence, although 'its reputation as a democratic 
party was damaged by the Altalena affair.'358  
Nonetheless, the Irgun's operations in Jerusalem continued in what was 
its last separate stronghold, and Ben-Gurion still had his eye on completely 
dismantling the Irgun. The assassination in Jerusalem of Count Folke 
Bernadotte, the UN mediator in Palestine, by a Lehi splinter cell on 17 
September 1948, served as the ideal validation to act against the remaining 
dissident Irgun factions. Eban notes that the murder of Bernadotte was 'once 
again an armed action with far-reaching political consequences [that] had been 
taken outside the scope of constituted authority,' to which Ben-Gurion reacted 
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firmly.359 On 20 September 1948, Ben-Gurion ordered the IDF to issue the Irgun 
commander in Jerusalem with a 24-hour ultimatum to cease all operations and 
to decommission, or else all necessary measures will be employed to do so. The 
Irgun was facing two alternatives – to risk further bloodshed or to accept the 
ultimatum. A day later it announced that:  
When taking into consideration the burden of responsibility for 
the fate of the Hebrew people and the sovereignty of the state, 
and in order to prevent further Jewish bloodshed, the painful 
decision is to accept the ultimatum. Irgun members will join the 
IDF.360         
Later that evening in a press conference, the Irgun confirmed that it 
ceased to exist as a separate militant organisation and that it would fully 
integrate with the IDF. Furthermore, it publicly announced that it would 
continue operations exclusively through legitimate political activity, and that it 
will teach Ben-Gurion a lesson by acting as the only opposition to his deceitful 
and short-lived rule.361 In this statement, the Irgun, that for almost two decades 
was the most powerful dissident Jewish organisation, officially lay down its 
arms and renounced the use of violence as a means to an end. The integration 
of the Irgun into the Israeli political system was now complete. 
 
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 
To provide a comprehensive analysis of the Irgun's transition from 
violence to politics it is important to address the international system that was 
also instrumental in its decision to integrate into the Israeli political system. 
Although events and processes on the systemic level had no direct connection 
to the Irgun, they certainly encouraged the creation of an independent Jewish 
state and thus significantly influenced its thinking and course of action. The 
three most important events that are closely intertwined and will be discussed 
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are the Holocaust, American support in establishing a Jewish state, and the 
appointment of UNSCOP and its decision to partition Palestine.  
The ramifications of WWII on the Jewish people are well-known; the 
Holocaust, in which six million Jews were murdered by the Nazis, gave 
prominence to the need to provide shelter and security to the remnants of 
European Jewry that were confined to displaced-person's (DP) camps in 
Europe. In the final stages of WWII, the Jewish Agency's repeated requests to 
open the gates of Palestine for Jewish immigration went unheeded, and the 
British Government was perceived as aiding and abetting Germany to 
annihilate the Jewish population in Europe. Katz argues that Britain was not 
willing to lift a finger 'to stop the process of the killing in Nazi Europe, because 
they knew that at the end of it all there would be fewer Jews to worry about in 
Palestine.'362 Nicholas Bethell agrees that inside the British Government in 
general and within the Foreign Office in particular, there was lack of sympathy 
for the Jewish and Zionist causes, which resulted in British officials averting 
'their eyes from the most pressing humanitarian considerations imaginable.' 363 
Moreover, the Holocaust had great influence not only on the Jewish community 
in Palestine but also on UN representatives who visited the DP camps and 
found that the Jewish refugees 'were unalterably determined to emigrate' to 
Palestine, and this had some impact in convincing them that a just solution 
must be produced.364  
The necessity to resolve the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe 
brought a powerful third party – the United States – into the Palestine issue. 
The US in the post-WWII era was strongly committed to Europe's security and 
heavily involved in the continental affairs. Consequently, Britain, as America's 
traditional ally, wished to share the burden of Palestine – politically if not 
materially – with the winning superpower. The British Government sought to 
secure some level of American participation in this seemingly intractable 
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conflict and to 'encourage a new sense of responsibility in the United States.'365 
However, the US was also supportive of the Zionist cause not least because of 
the Jewish political strength in the American administration and politics. 
Although the foreign policy and defence establishments accepted the benefits 
deriving from siding with the Arab world, most politicians favoured the Zionist 
cause. Along the years, the Jewish community in the US had built 'a vast, 
overlapping complex of influence and enthusiasm, which they used to collect 
and dispatch funds and to maintain Jewish morale,' throughout the American 
political spectrum.366 Certainly, when the American Government was invited by 
the British to get involved in the Palestine question, the Jewish people gained a 
powerful ally that had considerable influence in generating the final outcome of 
an independent Jewish state. 
Shortly after the scope of the Jewish disaster in Europe was revealed, on 
24 July 1945, US President Harry Truman expressed American support for the 
Jewish cause in a letter to Churchill: 'I venture to express to you the hope that 
the British Government may find it possible without delay to take steps to lift 
the restrictions of the White Paper on Jewish immigration into Palestine.'367 
Days later, following an American report that criticised the way Jewish refugees 
were treated in DP camps, Truman asked the new British Premier, Clement 
Atlee, to immediately allow 100,000 Jewish refugees to emigrate to Palestine. In 
his request, Truman emphasised that 'no other single matter is so important for 
those who have known the horrors of the concentration camps for over a 
decade as is the future of immigration possibilities to Palestine.'368 Once again, 
the Holocaust was used as a catalyst to resolve the Palestine question in favour 
of the Jewish people, and with the American president on their side Palestinian 
Jews believed that the creation of a Jewish state was closer than ever.  
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Although the British Government could not allow itself to disregard the 
American request, it was clear that in order to protect Britain's political, 
economic and strategic interests in the Middle East, it was necessary to 
maintain Arab and Muslim goodwill towards Britain. On the other hand, since 
the British Government needed the American support and finance, 'Britain 
could not afford to appear pro-Arab, and she would have at least to pay lip 
service to American Zionist opinion.'369 The price Britain had to pay was the 
formation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to investigate the 
problem of Jewish refugees in DP camps, on 13 November 1945. The British 
suggestion of a joint committee was intended not only to involve the US in the 
matter but also to postpone the submission of the Mandate of Palestine to the 
UN.370 Incidentally, the Irgun submitted a memorandum to the American 
members of the committee, in which it wrote that all attempts to appeal to the 
British conscience, justice and sense of humanitarianism were in vain, and 
therefore it was 'determined, in our relations with them, to use no other words 
but "fight!".'371  
The committee's report was published in 20 April 1946 and 
acknowledged that Palestine alone cannot provide a solution to all Jewish 
refugees in Europe. It recommended the admittance of 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine without linking this issue to the wholesale disarmament of illegal 
Jewish organisations, and the creation of a bi-national state under a UN 
umbrella.372 It seemed that the report tried to please both the US and British 
interests; it accepted Truman's request to grant entry to a significant number of 
Jewish refugees, and supported the British demand to maintain its presence by 
creating a trusteeship composed of Jewish and Arab provinces.373 Nevertheless, 
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everyone found reasons to reject the recommendations. The British 
Government quickly claimed that the report was: 
Unenforceable and would spell the beginning of a long period of 
unrest in the whole Arab world…it could only be enforced if 
Britain received financial, political and military support from the 
United States, and if illegal Jewish organisations were 
disarmed.374  
The Muslims wanted the whole of Palestine as an Arab state, and the US 
was sceptical about the political implications of the report. The Jewish Agency, 
although pleased with the approval of 100,000 Jewish immigrants, argued that 
the recommendations 'would not create the appropriate conditions for a Jewish 
national home.'375  
The Irgun also discarded the committee's report, but it found a positive 
side to it as the report 'left no room for illusions about the mood of the British 
Government and its determination to carry out the policy of the White Paper to 
the end.'376 Ultimately, due to strong opposition, the Anglo-American 
Committee's report did not come into fruition and the British Government was 
forced to look for another alternative to resolve the Palestine problem. 
However, it did succeed in elevating the Palestine issue to the centre of the 
international agenda and to the attention of powerful actors such as the US and 
the UN.  
After several other failed attempts to resolve the Palestine problem, 
British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, declared that the 'choice was now 
between an imposed solution and recourse to the United Nations.'377 As the 
situation in Palestine continued to deteriorate and the number of deployed 
British troops and financial investment mounted daily, an imposed solution 
seemed unrealistic and in February 1947 the government announced that it 
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would refer the Palestine question back to the UN.378 In its decision the British 
Government was hoping to rid itself from the heavy burdens needed to sustain 
the mandate, while retaining some privileges in Palestine specifically and in the 
region in general. Yet, the immediate implication of the decision was the loss of 
a strategically important British position in the Middle East as well as access to 
oil and other significant resources. A Foreign Office analysis concluded that 
surrendering Palestine to the UN would be interpreted by the Arab states as a 
sign of weakness and would generate a feeling 'that they could no longer rely 
on British interest and support, and our influence would rapidly decline.'379  
Referring Palestine to the UN was the most influential international 
factor contributing to the creation of Israel. On 15 May 1947, the UN appointed 
a Special Committee to investigate the best possible solution. UNSCOP's report 
was published on 31 August 1947, and despite many differences and 
disagreements there was a unanimous support for the idea that the mandate 
must end.380 The majority proposed a tripartite partition creating Jewish and 
Arab states and an internationalised Jerusalem under UN trusteeship. 
Furthermore, 150,000 Jewish immigrants would be allowed to enter the new 
Jewish state. The minority suggested the creation of an independent federal 
state after a three-year transitional period under the authority of the UN.381 
Despite the disagreements, the most significant element that stemmed from the 
UN report was re-introducing the concept of partition, initially launched in 
1937 and which was never officially taken off the table. 
The Jewish Agency, which by then had lost all confidence in the British 
Government, saw the submission of Palestine back to the UN as a 'great 
opportunity for international conciliation under the auspices of the new world 
organisation.'382 It also viewed partition as the 'only remedy that combined 
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finality, equality and justice.'383 While partition had become the approved 
policy of the Jewish Agency, the Irgun saw it as an unreasonable concession. 
Accordingly, Begin declared in a radio broadcast that the Irgun 'shall fight these 
plans, even if the majority of the Jewish Agency sees them as the solution of the 
Palestine issue. We shall never acquiesce in the partitioning of our 
homeland.'384 The Arabs also did not want anything to do with the UN and 
rejected partition claiming that the 'UN had no right to give away what was 
Arab history and population.'385 However, they encouraged the British 
evacuation, believing that once the British army was gone, they could invade 
Palestine and 'would end the problem once and for all.'386 
On the day before the partition plan was brought to the General 
Assembly's vote, Bevin submitted a detailed outline for British withdrawal from 
Palestine, pointing out 14 May 1948 as the last day of the British Mandate of 
Palestine.387 On 29 November 1947 the plan was adopted by 33 states against 
13; after decades of fighting it was determined that two states would be 
established in Palestine – one Jewish and the other Arab (see map 2). 
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Source: http://www.americanthinker.com  
Map 2: UN partition plan for Palestine (1947) 
When analysing the indirect systemic effect specifically on the Irgun's 
political integration, one must consider this against the organisational factors 
and the state policies that occurred simultaneously. In 1945, when the 
international involvement in Palestine gained prominence, the Irgun was very 
much committed to its armed struggle against the British with even more 
vigour. However, any advance on the international level that promoted the 
creation of an independent Jewish state and the withdrawal of the British 
forces, necessarily brought the Irgun closer to end its fighting. More 
importantly, after the Holocaust, an event of global magnitude that reinforced 
the Zionist cause, it was very difficult to rationalise the continuation of the 
British Mandate of Palestine and the prevention of Jewish immigration, and 
indirectly advanced the Irgun towards complete renunciation of violence. The 
Holocaust also accelerated the international community's desire to resolve the 
Palestine problem peacefully. As an outcome of the international work towards 
the establishment of a Jewish state, the Jewish Agency became more 




creation of a Jewish state. Thus, bringing the Irgun's revolt to an end also 
became a priority for the official Jewish institutions.   
However, this could not be achieved without a powerful international 
ally that would support the Zionist cause and grant it worldwide recognition. 
Palestinian Jews found such an ally in the US administration that was 
supportive of the establishment of a Jewish state. The US was an important 
source of influence and assistance not only for the Jewish Agency, but also for 
the Irgun, which invested resources in building a solid stronghold among the 
American Jewry.  
Throughout the years the Irgun established a network of American 
organisations that lobbied to undermine the legitimacy of the British Mandate 
of Palestine and supported the Jewish aspiration to return to their homeland. 
These organisations also rallied political support for the Irgun, raised funds, 
and eventually 'generated their own momentum, proposed their own programs 
and policies, and evolved into independent forces.'388 Moreover, Begin was 
perceived by the American administration as the leader of the most powerful 
opposition to the Jewish Agency, and assessed that there was a probability that 
in the future Begin would lead the new Jewish state.389 The strong relations that 
the Irgun had in the US, provided some degree of reassurance and security that 
the Zionist cause would eventually be realised.390 This in turn, allowed the 
Irgun to exercise flexibility in its dealings with the Jewish Agency, and since the 
realisation of the Jewish state was only a matter of time, compromise had 
become a viable alternative.   
The international actor that positively sealed the matter of a Jewish 
state, and had the greatest influence on the Irgun's transition from violence to 
politics, was UNSCOP and its decision to partition Palestine. Before publishing 
its report, the Special Committee thoroughly discussed the issue of Palestine 
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and met with representatives from all sides involved. While political 
deliberations took place in Europe and in the Middle East, the Irgun continued 
its violent attacks against the British forces in Palestine. It simply refused to let 
politics distract its attention from its main objectives, and thus it rejected any 
plan that would deny the Jewish people their historic right in Palestine. Yet, 
though the Jewish Agency and the British did their best to de-legitimise the 
Irgun and its violent struggle, UNSCOP, surprisingly, invited the Irgun, in July 
1947, to a meeting during which it was asked to submit its views on the 
situation in Palestine. At the meeting the Irgun's representatives handed 
UNSCOP members a memorandum titled "The Jewish State as the Complete 
Solution of the Jewish Problem". Furthermore, in August and again in October 
1947, the Irgun sent USCOP telegrams with the organisation's strategy 
regarding the Palestine question.391 Following the submission, the High 
Command's report concluded that the Irgun was officially recognised as a 
legitimate actor within the Jewish community in Palestine whose views must be 
taken into account.392  
For the first time the Irgun was exposed to international political 
negotiations and asked to be involved as an active participant and to contribute 
its insight on a possible resolution in Palestine. Days before UNSCOP published 
its report, the High Command reported that the meeting with UN delegates was 
held in good spirits, and although there was little hope that the Irgun's demand 
of a Greater Israel would be accepted by the committee, the existence of the 
meeting in itself reinforced the status of the Irgun in the eyes of the 
international system.393 Clearly, the Irgun's international legitimacy had 
substantial impact on relinquishing the ideological objective of a Jewish state 
on both sides of the Jordan River, compromising the creation of a Hebrew 
sovereign entity whilst realising that there could be no apparent justification 
for the continuation of the violent struggle once an independent state was 
proclaimed.  
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The Irgun is in no way a typical case study of terrorist political 
integration, not least because its central objective, the establishment of a Jewish 
state, was successfully accomplished. Throughout its armed campaign against 
the British rule, the Irgun 'established a revolutionary model that thereafter 
was emulated and embraced by both anticolonial and postcolonial-era terrorist 
groups around the world.'394 Likewise, the transformational process that the 
Irgun underwent epitomised a successful terrorist political integration.  
Although each examined factor had a different impact, the overall 
influence of the observed factors was overwhelmingly positive. While not all 
factors played in favour of adopting politics, it is nonetheless clear that as a 
terrorist organisation the Irgun's political integration offers a model, especially 
when compared to modern-day equivalents.  
Examination of the organisational perspective initially reveals the 
Irgun's utilitarian understanding of violence as well as the moderate perception 
of and behaviour towards the Jewish Agency. These attributes point toward a 
fair degree of readiness to accept political compromise, under the condition 
that a Jewish state be established. In fact, it was sometimes the preferred 
alternative, especially when the level of public support for the Irgun was low or 
when the British military offensive was too formidable to handle alone.  
Contrary to the observation of "the enemy" that prevails in current 
ideological philosophies of terrorist organisations, the Irgun did not want to kill 
all British personnel in Palestine nor did it question the existence of the United 
Kingdom. Although the mandatory administration was treated as an existential 
threat that must be removed, the Irgun imposed self-restraint and at times even 
a pinch of humanity in exercising its armed campaign against the British forces. 
Distinctively, the Irgun did not define operational success as killing as many 
people as possible or in attacking every accessible British target, but rather as 
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achieving a specific strategic objective; in its name violence was permissible. 
Unlike some other active terrorist organisations that perceive violence and 
killing as a religious duty or an operational goal, the Irgun as a principle 
employed violence only when necessary and with the intention to minimise the 
loss of life. In his memoirs, Begin admitted that the Irgun used physical violence 
to overthrow and replace the British rule, yet he rejected the use of the term 
"terrorist" attributed to the underground organisation: 'we were not a 
"terrorist" group – neither in the structure of our organisation, in our methods 
of warfare, nor in spirit.'395     
Moreover, the Irgun openly recognised its place in the Jewish political 
order and denied any aspirations for control over people or territory. It also 
accepted Ben-Gurion's leadership and the Jewish Agency's political 
prominence. Indeed, the Irgun's political ambition was restricted to becoming a 
legitimate actor in the community; an actor that could freely espouse its 
different views, be heard by the public and consulted with in times of need. In 
that sense, Begin's devotion to the prevention of civil war demonstrated that he 
was ready to sacrifice his organisation in order to maintain communal 
cohesion. Rubi Rivlin, former Speaker of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) 
and member of the Likud party (the successor of Herut), recently wrote that the 
Irgun never denied the legitimacy of an elected leader and never perceived its 
political rival as an enemy.396 Holding such moderate views towards the Jewish 
Agency and fervently committed to national unity and the prevention of civil 
war, made it easier for the Irgun to deal with an opponent that was respected.  
The breakaway of the Lehi and the fact that it promoted a far more 
radical ideology and strategy than the Irgun, best illustrated in Lehi's 
exploration of a possible collaboration with the Nazis and plans for the 
assassination of high ranking British politicians in London, is another 
significant factor that contributed to the Irgun's political integration. Contrary 
to Lehi's messianic nature, that at times led to irresponsible use of violence, the 
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Irgun truly believed that it served as the conscience of the Jewish people.397 
This inevitably obliged the imposition of moral and operational limitations on 
its strategy and tactical uses of force.398 Moreover, since the international 
community and the majority of Jews in the Diaspora perceived Lehi and the 
Irgun as representing the same right-wing ideology, it was paramount for the 
Irgun to distinguish itself from the fanatical group of Lehi men. By taking a 
more moderate approach, one that was also more appealing to the community 
as a whole, the Irgun was in fact willing to consider political compromise, not 
least to prevent greater divisions among Palestinian Jews. 
The level of public support that the Irgun enjoyed throughout its years 
of operation is equally important to its abandonment of terrorism. Despite the 
success and instrumental role in the collective Jewish fight against the British, 
the Irgun 'failed to spearhead a movement of civil uprising, did not broaden its 
political influence in the Yishuv [Jewish community in Palestine], and did not 
develop into a force able to decide the political or strategic course of the Zionist 
movement.'399 Indeed, once the Irgun realised that the general public attitude 
opposed violence and it had become practically an outcast in the Jewish 
community, the Irgun carefully sought an alternative to violence. The prospects 
of a Jewish nation and later the establishment of Israel gave the Irgun the 
justification to abandon terrorism and to adopt political means to achieve its 
ideological objectives. By integrating into Israel's political system, the Irgun 
hoped to maximise its public standing among Israelis and to gain more popular 
ground for its legitimate political party, which could eventually lead the 
nationalist ideology into the heart of the Israeli political consensus. This 
approach proved itself as wise long-term planning, when in 1977 the Irgun's 
political party, Herut, won Israeli parliamentary elections and Begin was 
appointed as Prime Minister. For the first time in Israel's short history, the 
government was headed by a right-wing leader and the 30-year rule of the 
Labour party came to an end. At least from a popular point of view, the Irgun's 
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political philosophy won the hearts and minds of Israelis, and brought Begin to 
the tip of the democratic political hierarchy.  
Based on the analysis of the British policy towards the Irgun, one can 
conclude that relying on a single military policy against a terrorist organisation 
could eventually result in a more uncompromising response and escalation in 
the level of violence. The British Government mistakenly treated the Irgun as a 
military problem, and not as political actor whose grievance needed to be 
addressed in order to secure the abandonment of its violent means. Seeing the 
Irgun solely through a security prism dismissed the nature of its ideological 
demand that was highly popular within the Jewish community. Although the 
Irgun's violent strategy did not receive the same public support as its ideology, 
the fact that the Irgun was constantly hunted down by the British, often at the 
cost of interrupting the daily lives of the Jewish community, resulted in 
mounting opposition towards the mandatory authorities. Additionally, the 
British reluctance to offer a viable political compromise to the Irgun and 
blocking all channels of communication, led the Irgun to implement a more 
hard-line and unyielding approach that the British Government could not deal 
with for extended period of time. Despite the superiority both in troops and 
arms, the British military policy failed to destroy the Irgun, leading the British 
government to relinquish Palestine to the UN and to withdraw its forces. Had 
the British, or the Irgun for that matter, seriously explored the possibility of 
compromise and dialogue, perhaps the Irgun's political integration, would have 
occurred sooner and many lives would have been spared.  
The official Jewish institutions headed by Ben-Gurion adopted a mixture 
of violence and compromise, confrontation and accommodation, in their 
dealing with the Irgun. This policy was fairly successful since it entailed two 
vital advantages that the British lacked in handling the Irgun – the first was the 
support and legitimacy of the Jewish community as a whole, and the second 
was the establishment of a democratic regime in which the Irgun could take 
part. Throughout most of the years of the mandate, Jewish public opinion 




sympathy was offered to the Irgun, the de-legitimisation campaign that was run 
separately by the British and the Jewish Agency was successful, and the Jewish 
community viewed the Irgun as a terrorist organisation that could jeopardise 
the Zionist cause. Even after Israel was established, the public opinion 
supported Ben-Gurion's actions against the Irgun and his handling of the 
Altalena affair, despite the heavy loss of Jewish lives.  
The formation of a democratic state and pluralistic society enabled Ben-
Gurion to offer an incentive for integration and an opportunity for the Irgun to 
channel its ideology to political activity. When Begin finally came to terms with 
the dissolution of the Irgun he 'was intent on demonstrating that he was now 
closing his underground years and moving towards legal party life in the new 
democracy of Israel.'400 Begin attempted to establish a constructive dialogue 
between Herut and the other coalition parties, but his party's platform was 
perceived as radical and he would 'learn by trial and error that governmental 
responsibility involved the abandonment of radical ideology and the adoption 
of a different kind of politics.'401 Indeed, for almost thirty years in the 
opposition, Begin and Herut were kept at a distance from any governmental 
responsibility. Among others, one example of how far Ben-Gurion was willing 
to go to outcast the Irgun was that as Prime Minister he ostracised Begin by 
refusing to call him by his name, but rather as the "Member of the Knesset 
sitting to the right of Yochanan Bader". This cynical example, points out above 
all how the Irgun and Herut were treated in the mainstream public opinion. If 
the ideological philosophy of the Irgun wished to endure, it seems that the 
single viable alternative was to adhere to the norms and rules of the Israeli 
political system and to win power through democratic elections. 
Lastly, the dynamics and events on the international level had 
substantial, albeit indirect, effect on the Irgun's political integration. By 
advancing the establishment of a Jewish state, systemic factors altered the 
Irgun's view on violence and its approach towards politics. Particularly, the UN 
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partition plan that gave the Jewish community a good reason for optimism, and 
was seen as part of a comprehensive international effort to resolve the 
instability in Palestine, 'undermined the significance of the Irgun's independent 
activity,' and brought it on brink of political accommodation.402 Clearly, the 
Irgun had to adapt itself to the changing international political circumstances; 
its lack of enthusiasm to do so was the prime reason for Ben-Gurion's decision 
to exert forceful measures against the Irgun.  
Nonetheless, the Irgun's exposure to world-politics and international 
calculations had a considerable positive effect on its strategy. Taking part in the 
political discussions evolving around the Palestine question had a significant 
effect on the Irgun. Ultimately, the decision to establish a Jewish state 
undermined the Irgun's violent campaign and facilitated the formation of its 
legitimate political party. This shift in strategy was not an easy one to perform 
and was an immense burden on Begin's mental state. Ofer Grosbard, a 
psychologist by profession, argues that the shift from violence to political 
compromise was extremely difficult for Begin, not only because he had to make 
peace with the fact that his dream of Greater Israel has not been accomplished, 
but also since he realised that it meant the disbandment of the Irgun. Moreover, 
Begin acknowledged that he was bound to become a citizen in a state headed by 
his all-time nemesis, David Ben-Gurion.403 Despite the fact that the Irgun 
ideologically objected to the UN partition plan, because it excluded Jerusalem 
and left the state too small to absorb future Jewish immigrants, it was ready to 
move on and protect whatever the international system was willing to give the 
Jews.404  
At long last, in September 1948 the Irgun accepted the government's 
monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, ceased its separate military 
operations and was fully incorporated into the state's national army. In doing 
so, the Irgun achieved the first of the two highest levels of political integration. 
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In 1977, twenty-nine years later, when Begin was elected as Prime Minister of 
Israel and Herut, the political successor of the Irgun, was leading the 




CHAPTER 3: THE ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE  
The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was the deadliest 
Protestant terrorist organisation active throughout the 
Northern Ireland conflict. Jim Cusack and Henry McDonald 
describe the UVF as a terrorist organisation that was 
responsible 'for a series of heinous crimes against 
ordinary people, which have left thousands of families devastated.'405 Its 
principal purpose was for Northern Ireland to remain an integral part of the 
United Kingdom. In the name of this objective, UVF members killed over 500 
people during the period between 1969 and 1998, also known as the Troubles, 
and after the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.406   
A thorough analysis of the UVF's transition from violence to politics 
cannot be complete without reference to the closely linked left-wing political 
party, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), which was established in 1977 and 
promoted the UVF's political ideas. Leaders of the PUP were former terrorists 
with considerable standing in the UVF and supporters came from working-class 
families in Northern Ireland. Since its inception, the party overtly expressed the 
UVF's political ideology in an attempt to 'solidify the base of support for the 
paramilitary action.'407 Contrary to its militant agenda in the past, nowadays 
the PUP is 'committed to maintaining and strengthening the present 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom,' 
through 'accountable democracy,' and a 'power-sharing in a devolved 
government.'408  
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Despite the UVF's support of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which 
the PUP was a party to, in its aftermath both organisations failed to find their 
way in a peaceful society; the UVF did not complete its political integration, 
continued to use violence and was engaged in internal armed clashes with rival 
Protestant groups as well as in criminal and drug-related activity, and the PUP 
was in a state of decline with no clear future in sight.409 Unable to rise above 
communal affairs and ethnic separatism and appeal to the wider Protestant 
constituency, the UVF failed to sustain its base of popular support. Moreover, 
the UVF's violence severely damaged the PUP's political success. Since 
Protestants tend to avoid openly expressing their support for those aligned to 
paramilitary organisations, the vote that the PUP received in the 2011 elections 
was negligible and subsequently the party lost its only seat.410  
The PUP's electoral fiasco signified, above all, the UVF's inability to 
become a credible political force and to attain a positive and constructive role 
in Northern Ireland in a post-conflict era. The UVF realised that its position and 
impact on the political situation in Northern Ireland was insignificant. The fear 
that it might sink into obscurity led the UVF to formally announce in May 2007 
that it would lay down its arms and 'assume a non-military, civilianised role.'411 
After forty years of violence, the UVF completed its transformation from a 
military to a civilian organisation, and vowed to achieve its strategic objectives 
exclusively through democratic and peaceful means. 
Clearly, the UVF played a central part in the Northern Ireland conflict 
but it has generally been overshadowed by the attention given to the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army – commonly referred to as the IRA (or 
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Provos).412 The 'dearth of literature related to all the loyalist terrorist 
movements' involved in the conflict 'may be somewhat deliberate,' but it does 
not change the reality that the story of the UVF is heavily under-researched.413 
Particularly, the countless studies of the Troubles 'have insufficiently explained 
the rationale underpinning the UVF’s use of the military instrument or why it 
finally decided to call a halt to its terrorist campaign in May 2007.'414  
There is considerable value in analysing the UVF's transition from 
violence to politics. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that unlike most terrorist 
organisations that fought against a state or an existing political order, the UVF 
not only supported a sovereign state but also wished to remain linked to it. To 
this end, the UVF is characterised by Steve Bruce, a leading expert on loyalist 
ideology and violence, as a pro-state organisation; a status that entails a range 
of factors and dynamics that are fundamentally different from other terrorists' 
participation in legitimate politics.415   
   
"FOR GOD AND ULSTER" 
The history of the Northern Ireland conflict has been comprehensively 
researched and discussed. Nonetheless, for the purpose of situating the reader, 
it is important to set out the context which led to the creation of the UVF.  
In essence, the Northern Ireland conflict is a clash between sovereignty 
and identity. The territory known today as Northern Ireland has a long history 
of bloody rebellions dating back to the beginning of the British rule in the 12th 
century. In the 16th and 17th centuries British monarchs began settling Scottish 
and English subjects, who were mostly Protestants, in the Northern part of the 
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Irish island, which was predominantly occupied by Catholics (a colonising 
process known as the "plantation of Ulster"416). The fact that the new settlers 
were racially and religiously different than the native Irish people influenced 
the 'relations between the two groups,' which 'were generally distant and 
periodically degenerated into open warfare.'417 In 1800 the British parliament 
passed the Act of Union that abolished the Irish assembly and put the entire 
island under direct British rule governed from London. The Act had social, 
economic and constitutional consequences that ultimately inflamed an Irish-
Catholic nationalist sentiment that opposed such legislation and exerted 
political pressure on successive British governments. 
By the end of the 19th century, the Catholics' demand for Home Rule 
advocating the restoration of Ireland as an independent and a sovereign entity 
grew stronger. Fearing to be put under the control of a Catholic-dominated 
Ireland, the Protestant minority threatened to rebel against the move. The 
ensuing debate produced the two main rival communities in Northern Ireland 
with separate national identities: the Unionists (mostly Protestants) that 
viewed Northern Ireland as a legitimate part of the United Kingdom and the 
Nationalists (mostly Catholics) that wished to have greater autonomy and 
eventually to establish an independent Irish Republic. Respectively, the two 
communities developed more radical expressions of militancy that advocated 
the use of violence for political purposes; Loyalism and Republicanism. 
The British government's response to the Catholic demands was to 
introduce several Home Rule proposals in the Westminster Parliament. 
Although the first two bills suffered parliamentary defeats, the third passed in 
1912 and it seemed that Ireland would become a self-governing autonomy 
ruled by the majority Catholic population. Out of fear that the 'British 
Government was bent on selling them out to a united Ireland,' the Protestant 
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majority in Ulster, who ferociously opposed self-rule from Dublin, formed the 
Ulster Volunteer Force – the original incarnation of the present terrorist 
organisation.418 Under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson, the UVF – the first 
loyalist paramilitary organisation – brought together several groups of 
volunteers into a well structured, trained and armed force. The prospects of 
Home Rule rallied the Protestants to sign a Covenant pledging to use 'all means 
which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a 
Home Rule Parliament in Ireland.'419 The implicit threat to use violence 
dominated the unionist psyche for generations to come. It also best reflected 
the predicament of Northern Ireland's Protestants – their 'loyalty to the crown 
was tempered by an occasional, sometimes violent, disloyalty to its 
government.'420  
The disciplined UVF was the main unionist apparatus in the threat to use 
military resistance, should the plans for Home Rule materialise. Yet, the Home 
Rule Act never came into effect and a civil war was averted, due to the outbreak 
of World War I in July 1914. Three days after hostilities began the British War 
Secretary, Lord Kitchener, recognising the patriotism of Ulstermen, expressed 
his desire that UVF men would enlist into the British army. Ten thousand UVF 
members accepted his call and joined the 36th Ulster Division. Their enthusiasm 
to fight alongside the British army despite the looming constitutional crisis at 
home is explained by Peter Taylor, a British journalist who wrote extensively 
on the Northern Ireland conflict: 'they were volunteers…they were not regular 
soldiers. They had joined out of love of their country and they really believed 
they had a higher duty to perform.'421 On 1 July 1916, the Ulster Division was 
sent to battle the Germans in Somme, France.422 Although they fought 
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heroically, UVF men 'died like cattle,' with 2,000 dead and over 3,000 
wounded.423 Keith Jeffrey describes the carnage of the first day of the battle as 
the day 'after which nothing would ever be the same again for Ulster.'424 
Indeed, the Battle of the Somme still plays an important part in Ulster's unionist 
narrative and is used by the present UVF as a 'key motif in its politics of 
resistance.'425  
Upon their return from the battlefield, UVF men discovered that the 
Home Rule plan was, again, under consideration. To make things worse, in the 
aftermath of WWI the leading Catholic party, Sinn Fein, won a majority of seats 
in the Irish Parliament and unilaterally proclaimed an independent Irish 
Republic. Simultaneously, the IRA opened an armed campaign to force Britain 
to withdraw its forces from the island. The British Government that wanted to 
negotiate an understanding with Ireland responded with a new Home Rule Act 
(1920). In the new legislation the British government acknowledged the 
unionist desire to remain British and partitioned Ireland into northern (today's 
Northern Ireland) and southern (today's Republic of Ireland) territories. 
Accordingly, Britain was to withdraw its forces from twenty-six counties of 
Ireland's thirty-two counties, giving them a Home Rule status. 
The six counties in the north (comprising the province of Ulster) that 
remained part of the United Kingdom were primarily inhabited by Protestants, 
while only one third of the population was Catholic. Hence, the Protestants 
could be expected to have a safe majority and were given a parliament in 
Belfast, known as Stormont, that was regarded as a 'Protestant parliament for a 
Protestant people.'426  
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Map 3: Map of Ulster (Northern Ireland)  
Following the partition of Ireland, Protestants and Catholics alike found 
themselves on the wrong side of the new borders. Contrary to the Protestants 
who enjoyed the services of the British security and civil administrations, 
Catholics encountered increasing communal segregation and inequality. The 
Catholics were perceived as a Trojan horse and 'to most loyalists, the minority 
nationalist population was seen as the IRA's sleeping partner as it shared the 
same aim of achieving a united Ireland.'427 Inevitably, ethnic, economic and 
social tensions deteriorated into violence and bloodshed. The violence, which 
by then had spread all across the island of Ireland, gradually petered out with 
the signing of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty establishing the autonomous Irish 
Free State in the south and leading to the withdrawal of the British forces from 
most of Ireland.  
For nearly 40 years the political situation was fairly stable, despite low-
scale attacks that continued in Northern Ireland, but hostility and animosity did 
not disappear. They re-surfaced in the late 1950s, when economic and social 
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policies strengthened discrimination and under-representation of the Catholic 
minority. A new wave of IRA violence against the local police force, the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), led the Protestants to believe that Catholics were 
turning towards social agitation and subversion.428  
The ever-present sectarian tension eventually exploded into deadly 
violence in the late 1960s, when Catholics and Protestants clashed over civil 
rights and political and social reforms. At first, the Protestants felt 'threatened 
by the Catholic demands for equal representation, equality and security.'429 
They sought the protection of the local government but found the Prime 
Minister, Capt. Terence O'Neill, inattentive to their demands. O'Neill was known 
for his reconciliatory and liberal views and ecumenical beliefs that repeatedly 
'touched on possibilities of cooperation between northern unionism and the 
southern nationalist State,' and therefore was denounced as favouring Roman 
Catholicism and capable of selling out Ulster.430 The Protestants had to look for 
protection elsewhere.      
To counter the IRA's terrorist attacks and defiance of the rule of law, in 
1966 Ulster unionists re-activated the UVF in Belfast and adopted the same 
motto – "For God and Ulster". Contrary to the original militia which was 
comprised of Protestant aristocracy and middle classes, the new UVF was based 
almost entirely on working-class members 'who were prepared to carry guns 
not placards.'431 It was led by Gusty Spence, an ex-soldier whose father fought 
with the UVF in WWI, who in his biography straightforwardly describes the 
UVF's objective and his motives to join in: 'There was incipient rebellion and I 
had taken an oath to Her Majesty the Queen to defend her – it seems grandiose 
– against enemies foreign and domestic. I saw my service in the UVF as a 
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continuation of my British army service.'432 Many UVF members under Spence's 
leadership genuinely believed that they were defending not only themselves 
against indiscriminate Catholic terrorism but also the British Crown, flag and 
the state.  
Soon the UVF began its terrorist campaign, primarily involving shootings 
and bombings, against IRA members and Catholic civilians. Despite the IRA's 
reputation as the most infamous terrorist organisation in Northern Ireland, the 
first victims of the Troubles were killed by UVF members in May and June 
1966.433 To this day, UVF members continuously deny accusations that they led 
or provoked the deterioration in the security situation in Northern Ireland. 
Others, however, claim otherwise arguing that the fact the UVF killed the first 
Catholic victim 'several years before the founding of the Provisionals, clearly 
show as false any suggestion that it was the Provisional IRA that started the 
Troubles.'434  
In response to the UVF's killings, the British police, at the behest of the 
Northern Ireland government, acted quickly and arrested Spence and others, 
charged them with the murders and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Yet, 
even without Spence at the helms, the UVF managed to launch a terrorist 
campaign that matched and periodically surpassed the IRA's. Although it 
received far less media and scholarly attention than its Catholic counterparts, 
the UVF's transition from a relentless terrorist organisation into a peaceful 
political actor is, undoubtedly, worthy of a more in-depth analysis.     
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ROLE OF VIOLENCE 
At first glance it may seem that violence has been an inherent feature in 
Irish history. For centuries violence was synonymous with the power struggle 
for dominance in Northern Ireland, and was perceived as 'an accepted vehicle 
of political communication.'435 However, it would be unjust to assume that Irish 
society and tradition are any different than other nations and peoples who 
were under “occupation” for many years. An alternative assertion is that 
violence in Northern Ireland was an outcome of a calculated analysis and aimed 
to achieve specific political objectives. As such, the UVF, even if defined as a 
pro-state organisation, was no different than other organisations that used 
terrorism as a tactic to threaten, coerce and achieve their political goals.  
The primary objective of the 1912-UVF men was to protect the union 
with Britain and when they were called for duty in WWI, they served their 
nation heroically. Overall, they left behind a respectable heritage that is 
celebrated to this day among loyalists. In contrast, the central objective of the 
modern UVF was to instil fear in the wider Catholic population. Clearly, current 
UVF men may have used the same initials but they could not compete with their 
brethren's gallantry and they were often denounced as terrorists of the lowest 
kind.436 Indeed, nowadays the UVF is widely perceived as an outlaw 
organisation that has nothing in common with its patriotic predecessor.437  
The modern-day UVF represented the radical and more militant end of 
the Protestant political spectrum. It firmly believed that achieving its aims 
required the use of violence against the Catholic population as a whole and IRA 
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members and supporters in particular.438 Typically, UVF members and 
supporters were those who had a strong sense of belonging to the six counties 
of Ulster and 'loyalty to the Protestant faith, Queen and country and the 
constitutional link with Britain.'439 The almost religious element in the 
connection between Ulster loyalists and Britain was noticeably expressed in a 
statement of a PUP leader: 'The historic calling for Loyalists strengthens their 
desire to remain within the United Kingdom whilst the choice to do so remains 
sacrosanct.'440 The UVF ideology was directly derived from the above statement 
and was manifested in three principles: defending the Protestant community 
against republican violence, rejecting a united Ireland under Catholic control 
and preserving Northern Ireland's British identity.  
The notion of defending the Protestants and that 'it is right to respond to 
a republican murder campaign with killing,' was central to the UVF 
confrontational narrative.441 The devotion of UVF men to the union with Britain 
was best described by Billy Wright, a notorious UVF senior commander, 'whose 
paramilitary career was to cost many Catholic lives,' that acknowledged he 'felt 
it was my duty to defend my people.'442 Increasingly, Protestants felt that they 
'were being pushed out of their traditional areas and workplaces, they were 
under siege, subject to genocidal attack, forced to retaliate,' and therefore 'only 
loyalist organisation vigilance and militancy could defend the Protestant 
population.'443 The responsibility to protect individuals and property was used 
by the UVF to justify their right and obligation to use violence against Catholics.  
For years the name UVF was tantamount to distinctively brutal acts of 
violence, and therefore the organisation suffered from a negative reputation 
and was condemned as an 'unlawful organisation whose activities were 
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directed to asserting and maintaining Protestant ascendancy…by overt acts of 
terror.'444 Certainly, the extremist and ruthless image was articulated in a 
threatening manifesto that was published on the eve of the UVF's foundation in 
May 1966: 'From this day, we declare war against the IRA and its splinter 
groups. Known IRA men will be executed mercilessly and without hesitation 
…We are heavily armed Protestants dedicated to this cause.'445  
A 0974 announcement further describes the UVF’s retaliatory strategy, 
that was based on the common loyalist idiom "terrorising the terrorists": 
We believe, rightly or wrongly, that the only effective way to beat 
the terror machine was to employ greater terrorism against its 
operatives…by bombing the heart of Provisional enclaves we 
attempted to terrorise the nationalist community into demanding 
that the Provisionals either cease their campaign or move out of 
the ghetto area…we believed we could force the Provisionals out 
of business or at least cause a drastic reduction in their 
operational activity.446  
The UVF went to great lengths to fulfill this declaration and its members 
adamantly believed that it was both necessary and just to use violence to defeat 
the nationalist aspirations. Since many members had previous military 
experience or criminal records, they were keen and even expected to exercise 
their violent skills. A particular vicious and petrifying illustration of such 
capabilities was a UVF unit, known as the "Shankill Butchers", which used to 
abduct, torture and carve up Catholic victims with knives and hatchets. These 
sadistic horrors signified an unprecedented level of brutality unfamiliar even in 
the death-struck society of Northern Ireland.447  
The nature of the UVF's terrorist attacks was mainly sectarian and 
indiscriminate.  Many of these attacks were aimed against public places that 
were frequented by Catholics without targeting specific individuals known as 
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IRA members. On 17 May 1974, the UVF demonstrated that its promise to 
employ greater terrorism was not just empty words, when it nearly 
simultaneously detonated four car bombs in the streets of Dublin and 
Monaghan, killing 33 people and injuring 258 – the deadliest attack in a single 
day in the history of the conflict.  
Contrary to many terrorist attacks by republican and loyalist 
organisations, no prior warning was issued before the explosions. Usually proud 
and vocal in their use of violence, UVF members refrained from claiming 
responsibility for the horrendous attack, probably because of the high death toll. 
No one has ever been brought to justice. Almost twenty years later, the UVF 
admitted that its members perpetrated the attack.448 Nonetheless, David Ervine, 
formerly a senior UVF member and later leader of the PUP, insisted that the 
attack was a natural and legitimate response to republican violence. When asked 
what the purpose of the attack was he simply answered that the UVF could not 
sit idly by when the IRA targeted innocent Protestants and therefore 'they were 
returning the serve.'449  
Generally, UVF men had freedom to devise and carry out attacks, which 
subsequently backfired. Bruce identifies the lack of effective control as one of 
the reasons why UVF members were perceived as murderous thugs and not as 
defenders of the Protestant community. He writes that UVF 'operations were 
only surgical and controlled as the skills and interests of the individuals in that 
particular group allowed them to be, which was often not much.'450 Indeed, the 
Dublin and Monaghan bombings were meticulously planned and well 
orchestrated, but they were the exception rather than the rule, and many other 
fatal attacks were perpetrated through exploiting the organisation's loose 
command structure.  
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Despite the brutal nature of the UVF's terror campaign in the 1970s, as 
time progressed and both Protestants and Catholics were engaged in political 
talks, members began to doubt the 'tactical effectiveness in reaching the UVF’s 
objectives through violence.'451 Consequently, from the early 1980s the UVF 
entered a period characterised by a behavioural change, self-criticism and 
moral reservations. First and foremost, the UVF was constantly aware of the 
damaging effect of unrestrained violence. Senior UVF commanders genuinely 
made an effort to exercise firm control over members and operations and to set 
boundaries in order to morally distinguish their operations from IRA's 
terrorism and to rebuild the UVF’s reputation among Protestants.  
The efforts to display a centralised command and control became 
particularly essential from the early 1990s onwards, when ceasefires and 
agreements were negotiated and the UVF did not want to appear as 
destabilising the peace process. Additionally, as prospects for reconciliation 
were high and the need to defend the Protestant community decreased, the UVF 
wished to reinforce its image of a responsible organisation at this politically 
sensitive point in time.  
Two examples specifically demonstrate the organisational state of mind 
in the mid 1990s. The first is the UVF's exceptional statement declaring its 
acceptance of the 1994 ceasefire. Gusty Spence, who was given the honour to 
read the text, chose to appeal to the wider public in Northern Ireland and 
apologise for decades of indiscriminate attacks and thousands of victims:  
In all sincerity, we offer to the loved ones of all innocent victims 
over the past twenty-five years abject and true remorse. No 
amount of words will compensate for the intolerable suffering 
they have undergone during the conflict.452  
The second is the decision of UVF senior command in July 1996, to expel Billy 
Wright and his team for perpetrating unwarranted attacks, insubordination 
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and defiance of the Belfast HQ orders during the 1994 ceasefire.453 Although 
these acts did not end UVF attacks completely, they made an impression of a 
genuine attempt to convey a self-restrained, less violent and more peaceful 
agenda. 
In conclusion, the UVF was clearly a vicious terrorist organisation that 
devastated the lives of many families in Northern Ireland. It used the same 
tactics to achieve similar objectives as any other terrorist movement in similar 
conflicts. However, in the application of violence, the UVF stands out in at least 
one important aspect; the leadership and majority of its cadre followed the 
Protestant desire to end the armed campaign. Particular interest was the 
understanding that the continuation of violence was politically futile, and that 
disengagement from terrorism was essential to allow the peace talks to succeed 
and a compromise to be reached.  
 
PERCEPTION OF THE OPPONENT 
Like most other terrorist organisations, the UVF had several opponents 
with whom it simultaneously fought against or was engaged with. On one hand 
republicans as well as ordinary Catholics were considered enemies. On the 
other, the Protestant unionist leadership was treated as untrustworthy.  
Categorically, the UVF believed that Catholics must be defeated should 
Protestants want to prolong the union with Britain. To this end, violence 
against Catholics was permissible, as explained by Henry Sinnerton: 
The purpose of the UVF was to kill. Their analysis was based on 
the argument that since the Catholic community was harbouring 
the Provos, the way to damage the Provos was to hurt the Catholic 
community until the Provos would be expelled or renounced. This 
policy depended on killing ordinary Catholics, any Catholic, rather 
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than the specific targeting of Provo volunteers and 
commanders.454 
Demonizing the republican enemy and brainwashing the Protestant 
community to resist any opportunity that might lead to Catholic primacy, led 
many loyalists to hold such hateful views. Soon conspiracy theories followed 
and UVF members were convinced that there was a Catholic plot to establish a 
united Ireland and believed that successive British governments 'had an 
ignoble tradition of doing deals with the republican enemy behind Ulster 
Protestant backs.'455 
The indoctrination process was managed by radical unionist leaders, 
most notably amongst them was the Reverend Ian Paisley, who espoused 
'keeping Northern Ireland British and, if that fails, keeping Northern Ireland out 
of the Irish Republic.'456 His charismatic personality and belligerent rhetoric 
largely shaped the loyalist mindset, and especially the UVF's. Paisley began his 
political career in the 1960s by expressing popular anti-Catholic views and 
initiating public rallies, in which he called for organised defence against IRA 
attacks to complement the army and the police. Later, as leader of hard-line 
unionism, Paisley was instrumental in portraying Northern Ireland as the 
imagined homeland for the Protestants, and pledged that it 'would take 
whatever steps it thinks fit to maintain Northern Ireland's constitutional 
position within the United Kingdom.'457 
Nowadays, Paisley is largely recognised as the unionist political leader 
who reached a compromise with nationalists and reinstituted the power-
sharing government in Northern Ireland.458 However, Protestants who listened 
to him in his early days admit that during his sermons he used vile and 
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inflammatory theological rhetoric.459 A particular case in point is his reference 
to the Queen Mother's meeting with the Pope as 'committing spiritual 
fornication and adultery with the anti-Christ.'460 Although there is no solid 
evidence that Paisley was involved in or knew about terrorist attacks and he 
firmly claims that he had always directed his followers to take a law-abiding 
political path, listening to his provocative oratory certainly led others to 
violence. Billy Mitchell, a senior UVF commander and later the PUP's political 
strategist who admitted that he idolised Paisley, explained that by listening to 
him 'you felt part of the cause…part of the organised band of people – the 
chosen few – who would defend Ulster.'461  
Undoubtedly, Paisley's words played a vital role in shaping the UVF's 
perception of the Catholics. His inspiration significantly augmented the 
devotion to protect the union at all costs by using violence to save Ulster from 
falling into the hands of the Catholics. In such a radical mindset, and due to a 
lack of solid ideology, the chosen strategy as articulated by Gusty Spence, was 'if 
you can't get an IRA man, get a Taig [Catholic].'462   
The UVF's view of the unionist political leadership was not positive 
either. It treated unionist leaders with distrust, suspicion and hostility, accusing 
them of failure to mount a coherent opposition campaign and mishandling the 
loyalist cause and the peace process. An article published in the UVF’s "Combat" 
magazine expressed this view:  
Working-class loyalists have been exploited, misinformed, misled 
and divided by the establishment Unionist parties...who have 
vested personal and financial interests in the maintenance of a 
divided loyalist movement.463  
Among UVF members 'there was a growing realisation that loyalists had been 
exploited historically by unionist politicians who cynically tolerated violence 
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for the unionist cause and then preached law and order after the loyalists 
acted.'464 Gusty Spence was even more blatant about it: 'the attitude of these 
people [the unionist leaders] is they want you hanged.'465 
Unionist politicians were repeatedly condemned for using loyalists as 
cannon-fodder by covertly goading members to carry out further attacks, but 
publicly denouncing and distancing them from the Protestant public consensus. 
Dawn Purvis, the former leader of the PUP, stresses that the UVF blamed the 
unionist politicians for using manipulative methods in order to preserve their 
dominance in power over the whole of the Northern Irish electorate.466 Even 
Paisley, the father of radical unionism and a hero in the eyes of many loyalists, 
was at times seen by the UVF as an opportunist, manipulator 'and a coward 
who makes encouragingly militant noises but then condemns the gunmen when 
they turn his rhetoric into actions.'467  
UVF's criticism against the unionist leadership was not limited to words 
but was translated into actions as well. Most notably were the steps taken 
against Prime Minister O'Neill who pursued rapprochement with the Republic 
of Ireland. O'Neill's decision to proscribe the UVF as a terrorist organisation 
designated him a legitimate target. To confront his "betrayal", the UVF 
formulated a strategy 'to halt O'Neill's "bridge building" policies and maybe 
even cause a reaction against him within the Unionist Party, which would force 
his resignation.'468 Accordingly, the UVF carried out a series of bombings 
against water and electricity installations in Northern Ireland intended to 
create the impression that they were perpetrated by the IRA. Spence recounted 
that the UVF committed those attacks to put pressure on O'Neill hoping that he 
'would be removed and someone more amenable to this group's thinking would 
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be put in place.'469 Ultimately, the UVF's attacks had their desired effect; O'Neill 
was defeated in the 1969 general elections and resigned.  
At times the UVF showed the same vigour in contending with unionist 
politicians as with IRA gunmen. The high price that loyalist families paid 
throughout the conflict and their support in the peace process, was a source for 
deep contention between the UVF and the unionist leadership. The following 
heated exchange between one unionist representative and David Ervine of the 
PUP, best illustrates the hostile relations between the two camps. When a 
unionist leader supported opposition to the peace process, Ervine responded: 
'That's easy for you to say, safe as you and your family are in the suburbs. But if 
there's war it's we and our sons who'll do the fighting and dying. We want this 
process because it's our only hope for peace.'470  
By and large, the UVF felt that it was its duty to challenge the republican 
armed campaign against the Protestant community. In a situation where the 
British state failed to meet its contractual obligations to the Protestant citizens 
of Northern Ireland, the UVF was perceived as part of a wider response to the 
political situation. Ian Paisley's role in playing on the fears of Protestants from 
nationalist hegemony in Northern Ireland, contributed greatly to the loyalist 
perception of Catholics. Edwards summarises that Paisley was 'intimately 
involved in fueling many hard-line attitudes harboured by those loyalists who 
took up arms.'471 The growing Protestant insecurity and the belief that 
Catholics are the source of all troubles, allowed the UVF to launch its own 
campaign of sectarian violence. 
In addition to the animosity towards the Catholic enemy, the UVF 
expressed deep mistrust of unionist politicians. Dawn Purvis best describes the 
loyalist view of the relations with the unionist parties: 'There was a love-hate 
relationship where unionist leaders sought to control and manipulate loyalist 
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paramilitaries but at the same time disown them.'472 The positive outcome of 
the division in the Protestant community was that it led the UVF to develop its 
own political platform, which presented an alternative and promoted a more 
inclusive form of unionism. According to Taylor, the PUP represented the new 
breed of loyalist politicians who wanted to reach a compromise that would end 
the war but safeguard the province's place within the United Kingdom.'473  
Clearly, the establishment of the PUP and the political course that the party led 
had a mitigating effect on the UVF's militant strategy. Also, the profound 
disappointment from the poor performance of the unionist leadership and the 
desire to bring a better future for Northern Ireland, served as catalysts for the 
UVF's support of the peace process. 
 
SPLIT IN THE RANKS 
From the Troubles' first day the loyalist camp was deeply fragmented 
and failed to maintain a strong and unified paramilitary front. While the IRA is 
regularly regarded as the principal republican terrorist organisation, there is 
no single equivalent among the loyalists.474 For many years the UVF had to 
operate parallel to another authentic and formidable loyalist terrorist 
organisation and for a short while also with its own rebellious faction. Nearly 
since its inception, the UVF competed with the strong and popular Ulster 
Defence Association (UDA). Later in the 1990s, following a split in the UVF 
ranks, it was challenged by the dissident Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). 
Overall, an analysis of the UVF's organisational factors clearly shows that 
competing with another grassroots paramilitary organisation while dealing 
with a splinter organisation had a considerable impact on its political thinking.  
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Although from the 1960s until the 1980s the UVF was the leading 
loyalist terrorist organisation, the UDA had a powerful presence in the 
Protestant community that at times overshadowed the UVF, particularly in 
terms of public support, financial resources and political influence. Contrary to 
the UVF, which maintained a small and experienced cadre organised in 
clandestine cells, the UDA emphasised 'its ambition to be a mass social and 
political movement.'475 It sprung from a large number of vigilante groups, 
formed across Belfast in the early 1970s to protect Protestant working-class 
neighbourhoods against IRA attacks. Quickly it developed more advanced 
political aspirations and espoused a similar ideology to the UVF. The UDA 
exploited the fact that the UVF was legally banned to recruit members and 
funds and it grew so rapidly that by the mid-1970s it was considerably larger 
than the secretive UVF. In fact, it became the largest of all the armed 
organisations in Northern Ireland, commanding over 50,000 members.476  
Like any other two competing organisations that appeal to the same 
constituency, the UVF and the UDA 'have rarely been on good terms for long.'477 
Despite its motto "law before violence" and overt political aspirations, the UDA, 
like the UVF, was very much involved in terrorism.478 Its members, in an 
attempt to avoid similar proscription, attacked IRA men and innocent Catholics 
under the nom de guerre of Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), killing more than 
250 people (second only to the UVF amongst loyalist terrorist organisations).479 
Since both were extremely passionate and recruited from and operated within 
the same areas, the rivalry often resulted in an open warfare over issues such 
as weapons, money, territorial control and personal loyalties.480 However, the 
UVF had an important advantage over the UDA; its members were better 
trained and well equipped while the typical UDA militants were mostly 
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inadequately armed local Protestants. A UDA member candidly admitted that 
the UVF 'were more militant than us, and they had guns. They also recruited 
soldiers who fought terrorists in Cyprus and Borneo, whereas we really hadn’t 
a clue. I'd never fought anybody in my life.'481 Accordingly, UVF men mostly 
belittled the UDA's armed campaign as described by one UVF member: 'We 
were never impressed by them. Aside from the killings, many of which were 
very dubious, all they ever did was break windows and let car tyres down.'482 
Like the UVF, the UDA took it upon itself to act as 'an army of last stand 
to fight the civil war in Ulster.'483 In doing so the UDA was not only a proactive 
Protestant organisation but necessarily a challenging force to the UVF. 
Consequently, instead of advocating for a unified political goal, the two leading 
loyalist factions were 'competing with each other to be the most effective 
representative of the community's political ambitions.'484 Although the UVF 
was more involved in killing republicans and controlled the loyalist camp 
through the 1970s, the UDA did not lag behind. Ironically, in such a violent 
environment, in which the stronger had better chances of surviving and gaining 
political dominance, the primary victim was the Protestant community. Inter-
communal clashes occurred almost on a regular basis, and deadly retaliations 
inflicted numerous Protestant casualties. Soon it was clear to leaders of both 
organisations that the rivalry gravely damaged the overall Protestant cause, 
which was in a state of decay since the paramilitaries were constantly fighting 
each other. Consequently, a degree of understanding was achieved after senior 
UVF and UDA commanders met and agreed that 'in the event of ill-feelings 
resulting in violence, weapons under no circumstances would be used.'485 
Despite the mutual understanding, violence resumed because contrary to the 
IRA's centralised structure and more disciplined members, the loyalist 
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terrorists could not control their ranks since they 'didn’t have the experience of 
handling men that could have sorted out those kinds of problems.'486  
The delicate balance-of-power within the loyalist camp was further 
undermined with the formation of another militant group. The increased sense 
of insecurity and siege mentality prevalent among some loyalist groups 
resulted in 1996 in the establishment of a breakaway faction within the UVF, 
known as the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). The new terrorist organisation 
opposed the 1994 ceasefire and the developing peace process. By joining the 
leading unionist parties (such as Paisley's DUP) in the rejectionist camp, the 
LVF temporarily enjoyed impressive public support. Although small in size, the 
LVF was an influential actor in the loyalist net of organisations, and had a 
substantial impact on the UVF's transition from violence to politics. 
The new hard-line dissident organisation disagreed ideologically with 
the UVF's adherence to the truce and decision to support the peace process. 
More precisely the LVF challenged the UVF's authority and 'attempted to 
thwart the prospect of a political compromise between unionists and 
nationalists by engaging in a blatant campaign of sectarian slaughter.'487 The 
split led to another outbreak of communal hostilities and re-escalated the level 
of violence in Northern Ireland. In the period before the Good Friday 
Agreement, when republican and loyalist violence greatly subsided, the LVF 
managed to take the lead in the loyalist armed attacks killing 26 people.488  
The leader of the LVF, Billy Wright, who felt more sympathetic to the 
political philosophy of Paisley, was the spirit behind the organisation's 
opposition to the peace talks. He believed that he could unite the loyalist 
organisations under his leadership, and be portrayed as the 'military savior of 
the Protestant people.'489 Wright denounced the UVF and the PUP as being 
'totally out of step with grassroots loyalist opinion,' and benefited from the tacit 
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support of many within the loyalist camp.490 The notable success of the LVF led 
the UVF to the realisation that 'Wright was now establishing an alternative 
centre of power,' and thus he was accused of treason and was given an 
ultimatum: leave the country or be killed.491 The UVF’s manhunt was preceded 
by the police who arrested Billy Wright in March 1997 and sent him to serve 
eight years in the Maze prison.492 Much to the UVF's relief, Wright, 'the UVF's 
public enemy number one,' was murdered in prison in December 1997 by 
members of the republican splinter group, the Irish National Liberation 
Army.493 Interestingly, Crawford suggests that Wright's death was a result of 
collaboration between British, Protestant and Catholic elements that wished to 
remove a major and popular obstacle from their way, each for his own 
reasons.494 Regardless of the motives, with Wright's death the LVF lost its 
vibrancy and was heading towards demobilisation. The murder sparked 
another brutal cycle of tit-for-tat killings between Protestants and Catholics, 
but despite momentary setbacks in negotiations the peace process was not 
severely damaged and a few months later the Good Friday Agreement was 
signed.  
Although the LVF opposed the Good Friday Agreement, after Wright's 
disappearance its ranks thinned rapidly and in effect it ceased to exist. A week 
before the May 1998 referendum, the LVF declared a ceasefire stating that the 
'war is over for good,' and agreeing to decommission its arms and explosives.495 
In doing so, the LVF, moved from an anti-agreement position towards 
acceptance of the new political order, thus becoming 'the first terrorist group in 
Irish history to surrender weapons voluntarily.'496 The success of the LVF's 
transition from violence to peaceful action led the UVF to seriously question the 
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usefulness and tactical value of its armed campaign. Cusack and McDonald 
write that the disappearance of the LVF triggered an internal debate within the 
UVF regarding its future. They quote a senior UVF commander who admitted 
that 'the LVF's demise enabled the organisation to consider its own 
dissolution.'497  
Since the 1960s the attention and support of the extreme loyalist 
community in Northern Ireland was divided between the UVF, the UDA and the 
LVF. It seems that the fragmented nature of the loyalist community was, in fact, 
a destabilizing factor that had an impact on the decisions and actions of the 
UVF.498 Operating in a state of constant opposition with organisations that have 
similar objectives and strategy was a strong incentive for the UVF to find new 
ways to increase its political power and popularity. When it had the 
opportunity, the UVF and the PUP chose to distance themselves from the 
rejectionist elements within the loyalist community by presenting a more 
moderate attitude, announcing a ceasefire and supporting the peace process. 
They wished to be part of the negotiations and hoped for its success not only 
for the benefit of Ulster but for their own survival.  
 
LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT 
In the case of the modern UVF, the level of public support is particularly 
crucial in terms of the contribution to its political integration. Certainly, it is the 
factor that was affected the most by its designation as a pro-state terrorist 
organisation. By definition a pro-state terrorist organisation tends to be 'less 
popular with the population they claim to defend,' since it has to battle over 
public support against a state’s constitutional institutions.499 Indeed, the UVF 
was relatively popular among loyalists and enjoyed large pockets of support 
within working-class areas, which experienced most of the sectarian violence. 
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Yet, it could not compete with the government, the security apparatuses, the 
civil administration and the judicial system, that was far more stable and 
powerful in comparison to an illegal terrorist organisation.  
From the outset, the UVF was inferior to the state, be it Northern Ireland 
or the United Kingdom, in what it could offer Protestants to attract new 
recruits, funds and political support. This was particularly important when it 
came down to filling the ranks of the UVF with motivated and skilled young 
men. Since the state’s official services could offer legitimate outlets for 
participation and far more respectable and well-paid alternatives, the UVF was 
unable to match this with tangible rewards.  
While the UVF’s stronghold was Belfast's working-class, 'it drew little 
support from the wider Protestant community and was firmly denounced by 
the middle classes and by religious leaders.'500 Generally, the Protestant 
middle-class was less affected by the sectarian violence, thus they were less 
inclined to join the loyalist terrorist organisations. Moreover, unlike the 
working-class Protestants who saw themselves as Ulster people, the middle-
class drew its identity from Britain rather than the local heritage.501 Inevitably, 
a working-class Protestant who was motivated enough to actively take part in 
the campaign against the IRA, often did so by joining the high-status, well-
rewarded and legitimate security services. A majority of Protestants who 
wished to play a part in defending their people, enlisted into the police force or 
the army, whereas the least capable members of the Protestant community 
joined the loyalist organisations. Yet, it would be wrong to suggest that those 
who preferred to join the UVF lacked in patriotism, devotion and motivation to 
fight the IRA.502  
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Indeed, those who eventually joined the UVF “contributed greatly” to its 
image as a vicious terrorist organisation. One incident that dealt a devastating 
blow to the UVF’s popularity, and aspiration to be perceived as an authentic 
political power in Northern Ireland, was the “Miami Showband" massacre in 
July 1975. A UVF team disguised as uniformed soldiers killed three members of 
the famous Irish band and brought shame on the Protestant community and 
international condemnation for the UVF. Atrocities of this kind blemished the 
entire Protestant community that mostly considered itself as 'decent law-
abiding and reluctant soldiers.'503 The idea that Protestants would kill innocent 
civilians contradicted everything they believed in; an unthinkable act that was 
carried out by people of their own strict upbringing. Gradually, the Protestant 
majority was sceptical of the UVF's claim to defend them from the nationalist 
expansion. Although at times the Protestants were willing to recognise the 
UVF's role as the 'avenger of IRA violence,' they were hesitant to accept it as 
their political representatives since they maintained a clear division between 
politics and violence, and there was 'little or no enthusiasm for a blurring of the 
boundaries.'504  
The fact that the UVF was engaged in random sectarian killings, which 
was regarded as the lowest kind of violence, was even more detrimental to its 
public support. The majority of Protestants believed that it was the role of the 
police to provide security and not uncontrolled and illegal vigilante groups. 
Consequently, it was extremely difficult for the UVF to justify the attacks and 
preserve a steady level of support, and it was compelled to repair its reputation 
by, for instance, issuing repeated calls to refrain from sectarian violence. To 
that extent, Gusty Spence, the UVF's leader, condemned in a televised interview 
in 1972 the sectarian violence and announced that 'random killing is to be 
deplored at any time and I would say to anyone engaged in sectarian murder 
"Cease it!".'505 In January 1974, the UVF announced that it has 'never sanctioned 
the execution of any person on account of his religious or political opinions and 
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we call upon all paramilitary organisations to do their utmost to ensure that 
such activities cease forthwith.'506  
In the early 1990s the UVF attempted to find other channels to attract 
public support. The leaders suggested to 'reduce the amount of ill-directed and 
random violence,' and instead to 'increase the amount of community work and 
political action.'507 In accordance with the new strategy, the UVF issued a press 
statement in which it called for all loyalist armed organisations: 
To desist from their present murder campaign and to channel 
their energies and resources into some form of constructive 
action…the indiscriminate killing of Ulstermen on account of their 
religious beliefs can do nothing whatever to preserve the 
Protestant liberties and restore democracy to Northern 
Ireland.508  
Clearly, the UVF's new approach did not bring about the expected 
results, and sectarian violence continued on all fronts. Subsequently, UVF 
leaders sensed that the organisation was losing the battle for hearts and minds 
of Protestants at home, and they were forced to find other creative ways to 
bolster popular support, funds and new recruits. Therefore, they resorted to 
the heritage of the brave members who fought courageously in WWI. The re-
formation of the loyalist paramilitary organisation under the same title and 
motto was intended to provide members with equal standing and respectability 
within the Protestant community. Of course, it would also serve to mobilise the 
Protestant community to support UVF members and policies. The modern-day 
organisation claimed to be a legitimate descendant of the 1912-UVF, that at its 
peak consisted of more than 200,000 members. It even used the Battle of the 
Somme as a central narrative to promote the UVF's role as protector of the 
Protestant community. An article published in 2008 in the UVF's "Combat" 
magazine stressed the patriotism of the heroes of the Great War and the 
sacrifice made by their successors: 
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They were the bravest of the brave, willing to stand against the 
mighty Kaiser for King and Empire For God And Ulster...They 
were men and boys like you and I, ordinary, hard working, family 
guys, who had a passionate love for their country. They were not 
conscripted, they volunteered!509 
The leaders of the present UVF were hoping to draw on the history of 
Ulstermen and 'to reap the benefits of legitimacy and public sympathy by 
association.'510 They believed that 'the leitmotif of Ulster’s blood sacrifice to the 
British crown and state' during WWI would assist both in their struggle against 
the IRA and in boosting popularity.511  
By the mid 1970s and early 1980s the popularity of the UVF plunged due 
to improvements in the political and security climates in Northern Ireland. 
While the republicans claimed their base of legitimacy for violence in the need 
to defend their rights against the Protestant oppressors, the loyalists could not 
do the same since the state's security forces were responsible for law and order 
and stripped the Protestant paramilitaries of their justification of existence. In 
fact, 'the success of the security forces in reducing the overall level of violence 
and sense of instability has removed a lot of the perceived need for the UVF.'512 
Consequently, the UVF was compelled to look beyond the borders of Ulster to 
raise public awareness and funds, mainly in the US but also in Scotland and 
other European countries. Yet, unlike the IRA, which was very popular 
internationally, the UVF was 'short of friends outside Ulster and almost 
completely shunned outside Britain.'513  
The UVF received some support from Scotland, which had close 
historical links to Ireland. Some Presbyterian Scots had strong anti-Catholic 
sentiment, so it was fairly simple for the UVF to open offices in Scotland to 
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support their brethren in Northern Ireland.514 The local branches succeeded in 
supplying a small number of weapons and raising an annual sum of £100,000 to 
support UVF operations. Nevertheless, the Scottish support was marginal and 
the local offices were closed after several police arrests. The significance of the 
Scottish support lay, according to Bruce, not in the weapons or the money but 
rather in the 'morale-boosting consequence of knowing that the loyalist cause 
has some support outside Northern Ireland.'515  
Since the UVF did not hold any appeal for international left-wing 
political and terrorist movements, it ended up 'with some strange 
bedfellows.'516 It briefly attracted attention from racist and fascist groups in 
Western Europe, which were electorally insignificant in domestic politics and 
therefore sought to associate themselves with more popular causes. For a short 
period in the 1970s the UVF had links to Neo-Nazi factions, but the initial 
intention to purchase weapons and explosives from them was left unfulfilled, 
since in return they asked the UVF to attack Jewish targets in Belfast. Even 
when external support was very much desired, the UVF could not bring itself to 
become linked with Nazi groups, especially because of the British army's 
history of fighting Germany and the UVF's role in WWI. Also, evoking Hitler and 
Germany disturbed the Protestant unionist psyche and therefore the contacts 
with these groups were abandoned.517 
The combination of brutal violence, competition with the state agencies, 
the improvement of personal security in Northern Ireland and the association 
with dubious groups outside the UK, significantly hindered the UVF’s efforts to 
mobilise public support for its armed and political campaigns. Clearly, when 
unionists felt that the security services were doing well in protecting them and 
that IRA violence was no longer an imminent threat, they no longer needed “the 
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services” of the UVF. Consequently, Protestants became 'less tolerant of the 
vices of their putative defenders.'518 It seems that the UVF was left with no 
other choice but to abandon terrorism in favour of legitimate political 
participation if it wished to play a constructive part in Northern Ireland's 
politics. The UVF realised that 'paramilitary organisations could not provide an 
alternative to mainstream Unionist parties,' and therefore gradually reduced its 
violent activity and at the same time put more focus on its political agenda.519  
 
DOMESTIC FACTORS 
This section examines the influence of the overall British policy to 
resolve the Northern Ireland conflict on the UVF's decision to participate in the 
constitutional political system. In principle, the British policy was intended to 
address the grievances of both unionist and nationalist communities and 
maintain law and order in the province. Yet, its effects were cardinal to the UVF 
decisions and actions and resulted in the organisation playing an important 
role in the peace process, mainly due to its ability to mobilise the loyalist camp 
in supporting the talks.  
Historically, the British policy in Northern Ireland was aimed at stopping 
the violence and bringing a peaceful resolution based on a power-sharing 
government, whilst involving the Republic of Ireland. To achieve these 
objectives, British governments devised two parallel strategic policies; a 
security strategy that included deployment of police and military forces as well 
as use of special legal powers, and a political patronage for negotiating 
ceasefires, interim accords and comprehensive peace agreements. In principle 
these were two separate policies, but in reality security and politics were 
inextricably linked and were applied simultaneously by both Labour and 
Conservative governments. This dual policy is best described by Michael 
Ancram, former Minister of State for Northern Ireland in the mid 1990s, 
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arguing that a state 'can talk to insurgents and their supporters even when 
taking military sanctions against them.'520  
Despite the diverse political views of different governments, the British 
leadership was conscious of the level of violence and attentive to the demands 
and positions of the public, and interchangeably put more emphasis either on 
security measures or political pressure. Wavering between security and politics 
proved to be a significant policy instrument that ultimately contributed to the 
UVF's (and the IRA's) decision to accept a peaceful resolution and 
accommodate lawful political activity.  
In addition to security and politics, the British efforts to address the 
economic and social roots of the conflict should not be discounted. Successive 
British governments worked to compensate for years of discrimination against 
the Catholics in welfare, employment and housing through political initiatives 
and legislation. These efforts had a significant effect in bringing the two rival 
communities to accept the Good Friday Agreement, and as Peter Hain, former 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, stated: 'It would be hard to 
overestimate the importance of these social and economic factors, and any 
discussion on the resolution of conflict in Northern Ireland which ignored them 
would be worthless.'521     
 
THE BRITISH SECURITY POLICY – A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 
From the outset, the raison d'être for the British direct involvement in 
Northern Ireland was based on the security needs of the local citizens. 
Officially, the primary objective of Britain's security policy, as outlined in June 
1977 by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, was to:  
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Free Northern Ireland from terrorism in all its forms and to do so 
in such a way as to ensure as far as possible that it will not break 
out again in future years…to eradicate terrorism so that it will 
have no chance of revival.522 
With this determination, the British Labour government led by Harold 
Wilson responded positively to Stormont's appeal for assistance in dealing with 
the Troubles. In August 1969, military forces were sent to Belfast to prevent 
further escalation of violence and civil unrest. Since the local (predominantly 
Protestant) police forces 'were proving incapable of containing, without 
exacerbating, the worsening situation,' the role of the security forces was to 
defend the law-abiding citizens of all denominations and tackle any form of 
violence, be it Protestant or Catholic.523  
Initially, the soldiers were welcomed by the Catholics, who felt 
defenceless against the Protestant onslaught. Yet, as IRA attacks increased 
dramatically, the army concentrated on safeguarding the Protestants and 
preserving their constitutional and ethnic union with the British mainland. 
Accordingly, in the eyes of the security services, the republican IRA was 
specifically perceived as the primary threat and responsible for fuelling the 
conflict. More generally, the Catholics were subjected to harsher security 
policies and largely regarded as a rebellious community that wished to promote 
the establishment of a unified Republic of Ireland.524 
At the beginning of the Troubles, the idea of Protestant hostility towards 
the Crown was unthinkable, particularly because of the shared history and the 
allegiance of Ulster citizens to Britain. In Protestant eyes, the marching of the 
British army into the streets of Belfast was 'a symbol of Westminster's 
commitment to their cause.'525 However, the initial British low-profile security 
policy in Northern Ireland, in an attempt not to alienate the entire Catholic 
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population, was interpreted by working-class Protestants as lack of aggression 
and determination against the IRA. Consequently, there was a danger that 
growing frustration among Protestants might lead them to violence, should the 
government appear inept.526 Undoubtedly, the UVF benefited from the British 
restrained strategy and enjoyed an upsurge of new loyalist recruits and public 
support. Soon UVF violence became a popular and effective method to assuage 
Protestant fears.  
Within the Protestant community, the UVF was, undoubtedly, the most 
violent manifestation of the opposition to the nationalist ideology that 
threatened to undermine the British efforts to restore order in Northern 
Ireland. However, a 1977 confidential memorandum reveals that the British 
government miscalculated its strength:  
The UVF is a comparatively small organisation with tight security, 
currently believed to be responsible for the majority of sectarian 
attacks. They are reasonably well organised as a military force but 
their effectiveness has been somewhat dubious.527  
Indeed at that time, mainly due to British military pressure and internal 
disorder, UVF members were less effective and somewhat disorganised, yet 
'their potential killing power was phenomenal.'528 The British attempts in the 
early 1970s to improve public safety in Northern Ireland were overshadowed 
by random shootings and frequent bombings. Soon even the loyalty of Ulster 
Protestants to Britain did not prevent them 'from determined opposition to 
particular actions of political representatives of the same crown and flag.' 529 
Naturally, as the political chaos in Northern Ireland deepened, the UVF gained 
more power and in the existing security vacuum it felt obligated to defend the 
Protestants even at the risk of clashing with the British security forces.  
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Facing a complicated situation in which a liberal democracy was forced 
to fight its own citizens who were involved in violence, Britain had to adopt a 
unique set of security and legal measures that would enable it to maintain 
stability and the rule of law. The British government was well-aware that 
accepting highly controversial methods would infringe some basic human and 
civil rights, but given the impossible and dangerous reality of Northern Ireland 
in the 1970s this seemed like a necessary evil. To that end, emergency 
provisions were 'designed to provide security forces with the necessary powers 
to prevent and disrupt terrorist activity.'530 Evidently, the main target for these 
draconian measures was the IRA but also the Catholic community that 
supported it and its republican ideology. Yet, as Protestant violence increased 
none of the loyalist terrorist organisations, and the UVF first amongst them, 
was immune to the controversial British tactics.   
Britain's policy against loyalist and republican terrorist organisations in 
Northern Ireland was implemented through three security-cycles: the local 
police force (the RUC), deployment of regular army personnel and Special 
Forces, and extensive legal powers to complement the overall security effort. 
These security-cycles were not used simultaneously from the beginning of the 
Troubles, rather they evolved gradually according to the needs and the severity 
of the situation. Nonetheless, once they were implemented concurrently, from 
1977 onwards, they had a remarkably positive effect on the security climate in 
Northern Ireland.531 The British security policy not only managed to contain the 
terrorists but also to attain an acceptable level of violence that the people of 
Northern Ireland, and the British public, could live with.    
The first security-cycle, and one of Britain's key instruments in Northern 
Ireland, was the local police force that was initially perceived as a body capable 
of attracting widespread support and seen as an integral part of both the 
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Protestant and Catholic communities. On the ground, however, Britain's 
handling of the issue of law enforcement was representative of its 
mistreatment of the ethnic divisions in Northern Ireland that discriminated 
against the Catholics. More specifically, the Protestants constituted 88% of the 
total RUC personnel, which explains why the Northern Ireland police force 
'failed to inspire confidence and trust in large parts of the population.'532 Also, 
the senior and mid-level positions of the Northern Ireland civil and judicial 
services were disproportionately Protestant.533 Moreover, since the Protestants 
were mostly seen as allies, the British government agreed to establish 
exclusively Protestant special armed units, such as the "B Specials", to fight 
against Catholic subversives and any unlawful activity.534  
Expectedly, many UVF men, who previously served in the British army, 
were inclined to join the local police units, and therefore the loyalist terrorist 
organisation was regarded by nationalists as 'a cover-name for Stormont's own 
law and order institutions.'535 Even the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), a new 
locally-recruited militia open to all that was established in 1970 to provide 
policing support to the RUC, did not convince the Catholics that they will be 
treated equally.  
As in previous cases, entire UVF units joined the UDR and were granted 
training and access to weapons and intelligence. A confidential British Military 
Intelligence report written in 1973 (and released in 2004), found evidence that 
'members of subversion or extremist groups have deliberately attempted to 
join their local UDR group on masse,' and concluded that the motives of UVF 
men who joined the UDR 'were probably to obtain weapons training, and 
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perhaps to place its members in a position where they had access to arms and 
ammunition.'536  
The fact that UVF members, under the auspices of the police force, 
unofficially enjoyed close relationship with the British security apparatuses, 
further discouraged Catholics to take part in the defence of Northern Ireland.537 
Therefore, UVF men were perceived by many nationalists as 'puppets of 
imperialism or "death squads" under the command and control of their British 
masters.'538 In placing Northern Ireland's policing duties in the hands of 
Protestants, and amongst them many UVF members, Britain effectively ensured 
that Northern Ireland's security would remain unionist-oriented.  
In the early years of the Troubles it was clear that the RUC was no longer 
capable of subduing the republican and loyalist violence or maintaining order 
in the province. Moreover, an official report of the British Army admits that the 
RUC 'was completely overwhelmed by the scale of violence,' and that it was ill-
prepared, used unnecessary force and gained a bad reputation.539 The UVF in 
particular, that was acknowledged in the report as the most dangerous terrorist 
organisation among loyalist armed organisations, exploited the RUC's 
favouritism towards the Protestants to run risk-free armed attacks against 
Catholics.540 Soon it was apparent to the British government that the UVF's 
sectarian attacks became more effective and its operations undermined any 
possibility for a peaceful resolution. Subsequently, the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, made sure that local policemen received more 
training and better equipment and were allowed to use harsh interrogation 
techniques. The impact was dramatic and the RUC 'had recovered its 
operational effectiveness,' and had taken the lead in security operations in the 
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province by the end of the 1970s.541 Moreover, the RUC received support from 
the UDR and intelligence from the army, and was able to execute raids on 
several UVF centres and arrest many operatives, which led to reports that by 
the early 1980s in certain areas in Northern Ireland, the UVF was 'practically 
non-existent.'542  
Despite the efforts, the police alone could not achieve substantial results 
against the terrorists. Therefore, the British government decided to deploy the 
army heavily in Northern Ireland to support the RUC; thus forming the second 
security-cycle. The 38-year long British military presence in the province, code-
named "Operation Banner", was intended initially to cope with the widespread 
public disorder, and later to bring terrorism to an end. At the height of the 
campaign 28,000 soldiers were stationed in the province, and well over 
250,000 soldiers served in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2007.543 An 
official report concluded that the army's overall performance against irregular 
organisations in Northern Ireland was successful using 'a high-quality, robust 
and professional force which was able to adapt and evolve rapidly.'544   
However, success cost dearly and 697 British servicemen were killed by 
loyalist and republican terrorists.545 To reinforce the military campaign, 
Secretary Mason, dubbed by Gusty Spence as a 'little dictator,' decided to 
deploy the elite Special Air Service (SAS) into Northern Ireland; action that 
significantly diminished the operational capability of the local terrorist 
organisations.546 During a Parliament session in 1977, Mason declared that the:  
Army will be concentrating on increased SAS-type activity and 
more specialist troops trained in anti-terrorist activity will be 
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coming to Northern Ireland in the immediate future. They will be 
specially trained in covert activity.547  
Apart from the military value that stemmed from the deployment of the SAS, it 
mainly demonstrated the British government motivation to apply a hard-line 
approach towards all the terrorist organisations in the province.548 
Secretary Mason, who was known for his unwavering stance in cracking 
down on loyalist violence, and specifically the UVF's, symbolised the British 
security policy that refused to openly declare a "state of emergency" or "war" 
and insisted on treating terrorists from both sides as common criminals rather 
than politically-motivated individuals. Christopher Andrew concluded that 
during Mason's term as Secretary of State, the security services main counter-
terrorism achievements were against the loyalist terrorist organisations.549 
Furthermore, Secretary Mason gave the RUC the lead role in combating 
terrorism but made sure that it 'will continue to be buttressed by the army, 
which will remain deployed in whatever strength is needed.'550 Although he 
reduced the number of regular soldiers in Northern Ireland, Mason put greater 
emphasis on pin-point operations and granted more powers to the army and 
police. Clearly, Mason's security reforms and tough military policy led to the 
decline in the death toll as a result of UVF attacks; from 1977 onwards, the 
annual number of victims fell from 60 to 2, and the number of UVF men serving 
time in prison increased considerably.551    
 The success of the security policy could not have been achieved without 
complementary judicial powers. This third security-cycle enabled the Crown 
courts to prosecute and convict terrorists, using internment without trial, trials 
without a jury, harsh interrogation techniques, and increased penalties for 
membership in terrorist organisations. These extensive legal measures inspired 
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a public outcry and to some extent even fuelled the conflict, yet when combined 
with aggressive military strategy they contributed greatly to the containment of 
violence. Cusack and McDonald note that the emergency powers given to the 
police and the army did not stop the UVFs killings, but they 'severely reduced 
their ability to cause mayhem…emasculated the UVF's capability to wage 
war…[and] indeed the number of murders and attempted murders decreased 
dramatically.'552   
One particular measure, commonly known as the Supergrass system, is 
often underestimated but proved to be very effective in decimating the ranks of 
both republican and loyalist terrorist organisations and reducing sectarian 
attacks.553 Nonetheless, it was highly controversial in terms of infringing 
judicial rights that 'did considerable damage to the criminal justice system in 
Northern Ireland.'554 This measure was part of a comprehensive 'security 
strategy to remove in a systematic way suspected terrorists from circulation in 
the community.'555 The Supergrass system enabled the police and Crown 
prosecution to arrest and convict terrorists based on uncorroborated evidence 
'provided by persons who had been actively involved in political violence 
themselves and who had agreed to give evidence for the prosecution against 
others involved in similar activities,' in return for immunity, clemency or 
reduced prison sentences, and even a new identity.556  
At its peak in the 1980s, the use of Supergrass informers certainly 
damaged the UVF's operational capability. A significant outcome was the 
increased number of UVF informers who struck a deal with the RUC to 
implicate their friends, by providing the security forces with valuable 
intelligence that put a face and address on many of the UVF's top men and 
covert cells. As a result, hundreds of UVF members were arrested or 
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imprisoned, enormous funds were diverted from arms purchases to support 
them and their families while in jail, and the leadership structure was in total 
disarray. According to Andrew, the UVF did not recover from the long prison 
sentences passed on some of its leaders, and its operations were limited to 
'attempts, frequently unsuccessful, to smuggle arms and explosives to Northern 
Ireland.'557 
 A serious issue that should be addressed when analysing the British 
security policy in Northern Ireland, is the Catholic accusation that the UVF was 
a proxy of the police and army and regarded it as 'the security services off-
duty', suggesting that the UVF was controlled by Britain.558. Certainly, the UVF's 
operational capability was damaged by the British security policy. Yet the close 
(sometimes overlapping) links between Protestants and British security 
personnel led to claims that the UVF was formally (attacks sanctioned with 
directives from operational and political levels of government) and informally 
(individual servicemen assisted UVF terrorists in their attacks without official 
approval) colluding with the British forces.559 Consequently, Catholic 
allegations often suggested that the security services provided the UVF with 
weapons and intelligence on IRA members and targets and even carried out 
joint operations.  
 Naturally, the UVF did not want to be portrayed as a “puppet” of the 
British establishment but rather as an authentic and independent local reaction 
to republican violence. In an attempt to dismiss any possibility of collaboration 
with the British security forces, the UVF declared in 0994 that ‘the idea that the 
politicians and policemen were directing us was absurd…if we had top-level 
information on republican targets from the police there would have been 
countless more republicans buried up.’560 Bruce supports this argument and 
explains that only a small number of soldiers and policemen actively aided the 
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UVF or provided weapons and information, and that 'despite sharing a common 
enemy, recruiting from the same population, and living in the same areas, the 
security forces and the paramilitaries have not enjoyed a cosy relationship.'561 
After the explosion of the four car bombs in Dublin and Monaghan, 
people in Northern Ireland expressed even more scepticism of the UVF's ability 
to perform such a complicated operation on its own. Rumours even suggested 
that the British intelligence was either directly involved or supplied the 
explosives. In response to the allegations, a UVF senior commander said that it 
'read like something from The X Files.'562 Ultimately, in the 1993 statement, in 
which the UVF took sole responsibility for the attack, it also denied any 
allegations of colluding with British security services:  
The UVF avails itself of this opportunity to state clearly and 
without reservation that the entire operation was from its 
conception to its successful conclusion, planned and carried out by 
our volunteers aided by no outside bodies… The type of 
explosives, timing and detonating methods all bore the hallmark of 
the UVF.563    
In 2007 an official Commission of Investigation into The Dublin and 
Monaghan bombings of 1974 was ordered by the government of Ireland. The 
commission, led by Patrick McEntee, concluded in its final report that it found 
no evidence of collusion between the UVF and British security services.564 
Although both the UVF and British authorities went to great lengths to dispel 
any claims of collaboration, there is no doubt that there was some level of social 
and operational interaction between the security forces and loyalists. Evidently, 
there have been soldiers and policemen who were sympathetic to the loyalist 
view or even helped UVF terrorists in one way or another. James McAuley 
points out that 'there is little question that some selective assassinations by 
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loyalist paramilitaries were encouraged and assisted by the state.'565 Cusack 
and McDonald concur that there was collaboration between the British security 
services and the UVF, yet they reject the claim that it was institutionally-based. 
They note that if this was the case, 'then it would be impossible to explain why, 
by the end of the Troubles, there were more loyalists than republicans serving 
life imprisonment in the Maze prison.'566  
 In reality, an absolute majority of regular army soldiers, as opposed to 
the locally-recruited RUC and UDR, served short tours-of-duty in Northern 
Ireland and were less involved in the community life. In fact, they showed 
'ambivalence towards Protestants…and considerable initial sympathy with the 
Catholic minority.'567 Therefore, the army treated Protestants and Catholics 
equally by applying the same military and legal measures towards both 
communities regardless of the servicemen private views. Furthermore, because 
of the popularity of the alleged collusion, the British government was even 
more adamant in dispersing the Catholic sentiment of discrimination in the 
security policy. Under various special powers granted to the security services 
by the British government and the Crown courts, UVF members were hunted, 
detained, interrogated and convicted, as relentlessly as republicans. This even-
handed policy was described in a 1979 classified briefing paper that was sent to 
the Prime Minister by a senior official at 10 Downing Street pointing out that:  
The police draws no distinction between Catholics and 
Protestants in the investigation of security offences and the 
prosecution of such offenders...In searching for arms and 
explosives, the security forces are acting vigorously against both 
Catholic and Protestant areas.568 
Addressing the increasing role of the UVF in the terrorist attacks, the 
paper noted that 'the growth of Protestant violence represents a very serious 
change in the security situation. The shooting and other attacks on the Army in 
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Protestant areas...had nothing to do with the IRA or with incidents engineered 
by them.' It concluded by urging the prime minister to promise Catholic leaders 
that 'the security forces will continue to confront with the utmost 
determination and with complete impartiality all those who seek to disrupt the 
community by violence, whether be Protestant or Catholic.'569 
Despite the British attempt to treat loyalists and republicans equally, 
allegations of collusion between the British security forces and loyalist 
paramilitaries in Northern Ireland still continued. Throughout the years, British 
governments commissioned several enquiries and reports to investigate these 
allegations. Such an official inquiry, conducted by Sir John Stevens, 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, concluded in 2003 that members of the 
British security services colluded with Loyalist terrorist organisations in 
Northern Ireland to murder Catholics. Stevens determined that collusion 
ranged from the 'wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, 
the withholding of intelligence and evidence, trough to the extreme of agents 
being involved in murder.' He specifically highlighted that the 'unlawful 
involvement of agents in murder implied that the security forces sanctioned 
killings.'570  
Another review, ordered by the House of Commons and published in 
December 2012, which was led by Sir Desmond de Silva, a prominent British 
lawyer, concluded that a covert agent-running unit of the British Army, known 
as The Force Research Unit (FRU), was 'passing significant and exploitable 
intelligence to the RUC,' that was provided by recruited agents within the 
Loyalist terrorist organisations.571 Based on his comprehensive research, de 
Silva further determined that the:  
Scale and seriousness of the collusion between some members of 
the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries should have 
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necessitated urgent and rigorous action on the part of the 
authorities to pursue those responsible.572 
In retrospect, for the most part, the British unyielding attempt to fight 
loyalist violence as stringently as republican terrorism was successful in 
improving personal security in Northern Ireland. It also greatly influenced the 
local public opinion that opposed violence, particularly when communal life 
became vibrant again by the end of the 1970s. Specifically, the notion that the 
British government acted more decisively to crush loyalist and republican 
violence had considerable impact on Protestants. While fewer thought violence 
was still necessary, even those who remained committed to the armed 
campaign believed that violence could no longer be justified. Bruce mentions 
one UVF member who admitted in the late 1980s that 'there was no need for us 
then…I said we should grease our guns and put them under the floorboards and 
send a big cheque to the RUC benevolent fund and let them go with it.'573  
 
THE BRITISH POLITICAL DIMENSION – CREATIVITY AND COMPROMISE 
Although Britain was responsible for governing Northern Ireland, its 
political role was mainly to arbitrate between two warring communities hoping 
that it would eventually create the conditions for resolving the conflict through 
compromise.574 In analysing the UVF's transition to politics, one cannot 
overlook Britain's determination and creative thinking in bringing the conflict 
to a negotiated settlement. Charles Townsend supports this assertion when 
writing that 'it is doubtful whether any party to the Northern Ireland conflict 
has shown such a desire as the British government to reach a settlement.'575  
At times of military stalemate, Britain's political initiatives helped to 
reducing the levels of violence. By no means was this an easy task; Labour and 
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Conservative governments knew that a 'peace process has to resolve much 
more than the Troubles…it has to address the whole legacy of history and the 
many unresolved problems inherited from the past.'576 Nonetheless, every 
British premier since 1969 took it upon himself to facilitate a dialogue between 
Protestants and Catholics, and insisted that the Republic of Ireland must play a 
role in the process. In return for a possible cessation of violence, Britain 
provided solid political support and offered social assurances and economic 
incentives to encourage all parties to reach agreements. Ultimately, the rival 
parties managed to take advantage of one another's exhaustion of violence as 
well as willingness to compromise, and thus were able to successfully resolve 
the long and bloody conflict.  
Britain's direct political involvement in Northern Ireland was somewhat 
unplanned and the circumstances at the beginning were rather grim. Initially, 
the British government left the management of Northern Ireland to the local 
unionist leadership. But when violence escalated dramatically in the early 
1970s, with a catalyst such as "Bloody Sunday", Northern Ireland became 
ungovernable and extreme measures had to be taken. Facing increasing IRA 
attacks, angry unionists expected London to defend Ulster and demanded 
tougher security measures. The British Conservative PM, Edward Heath, was 
determined to restore order in the province by assuming direct responsibility 
for security. When the unionist premier Brian Faulkner refused, Heath 
announced in March 1972 the suspension of the Stormont parliament and 
introduced Direct Rule from London. Subsequently, Faulkner and his cabinet 
resigned and Heath transferred executive powers to a designated Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, and the province was to be administered through a 
new governmental department – the Northern Ireland Office.  
The starting point of Britain's political responsibility over Northern 
Ireland could not have been direr. Although Direct Rule was intended to be 
temporary, it was clear that the decision to 'prorogue Stormont was made in 
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the absence of a long-term plan.'577 The introduction of Direct Rule had 
significant impact on the lives of the people of Northern Ireland. For the 
Protestants, the abolishment of Stormont represented the failure of traditional 
unionism and for the first time since 1920 they were no longer in charge of 
their political destiny. This notion created a trauma within the unionist 
community, enhanced their feelings of being driven into a united Ireland, and 
therefore was perceived as the destruction of Protestant supremacy in 
Northern Ireland. Nationalists, on the other hand, interpreted Direct Rule as 
another triumph on the road towards a united Ireland, which gave the IRA a 
boost to step-up its attacks. In response, loyalist terrorist organisations 
intensified their sectarian attacks against Catholics, and the cycle of violence 
peaked.  
Confronted with two displeased communities and being blamed for the 
political chaos in Northern Ireland, the British government was forced to find 
new ways to resolve the conflict. By and large, the British political efforts can be 
divided into three strategies: the first was formulation of peace initiatives that 
affected the UVF's strategy and tactics; the second was the use of political 
exclusion as a "carrot and stick" mechanism to draw radical organisations into 
peaceful negotiations; and the last one was cooperation with the PUP as an 
instrument to bring about the UVF's disarmament and demobilisation.  
 Since the early 1970s the security deterioration in Northern Ireland was 
a main concern for the British government and its officials were assigned to 
draw political initiatives to halt terrorist attacks and promote peace. In devising 
schemes for peaceful resolution, Britain had to be careful not to provoke a 
loyalist backlash while offering republicans political concessions aimed at 
persuading them to enter negotiations.578 Between 1972 and 1998 British 
governments presented several peaceful proposals, the most notable were the 
Sunningdale Agreement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the Good Friday 
Agreement, which above all others signifies the peaceful end of the Northern 
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Ireland conflict. These proposals had utmost importance in gradually 
convincing the opposing communities not only to talk to each other but to 
address the grievances and recognise the legitimacy of some of the claims on 
each side. The British determinacy to provide the armed organisations an 
honourable way out of the conflict was pivotal to the success of its political 
strategy.579  
The UVF's transition from violence to politics could not have 
materialised without the above mentioned peace initiatives and other 
engagements, that began in the early 1970s and laid the foundations for the 
current political order in Northern Ireland. According to Dixon, the initial 
British strategy was to 'construct a moderate power-sharing executive of 
nationalists and unionists which could devolve power back to Northern 
Ireland.'580 Accordingly, the first workable plan, known as the Sunningdale 
Agreement, was launched in December 1973. It was aimed at establishing a 
new government in Northern Ireland 'in which nationalists and unionists 
would share power within a wider political framework involving the Irish 
Republic.'581 More specifically, the agreement was intended to put an end to the 
Protestant political dominance and allow a greater role for the Catholics in the 
future government of Northern Ireland, whilst reassuring the constitutional 
status of the unionist community. Furthermore, it recognised the direct 
involvement of the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland as vital for any 
peaceful settlement.582  
Despite its promising approach, the Sunningdale Agreement brought 
neither an end to loyalist or republican terrorism or long-term stability. The 
main reason for its failure was the exclusion of the radical elements in both 
camps that strongly believed that 'what British governments thought was best 
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for Northern Ireland was seldom viewed in that light by most of its citizens.' 583 
Ulster loyalists believed that it was 'over-balanced against unionism,' and 
therefore opposed any attempt to form a power-sharing executive.584 The 
republicans, on the other hand, ruled themselves out of any likely peace process 
claiming that the agreement fell short of their demand of Northern Ireland free 
of British control. Ultimately, the agreement collapsed due to the unionist 
determination to bring down a political roadmap that was perceived as an 
appeasement to republican violence and could potentially lead to Irish unity. An 
extensive industrial strike of working-class Protestants in May 1974, not only 
further emphasised the unionist alienation but essentially 'brought the power-
sharing executive to its knees.'585  
Despite the wide unionist opposition to the agreement, the Sunningdale 
process was the cornerstone for the UVF’s future political participation. It must 
be noted that since its inception the leading loyalist terrorist organisation was 
more prone to political considerations than other armed groups and was rather 
unique in its understanding of the power of politics. Bruce points out that the 
UVF was always aware that a paramilitary organisation 'cannot be a powerful 
independent political force; such role must be left the politicians.'586 Although 
the UVF publicly opposed the Sunningdale Agreement, it recognised an 
opportunity to raise its popular standing and strengthen its political 
consciousness. To give the fragile peace process a chance to develop, the UVF 
declared a self-imposed ceasefire in November 1973. However, the 
organisational restraint had another important, and less known, objective – to 
convey its disenchantment with the way Ulster politicians were handling 
Northern Ireland's affairs, and to establish itself as a political alternative to the 
constitutional unionist leadership. This unexpected move was best explained 
by Billy Mitchell, a senior UVF member and later a PUP politician: 'We felt if we 
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called a ceasefire and stopped the hostilities, perhaps we could engage 
politically and maybe even ourselves come up with some political thoughts. We 
just felt that continued acts of violence weren’t taking us anywhere.'587 
The principles introduced in the Sunningdale Agreement are thought to 
be ahead of their time, and they served as the basis for every other peace 
proposal presented after. A newly devised political roadmap, known as the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, was described by a British politician as 'Sunningdale 
plus.'588 The agreement signed in November 1985 by British and Irish premiers, 
was seen as the adequate platform to bring a peaceful settlement. In its main 
clauses the agreement confirmed Northern Ireland's link to Britain and noted 
that any change in the constitutional status of the province must be approved 
by a majority of the population. To galvanise the nationalists to accept the 
agreement, it also formally reaffirmed Ireland's legitimate right to influence the 
decision making of Northern Ireland's government and set out the conditions 
for a devolved government.589 Peter Hain, former Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, argued that the agreement 'liberated the nationalists,' as it: 
…effectively moved the debate on from the immediate causes of 
the conflict to the fundamental issue of identity, and the rights of 
nationalists to have their sense of belonging recognised by both 
Governments.590   
Although the agreement was approved by an overwhelming majority in 
the British and Irish parliaments, it failed to bring the desired peace, security 
and stability to Northern Ireland and encountered a wide opposition from 
unionists and nationalists alike. It did, however, improve the working relations 
and cooperation between the British and Irish governments, a factor that would 
turn out as crucial in the peace process in the 1990s.   
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 The Anglo-Irish Agreement was received by the UVF with ambivalence. 
On one hand, it did not want to undermine the peace process, particularly after 
many members had already been indoctrinated and prepared for a political 
compromise.591 On the other, UVF leadership felt obliged to oppose any 
possibility that would bring Britain’s political and military withdrawal from 
Northern Ireland. Ultimately, the alleged triumph of nationalism set the tone for 
the UVF and it was met with a new wave of loyalist violence. Yet, this time the 
potential targets were the new institutions set up under the accords as well as 
security personnel and civil servants responsible for implementing the 
agreement. A UVF warning stating that 'if you are not for us then you are 
against us,' signalled a watershed in UVF-security forces relations.592 The 
armed opposition led to unavoidable clashes between the UVF and the RUC and 
resulted in casualties on both sides. However, the UVF's attacks against official 
government representatives were counter-productive and immediately 
resulted in further decline in the organisation's public support among working-
class Protestants.  
In effect, UVF attacks against security and civilian personnel marked the 
beginning of the end for its activity as an armed terrorist organisation. Scenes 
of UVF attacks on police and military targets were broadcast in the media and 
estranged many in the Protestant community. If one can argue that until the 
summer of 1986 law-abiding Protestants "accepted" violence as a necessity, 
when violence was purposely targeting state representatives it was roundly 
condemned and largely seen as intolerable. Also, under the leadership of the 
Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who was committed to battle 
the IRA as well as loyalist violence, Protestants felt more secure and the UVF’s 
justifications for its armed campaign became less relevant.593  
By the end of the 1980s, the UVF's standing among Protestants was at an 
all time low, and therefore had no other choice but to re-think the existence and 
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future course of the organisation. Cusack and McDonald stress that the internal 
deliberations resulted in a growing realisation 'that no one would win the 
war...[and] that a cessation of violence was inevitable.'594 The understanding 
that the armed campaign reached a military stalemate together with the 
changes in the political landscape, set the background that eventually produced 
the ceasefires in the 1990s. Gusty Spence, who was instrumental in advocating 
the use of non-violent methods, established himself as the leading force behind 
the move towards peace:  
I had attempted to persuade and use whatever influence I had 
with the UVF hierarchy to call a ceasefire, at least for a limited 
period but hopefully for a longer period in order to get some 
political dialogue going.595  
His efforts were fruitful and by the early 1990s the UVF was looking for 
a political direction and its leadership decided to coordinate its actions with the 
PUP and to use the party’s political credentials to capitalise its public stature. 
The interdependency between the two organisations led to an understanding 
that if the UVF's violence continues it could not only lead to a collapse of the 
PUP but is also detrimental to the Protestant cause and brings suffering to the 
entire community.596  
The loyalist political analysis that no good could come out of violence, 
led to the formation of a united front, known as the Combined Loyalist Military 
Command, in which the UVF had a prominent role. The CLMC’s focus was 
political activity and the drafting of a coherent manifesto to replace what they 
perceived as the uselessness of the unionist politicians.597 Soon after its 
foundation, the CLMC issued its first ceasefire statement on 22 April 1991:  
In the light of impending political dialogue and in common with a 
sincere and genuine desire to see a peaceful and acceptable 
solution to our political differences, the Combined Loyalist 
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Military Command shall order a universal suspension of 
aggressive operational hostilities.598      
The unilateral ceasefire characterised a period that lasted until 1994, 
during which the peace process gradually became more dominant than violence 
in Northern Ireland. The notion that 'governments sooner or later end up 
talking to those they had regarded as terrorists,' encouraged the British 
government to seek alternative ways to reach a political settlement.599 The fact 
that ordinary citizens and terrorists on both sides were now ready to accept 
any compromise that would end the standstill further motivated the British 
government. 
The next step was a joint statement issued in December 1993 by British 
and Irish premiers, known as the "Downing Street Declaration". The statement 
carefully outlined the principles for peace in which "self-determination" and 
"consent" were central components.600 It seemed that both loyalists and 
republicans could not stay indifferent to these principles, particularly when 
faced with the public’s demand for a cessation of violence.  
After UVF concerns that Prime Minister John Major struck a secret deal 
with the IRA before announcing the Downing Street Declaration were abated, it 
was believed that the obstacle for peace was removed and 'the stage seemed set 
for the final stretch of the road to peace.'601 The IRA responded in August 1994 
with a general ceasefire that, to a large extent, caught the UVF by surprise. At 
first, loyalists suspected that they had been betrayed by the British 
government, but quickly the streets of Belfast were filled with slogans 
celebrating the IRA's surrender. When loyalist enthusiasm subsided the UVF 
realised that it remained the main party that was still officially committed to 
violence at a time when the people of Northern Ireland were attempting to 
resolve their conflict peacefully. In order to survive as a meaningful actor in the 
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province's political power-struggle, the UVF was compelled to respond with its 
own ceasefire six weeks later.602 
 Although the road for peace still had a long way to go, it seemed that the 
process was on the right track. After receiving assurances from the British 
government that the "Union was safe", Gusty Spence, the man who saw the 
Troubles as they began, read a statement saying that the UVF, and other loyalist 
paramilitaries, would universally cease its hostile operations for as long as the 
republicans kept their own ceasefire. Spence concluded the statement with a 
message of hope that the conflict could end without further violence: 'Let us 
firmly resolve to respect our differing views of freedom, culture and aspiration 
and never again permit our political circumstances to degenerate into bloody 
warfare.'603   
However, the euphoric atmosphere did not last long as the 'optimism 
and enthusiasm began to drain away.'604 Since the inclusion of Sinn Fein in the 
peace process was delayed, in February 1996 the IRA detonated a massive 
bomb in Canary Wharf, and the republican ceasefire was officially over. Loyal to 
their new mission to support the peace process, instead of calling for retaliatory 
attacks, UVF leaders appealed to their constituency not to strike back and 
warned that a return to violence would discredit their effort to reach a political 
settlement. Dawn Purvis points out that the PUP was involved in an intensive 
dialogue with the UVF and was able to deliver a clear message that retaliation 
would scupper the peace talks when people were really looking forward to this. 
She emphasised that by demonstrating self-restraint, the UVF took the high 
moral ground and proved its commitment for negotiations for the benefit of the 
country and the Protestant people.605 Indeed, the UVF refrained from reprisals 
and teams who decided to take unwarranted revenge were disbanded and the 
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men expelled from the organisation.606 Overall, it was the UVF's finest hour – it 
demonstrated an impressive ability to exert control over its operatives and 
despite occasional clashes with Catholics and intensifying internal loyalist 
feuds, the UVF's ceasefire held and the organisation remained committed to 
peace.  
The breakdown of the republican ceasefire did not discourage Britain's 
efforts and determination to reach a political compromise. Indeed, it took 
another change of government in London to resolve the Northern Ireland 
conflict. The landslide victory of a new Labour administration, led by Tony 
Blair, in the May 1997 general election put the peace process back on track.  
In its electoral manifesto, the Labour Party promised to revive the peace 
process based on all-party negotiations, this time including the Sinn Fein as the 
representative of republican Catholics. Two months later the IRA responded 
with its second major ceasefire and subsequently the Sinn Fein was officially 
invited to join the peace talks. According to Taylor, Blair was free from 
'parliamentary arithmetic' that had so restricted his predecessor.607 This 
allowed him to devise three objectives that guided his approach for dealing 
with Northern Ireland: creating a space without violence to allow politics to 
flourish, identifying courageous individuals that could lead their communities 
and searching for a political framework that could lead to a compromise.608  
In accordance with his statements and roadmap for peace, Blair publicly 
promised the unionists that they had nothing to fear from his new government, 
and that 'Northern Ireland is safe in the hands of this Government.'609 At the 
same time he demonstrated his genuine willingness to invigorate the dialogue 
by gesturing to the rejectionist parties. To show his desire to bring also the 
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republicans into the inclusive negotiations, he agreed to meet Gerry Adams, 
leader of Sinn Fein, in Belfast (the first meeting between a British premier and a 
Sinn Fein leader since 1921). After their meeting Blair told the media: 'We can 
continue with the hatred and the despair and the killing, treating people as if 
they were not parts of humanity, or we can try and settle our disagreements by 
negotiation, by discussion, by debate.'610 To further emphasise the fruits of 
peace, Blair invited Adams for another meeting, this time at 10 Downing Street, 
signaling both domestically and internationally that Sinn Fein had become an 
acceptable player in the political corridors of British and Irish administrations, 
under the condition that violence would no longer be a valid strategy.  
 The peace talks, chaired by US Senator George Mitchell operating under 
the umbrella of the British and Irish prime ministers, ultimately culminated in 
the all-party Good Friday Agreement. The agreement, which was signed in April 
1998, not only provided a balance between unionist and nationalist interests to 
make peace possible but also 'signalled a profound transformation in the 
politics of Northern Ireland. The stagnation that had long paralysed the region 
was broken up.'611 The agreement, despite the setbacks that occurred during its 
implementation, gave the peoples of Northern Ireland, Britain and the Republic 
of Ireland, real hope of ending the conflict as well as tools to resolve any future 
disagreements peacefully.    
However, none of the central milestones in the agreement (a) the 
constitutional status of the province could only be changed by a majority vote 
of the citizens, (b) national assembly with devolved legislative powers and a 
power-sharing executive, and (c) appointment of a North-South Ministerial 
Council to promote cross-border cooperation, were innovative in essence and 
appeared in almost all previous initiatives. What made this agreement different 
from all others was its premeditated objective 'to bring paramilitaries out of 
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violence by bringing them into the political system of the province.'612 All the 
parties who signed the agreement, including the Sinn Fein, the PUP and the 
Ulster Democratic Party (the political party that was associated with the UDA), 
agreed to the clause reaffirming their 'total and absolute commitment to 
exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political 
issues, and our opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any 
political purpose.'613 Although the notions of democracy, consent and non-
violence were not new, it seemed that due to the institutional changes, the 
political developments, the personal and intensive involvement of Tony Blair 
and Bill Clinton and the wide international attention, this time the parties were 
truly committed to honour their signature.  
The British persistence in initiating creative formulas to bring a peaceful 
end to the Northern Ireland conflict is commendable, especially when having to 
deal with powerful forces that rejected the peace process and threatened to 
derail it. Nonetheless, at times when peace seemed a remote possibility, the 
British government was ready to use controversial measures such as political 
exclusion through legal proscription that was aimed at preventing a person, a 
movement or organisation from taking an active part in constitutional political 
systems.  614 The objective of the British action was to pressure terrorists by 
limiting both their actions and movement, in the hope that it would encourage 
terrorist organisations to renounce violence and adopt non-violent methods.  
When the modern UVF began its violent campaign against Catholics in 
mid-1966, the automatic response of Prime Minister O'Neill to the public uproar 
was to execute his authority under the Special Powers Act to proscribe the 
organisation, legally rendering membership an offence punishable by 
imprisonment. Addressing the Assembly in Stormont, he announced that 'this 
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organisation now takes its proper place alongside the IRA in the schedule of 
illegal bodies.'615 O'Neill's action was in-line with the British government's 
policy to stand firm against any infringement of law and order: 'I warn those 
who set their ends before the interest of the community that the Government, 
acting in the best interests of all, will move against them with rigorous 
severity.'616  
Political exclusion had a negative effect on UVF men, who were 
persecuted by the security services and sentenced to long periods in prison 
under the new provisions. Many of them were looking for an alternative to 
accomplish their objectives. In that sense, the Sunningdale Agreement was a 
watershed for the UVF's political awakening. It provided an opportunity to cut a 
deal with the government that would keep the union safe whilst battling IRA's 
violence. Indeed, the political seeds that were planted had been translated into 
an unprecedented offer that received little academic scrutiny. In April 1974, 
UVF representatives met with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and 
proposed to end the organisation's violent activity and assume a legal status: 
The Ulster Volunteer Force, Brigade Staff, hereby offer the 
services of the UVF and its associate units to supplement the Civil 
and Military Authorities in their endeavours to combat terrorism 
and anarchy…we would, of course, not expect to be permitted to 
assume the role of an independent armed militia.617 
Shortly after, in a secret meeting a UVF delegation suggested to NIO 
officials that the organisation would be disbanded or 'accepted as part of the 
security forces, armed with licensed firearms and acting under the control of 
the Army or the RUC.'618 In return, they demanded that the government would 
apply tougher measures against the IRA, including deployment of police forces 
in republican areas, confiscation of weapons and ending political contacts with 
republican representatives.  
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 In demonstrating such a rational and pragmatic approach, the UVF 
acknowledged that it could not be allowed to proceed as an armed organisation 
if it wished to become part of the constitutional political system. Accepting the 
UVF’s readiness to join the British security services could have paved the road 
to achieving the highest degree of political integration while neutralising the 
most radical element in the Protestant camp. Yet, both the UVF and the British 
government were short-sighted and did not foresee the potential in such a far-
reaching offer. The UVF's declared ceasefire led to internal disputes, mainly 
among people 'who joined to fight republicans rather than talk politics,' and the 
offer was retracted.619 The British government on its part could not tolerate a 
situation in which a loyalist terrorist organisation joining its security forces, 
since it would have strengthened the nationalist perception that the British 
army and police are operating at the Protestants' behest.   
 Despite the rejection, the British government noticed the UVF's 
increasing interest in politics and viewed it as a fertile ground to accommodate 
the loyalist terrorist organisation into the peace process. This notion was 
indicated in a classified NIO document concluding that 'there are people who, 
although at one time committed to violence, would now like to find a way back 
to political activity.'620 In an attempt to reach out to the UVF, the British 
government encountered an obstacle: the political dealings were hindered by 
the fact that it was a proscribed terrorist organisation – the only loyalist 
organisation banned by the unionist Prime Minister O'Neill in 1966 (and also 
by the British government itself in 1973). Thus any cooperation with its 
members was legally forbidden. In order to encourage political transition, the 
new Labour government, that took a more reformist approach than the 
previous Conservative administration, decided in May 1974 to remove the UVF 
from the list of designated terrorist organisations. A month later, the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, explained to the House of Commons 
that the reason for de-proscribing the UVF was 'to encourage genuine political 
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activity' in an anticipation that many of its members and supporters would 
follow a constructive political path rather than violence.621  
Lifting of the ban in an attempt to facilitate negotiation enabled the UVF 
to establish in June 1974 its first lawful movement, the Volunteer Political Party 
(VPP).622 The new party was founded by members 'who thought the UVF 
should be doing something positive to complement its terrorism,' after years 
that it 'had been denied the just right to express openly its political ideology.'623 
Additionally, the formation of a grassroots political party was aimed at giving 
loyalists a voice to communicate their disappointment and distrust in the 
incumbent politicians who led Ulster into a decay and anarchy. The UVF used 
the VPP as an instrument to remove its branding as 'nothing but a bunch of 
hooded assassins, determined to wreck Ulster by the use of violence.'624 As 
such, although the VPP still opposed the notion of independence for Northern 
Ireland, it introduced the UVF's new and moderate outlook that was viewed:  
…not simply through the eyes of sectarian bigots and gunmen but 
through the eyes of enlightened Ulster men…[and] the creation of 
a new society based upon the unity and sovereignty of the 
ordinary rank-and-file Ulster people, Protestant and Roman 
Catholic alike…The people of Ulster must realise that sooner or 
later they are going to have to live together.625  
The talk about Protestants and Catholics living side-by-side represented 
a radical political change, especially since it came from a terrorist organisation 
that only a few years earlier contributed to the downfall of a unionist prime 
minister who was working towards reconciliation with the Catholics.  
Despite its promising start, the VPP performed miserably in the 1974 
general elections and its single candidate polled only 14% of the unionist vote. 
A contributing element for the electoral defeat, as explained by Dawn Purvis, 
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was the branding of the VPP and the UVF by mainstream unionist parties as 
communists, Marxists and revolutionaries, which may have led unionists to 
distance themselves from the nascent loyalist party.626 Anthony Richards, 
however, suggests that the VPP did not have a real chance from the start. First it 
failed to present a radical and fresh political alternative to the 'stale old 
unionism.' But even if it did, in his view 'anything innovative was treated with 
suspicion as a further potential dilution of the Britishness of the province.'627 In 
any case, the humiliation ‘proved to many that the experiment had failed. 
Worse still, it made the big brave men of the UVF look silly.'628 Soon afterwards 
the VPP was dissolved and the UVF acknowledged that 'the low poll for the VPP 
candidate indicates that the general public does not support the political 
involvement of the UVF. It would, therefore, be fruitless for the UVF to continue 
to promote the Volunteer Party as a party political machine.'629  
The end-result was the UVF pulling back from politics and quickly 
resuming its sectarian attacks, believing that it was the only way to restore 
prominence within the Protestant community. Indeed, the British concessions 
proved to be premature, and when the UVF returned to violence - an act that 
was perceived as a slap in the face of the British government - it was re-
proscribed in October 1975. Secretary Rees himself justified the decision 
arguing that:  
Unfortunately, it became increasingly clear during 1975 that 
members of the UVF were deeply involved in sectarian violence 
and that the organisation was departing from the path of political 
engagement...It became abundantly clear that a large number of 
members of the UVF were once more wedded to violence.630  
 The UVF's new sectarian campaign was especially disturbing for the 
British government that dreaded further escalation in the level of violence. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
626 Interview with Dawn Purvis 
627 Richards, Anthony. "Terrorist Groups and their Political Fronts", in Dingley, James. 
Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p. 93 
628 CJ 4/1919, A19, Fortnight, Vol. 6 
629 UVF Brigade HQ Staff statement, Belfast Telegraph, 11/11/1974 




Therefore, it was met with the largest police and army operations combining 
aggressive military and judicial measures, that resulted in the killing and 
apprehension of many of the hard-core cadre of the UVF. The defeat of the UVF 
led Gusty Spence, who by then advocated for non-violence, to strongly express 
his political ideas in an attempt to influence the organisation's leadership to 
embrace democratic politics. In his view, the UVF should 'grease the guns and 
put them away. If the IRA have to be dealt with, let the security forces deal with 
them.'631 Accordingly, Spence began inspiring loyalists to become involved in 
party politics and social activity. His words were aimed at persuading UVF 
members to think positively about the option of political compromise. Indeed, 
Spence’s words had a real impact on many members, as described by one UVF 
prisoner: ‘I just came to the conclusion that some day we were going to have to 
talk and come to some form of accommodation.’632 
Clearly, the use of political exclusion did not succeed in the case of the 
UVF. Yet, it cannot be regarded as a total failure. Dawn Purvis argues that the 
VPP's electoral defeat did not discourage the UVF because it instilled the 
understanding that political participation was about giving the loyalists a right 
to be heard: 
There were still political thinkers within the VPP and in the 
prisoner class within the UVF who believed that this was the way 
forward for Northern Ireland. That working-class people were 
cannon-fodder and being used by the unionist politicians and they 
needed to have their own voice.633 
Although the UVF returned to sectarian violence after the political fiasco 
of the VPP, the British government identified that a conscious decision was 
made by many UVF members to move away from violence and support political 
accommodation and the peace process. Apart from embarking on military and 
judicial campaigns to counter republican and loyalist violence, the government 
decided to encourage the process of disillusionment of terrorist activity that 
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was mainly underway among imprisoned UVF members. Inside prison, under 
the supervision of British security services, UVF men became engaged in a 
political dialogue not only amongst themselves but also with their republican 
rivals. In retrospect, many loyalist politicians that began their paramilitary 
period in the ranks of the UVF, and later supported the Good Friday Agreement, 
owe their political indoctrination to their experiences in prison. To many of 
them, the 'mentor' was Gusty Spence, who according to Taylor 'more than any 
other single person sowed in the hard soil of Long Kesh the political ideas that 
were to flourish years later in the form of the UVF's new political party, the 
PUP.'634 
Indeed, political thinking was the ideological building block for 
establishing the PUP in 1977. The party wanted to attract mainly 'former 
loyalist paramilitaries or any other member of the public who wanted to take a 
political road but who were unsympathetic towards mainstream unionist 
parties.'635 The PUP represented a vanguard political course within loyalism, 
one that not only endorsed a dialogue with republicans but also accepted the 
Irish dimension and the accommodation of nationalists in the Northern Ireland 
government. It also promoted a socialist agenda that rejected the Protestant 
supremacy by arguing that the 'working-class of both communities was 
mistreated by the unionist leadership.'636 Essentially, the establishment of the 
PUP was welcomed by the British government, that decided to embrace the 
new unionist party and cooperate with it in order to find ways to attract 
unionists and loyalists into a peace process and bolster the need for a political 
resolution.  
Since its foundation the PUP supported the peace process, and many of 
its leaders, who were former terrorists that spent time in prison, played a 
critical role in mobilising the loyalists to support the Good Friday Agreement. 
The PUP's voice represented those Protestants who rejected the 'politics of 
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fear' and wanted a better future for their families and community.637 Taylor 
points out that the PUP represented a new breed of politicians who 'were in the 
business of saying "yes" – on certain conditions – instead of what had always 
appeared to be the loyalist traditional "no".'638 One of the key achievements of 
the PUP was offering political analysis to the UVF, eventually leading to the 
1994 ceasefire. It was the PUP which presented the UVF with the idea to 
respond positively to the IRA's ceasefire, articulating the political benefits of 
such a decision and insisting on a "no first strike" policy.639  
Against all odds, the ceasefire held for three years during which British 
and Irish governments consulted regularly with the PUP. According to Purvis, 
the UVF's ceasefire was the long-awaited opportunity for the PUP to make a 
real impact on political developments in Northern Ireland. It enabled the PUP 
to strengthen its public profile locally and internationally and subsequently the 
legitimacy of the party's objectives was finally recognised. Furthermore, it was 
able to promote welfare and social issues that substantially increased its 
electoral base.640 The UVF expected to benefit from the PUP's political 
prosperity and believed that the 'electoral mandate of those associated with it 
would be recognised, and they would be treated like any other political party 
for the purposes of political dialogue.'641 The UVF's willingness to compromise 
and end violence had a larger effect; it increased the sense of solidarity and 
confidence among loyalists who seriously considered political action, 
particularly since the 'time was ripe to begin the task of politicising the wider 
loyalist community…and to talk their brand of unionism to a wider public.'642  
Riding on its success to convince the UVF to declare and uphold the 
ceasefire, the PUP broke out from the loyalist camp and attracted many new 
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supporters who had no paramilitary experience whatsoever.643 It performed 
relatively well in the 1996 elections to the Protestant All Party Talks, the forum 
that sent representatives to the peace talks, wining 3.5% of the total unionist 
electorate and taking two seats in the Forum.644 More importantly, from being 
the PUP's best electoral performance ever, the party was now 'in a position to 
exercise what it sought dearly, influence, though they had no delusions about 
exercising power.'645  
In an attempt to capitalise on its electoral success, the British 
government sought to engage with the PUP, which supported the main pillars 
of every peace initiative, primarily a democratic devolved administration. For 
the British government it was vital that loyalist parties would be represented in 
the peace talks, as they could potentially bring the armed organisations into the 
political process. But the official negotiations that opened at Stormont in June 
1996, without Sinn Fein, quickly came to a halt. The stumbling block was the 
issue of decommissioning that was brought to the centre by the British 
government and unionists. They emphasised how crucial it is for building 
confidence and portraying good will to put the past behind, and wished that the 
terrorist organisations would begin to disarm before the opening of the peace 
talks.646  
Despite the evident logic in decommissioning for defusing tension and 
hostility and showing a commitment to the peace process, the British 
government was met with a firm refusal from paramilitaries on both sides. The 
UVF claimed that retention of its arms was a defensive measure and that it 
would be unimaginable to ask loyalists to decommission 'with a fully 
operational heavily armed Republican war machine intact and refusing to 
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relinquish their arsenals.'647 As a compromise, the PUP suggested that 
decommissioning should not be presented as a precondition to negotiations, 
but must take place 'in tandem with the development of genuine trust and 
mutual respect between the several parties formerly engaged in the conflict.'648 
Loyal to its commitment for shared responsibility between unionists and 
nationalists for the benefit of the country rather than local political interests, 
the PUP became a significant player in the peace process by advocating a 
conflict transformation approach. Despite the suspicion that unionists felt 
towards the Good Friday Agreement, the party strongly campaigned for loyalist 
support arguing that the agreement guarantees the 'security of the Union as 
long as the majority of the people of Northern Ireland wanted to remain part of 
the United Kingdom.'649  
Shortly after the signing of the agreement, the first National Assembly 
elections were scheduled. The British government saw the elections as the first 
major test to the fragile agreement and was hoping that it would lead to 
stability and prosperity in Northern Ireland. The PUP expected to reap the 
fruits of peace and translate its prominence among loyalists into electoral 
success, predicting between five to six seats in the Assembly.650 It was in the 
best interest of the British government that loyalist parties would perform well 
in the elections, demonstrating not only their endorsement of the agreement 
but also their ability to persuade their constituencies to do the same. However, 
the internal split among loyalists that already led to scores of casualties also 
took its electoral toll; the PUP won only two seats. Perhaps the only consolation 
was that the old time loyalist nemesis, the UDA, performed even worse and 
their political party, the UDP, failed to win any seats.651  
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In an attempt to explain the failure to cultivate a more profound political 
legitimacy among the Protestant electorate, Dawn Purvis blames the DUP and 
Ian Paisley for constantly advocating the selling out of Northern Ireland to the 
unionist community, whilst labelling PUP politicians as 'peacenics' or 'hard men 
going soft.' In a critical tone towards the Protestant electoral trends, she admits 
that the support for the PUP did not reflect itself in votes, mainly because: 
People voted for what they did not want as opposed to what they 
wanted. Paisley’s message was consistent in its negativity so he 
could tell people what he did not want, and if they did not want 
Sinn Fein and a united Ireland they should vote for him.652  
Gusty Spence attributed some of the electoral disappointment to the fact 
that unlike IRA men who were Sinn Fein supporters, 'the UVF was never like 
that,' and when election time arrived 'members of the UVF worked for other 
political parties in opposition to the PUP.'653   
 From the pinnacle point of 1998 when many Protestants were reassured 
that they could put the Troubles behind and look forward to a better future for 
Northern Ireland, it was all downhill for the PUP, and the UVF's behaviour and 
actions were much to blame. In a report that was ordered by the PUP in 2004 to 
look at the internal dialogue within loyalism, the authors concluded that the 
PUP's 'pragmatic non-combatant style of politics' was 'tarnished by the violent 
actions perpetrated by its paramilitary "partners".'654 Although the UVF ceased 
all armed operations against Catholics or the security forces, instead of 
standing down its members diverted their violent actions against fellow 
Protestants, during a period that was known as the "Shankill Feud". It also 
openly declared that it continued to recruit, rearm and train in case the war 
against the IRA resumed.655 But probably the worst politically damaging 
activity that the UVF took part in since 1998 was drug trafficking, racketeering 
and other mafia-like criminal offences. These illegal activities, as well as the use 
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of punishment beatings against anti-social individuals, particularly hampered 
the PUP's potential to grow as a major political force.656     
 Decommissioning was another issue that damaged the PUP's political 
growth. The unionist First Minister, David Trimble, believed that 
decommissioning was imperative to the success of the agreement and argued 
that the 'sight of guns being destroyed and explosives put beyond use, no 
matter how few, would shatter the myth that armed groups never surrender 
their arsenals.'657 The UVF, however, insisted that disarmament was merely a 
tactical manoeuvre of unionist leaders to attract the Sinn Fein into a power-
sharing executive. Accordingly, it issued a statement that the conditions for 
arms removal did not exist and therefore it refused to surrender any weapons 
until the IRA reciprocated.658 Since most unionists supported decommissioning, 
the UVF insistence on retaining its weapons was detrimental to the PUP's 
political standing. At times when Gerry Adams acknowledged in the high-
profile venue of the World Economic Forum in February 2002 that nationalists 
cannot 'force upon unionism an all-Ireland state which doesn't have their 
assent or consent,' the UVF's refusal to decommission and inability to adapt to 
the new atmosphere of peace and conciliation stood as a stark contrast.659 
 Undoubtedly, the link between the UVF and the PUP inflicted terminal 
damage on the latter's political prospects. The fact that many unionists became 
increasingly critical of the economic, social and communal benefits that were 
supposedly attached to the peace process reflected poorly on the PUP's political 
growth. As a result, in the 2003 election the PUP lost one seat with David Ervine 
remaining its sole representative to the Northern Ireland Assembly. His ability 
to represent the loyalist agenda was significantly reduced.660 McAuley explains 
that the limited support for the PUP stems from the prevailing feelings voiced 
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among Protestants of uncertainty about their future and that the union is once 
again under threat.661 In a broader outlook, Edwards and Bloomer concluded 
that the 'challenge of transforming and unifying the Loyalist working class to a 
stage where this translates into electoral strength was probably impossible.'662 
Under such political climate, Paisley's DUP was able to frame itself as the only 
guardian against Catholic dominance, and to win 30 seats to become the largest 
party in the assembly.  
Two months before the 2007 elections, David Ervine died and Dawn 
Purvis was elected as the new party leader, becoming the first woman to lead a 
unionist party in Northern Ireland. The expectations that her election would 
boost the party's public image and inspire Protestant women to vote for the 
PUP were not met. Little over 3,800 people voted for the PUP in the general 
elections, which was barely enough for Dawn Purvis to maintain her own 
seat.663 In a reality in which the PUP was struggling to remain a viable political 
actor in Northern Ireland politics and the Protestant support in the loyalist 
cause was marginal, the UVF's announcement about ending its terrorism 
campaign was expected, and perhaps even inevitable.   
 
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 
Undoubtedly, the least researched aspect of the story of the modern 
UVF, is the influence of the international dimension on its grand-strategy and 
day-to-day tactics. Unlike the IRA that mastered the international theatre and 
capitalised on its benefits, the UVF faced difficulties in getting the exposure, 
support and profits that often come together when reaching to the outside. 
Therefore, arguing that such influence does in fact exist and analysing its 
effects, poses a challenge to any researcher who claims that the international 
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system should not be overlooked when investigating a terrorist organisation's 
transition from violence to peaceful politics. 
It is often argued that the Northern Ireland conflict attracted, from the 
outset, immense international attention and intervention that 'influenced the 
policies of the British and Irish governments and the expectations of the 
communities.'664 The fact is, however, that until the early 1990s there was little 
international interest in the Northern Ireland conflict. Lord Alderdice, a 
prominent Northern Ireland politician, even suggested that 'the British 
government did not want any international involvement at all,' arguing that this 
was an internal matter to the United Kingdom to be resolved by the British 
government.665 Indeed, at that time, the international focus was pointed 
towards other Cold War theaters of conflict, mainly in the Middle-East, Asia and 
Africa. In the absence of international intervention in the Northern Ireland 
conflict, Protestants and Catholics alike hoped that the British and Irish 
governments could bring about a peaceful end to the Troubles by themselves.    
With the end of the Cold War and the peaceful settlements of protracted 
conflicts in South Africa and the Middle-East, the world's attention diverted 
from the periphery to the heart of Europe. At this point the Northern Ireland 
conflict could not remain an isolated dispute and the ramifications of the post-
Cold War era had a strong impact on the behaviour of all parties operating in 
the province. Jonathan Tonge explains that new hopes for reconciliation 
replaced sentiments of hostility and communal rivalry, since the 'ending of the 
Cold War provided a convenient framework to develop the [peace] process and 
allowed the ditching of ideological baggage.'666  
Amidst such international environment, the dominant view in the 
province was: 'if Jews and Arabs can do it in Palestine, if blacks and whites can 
do it in South Africa, why can't Protestants and Catholics do it in Northern 
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Ireland?'667 All the parties in the conflict were prepared to "internationalise" 
the Northern Ireland problem. Soon, external actors, primarily the United 
States and the European Union, became involved and were instrumental in 
accelerating conflict resolution and consolidating political developments. Apart 
from economic support, the US and the EU encouraged and pressured the 
parties 'to maintain their commitment to finding a compromise solution to the 
conflicting claims of unionists and nationalists over Northern Ireland.'668 Peter 
Hain, former Secretary for Northern Ireland, concluded that the international 
community made an important contribution to the peace process by providing 
reassurances and injecting trust that supplemented the efforts of the British 
Irish governments.669  
Undoubtedly, the biggest international contribution for the transition 
from violence to peaceful politics in Northern Ireland is attributed to the United 
States. Traditionally, American administrations took a non-interventionist 
approach and maintained that Northern Ireland was a domestic concern of 
Britain. However, the large Irish-American community living in the US was 
heavily involved in the conflict in their homeland. They followed the Troubles 
closely and contributed not only money and arms to both loyalists and 
republicans, but also put pressure on American politicians to actively intervene 
in the conflict. Consequently, American presidents and congressmen were 
drawn into the conflict and put diplomatic pressure on British leaders to seek a 
peaceful resolution. They also allocated financial resources to support the 
peace process and cross-border initiatives, aimed at bringing Catholics and 
Protestants to sit together and have a serious dialogue.670  
The American involvement in Northern Ireland further intensified under 
the leadership of President Bill Clinton. The foreign policy during his 
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administration placed a high priority for the Northern Ireland conflict.671 
Clinton's commitment to resolving the conflict goes beyond that of any previous 
president, and he played a critical role 'in both pushing the peace process along 
and bringing it to a successful conclusion in 1998.'672 In addition to exercising 
his political strength as leader of the "free world", Clinton appointed a special 
envoy, Senator George Mitchell, to serve as a mediator between all the parties 
involved and to provide American political and economic support in the peace 
process. Taylor determines that without Mitchell's personal involvement and 
the American political pressure 'it is unlikely that the Good Friday Agreement 
would ever have been finalised.'673  
While the international intervention and mediation greatly affected the 
British and Irish governments and local parties, it had another, somewhat 
indirect, effect on the republican and loyalist terrorist organisations. In the 
post-Cold war balance of power, headed by the US, it was far more difficult for 
the terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland to legitimise a strategy of 
sectarian violence.674 Specifically, the 9/11 attacks against American targets 
had a substantial effect on those in Northern Ireland who were engaged in 
violence. Lord Alderdice explains that after the attacks international public 
opinion, and particularly Americans, became very intolerant of the tactic of 
terrorism and 'anybody that might be involved in using this tactic was on the 
wrong side of the game.'675 At times of changing political context, both locally 
and internationally, the UVF was struggling to maintain meaningful public 
support and the continuation of armed attacks under such circumstances could 
have brought the organisation to its knees. Indeed, the 9/11 attacks further 
emboldened the UVF to embark on a process of re-thinking its broader policy 
objectives, which ultimately resulted in the organisation's abandonment of 
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military means.    
Another international aspect that contributed to the UVF's transition to 
peaceful political activity is the understanding that communicating its ideology 
and policy to the world could help the loyalist cause. In principle, the IRA has 
been more exposed to the international arena, and enjoyed funds, weapons and 
sympathy from external communities. Consequently, it was also more 
susceptible to international pressure and paid attention to political 
developments outside the British-Irish boundaries. The UVF, however, 
acknowledged that it was more or less internationally friendless outside the 
UK, and therefore, unlike the IRA, could not receive similar political and 
logistical support from other states. 
Since nationalist demands were more popular in the eyes of the 
international community, and external actors were more favourable to their 
position, unionists, and particularly loyalists, felt that they 'have few friends in 
the world.'676 Shortly after the 1994 ceasefire, the peace process boosted and 
the international attention in the conflict increased dramatically. Fearing the 
nationalist political parties would mobilise American and European support for 
their cause, the UVF, through its political representative in the PUP, believed 
that the loyalists must also find a way to gain widespread sympathy and impact 
political developments in Northern Ireland.677  
An important event that had a significant effect on the UVF's view of the 
international dimension was Gerry Adams' visits to the US and subsequent 
meetings with President Clinton. Granting a visa to Adams became a 
controversial subject, to which the British government, the unionist leadership 
and key American officials were strongly against. Despite the opposition, 
Clinton authorised Adams' visit to the US, since he 'thought it was the best shot 
we had to bring the violence to an end.'678 The hand-shaking between the two 
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leaders held a broader meaning, since the lesson learned by the UVF was that 
being part of the peace process paid dividends and granted international 
standing and legitimacy. Lord Alderdice reveals that the loyalists were unhappy 
with Adams's visit to the US, but more importantly they wondered why their 
own leaders were not doing the same.679 Subsequently, UVF and PUP leaders 
were looking for similar opportunities that would eventually establish them as 
contributing players in the peace process. The loyalist universal ceasefire 
presented such an opportunity, and soon UVF and PUP leaders received an 
invitation to visit the US. After years of nationalist perspectives dominating the 
international discourse, the UVF was able to deliver its own political views 
across the Atlantic. Sinnerton argues that UVF leaders were able to capitalise 
upon the visit in order to gain credibility among American political circles and 
to dispel many misconceptions. Furthermore, they were successful in 
articulating their side of the story and positioning themselves as bona fide 
political entities.680      
As a result of the successful peace talks and the demand that terrorist 
organisations in Northern Ireland commit to non-violent means, the issue of 
decommissioning was given renewed attention. This was another dimension of 
international involvement that greatly affected the terrorist organisations in 
Northern Ireland. George Mitchell claims in his personal account that he was 
convinced that the British demand for decommissioning prior to entering 
negotiations was unworkable. Instead, he set forth in 1996 an alternative that 
required all parties involved in the process to commit exclusively to democratic 
means and total and parallel disarmament of all terrorist organisations 
verifiable by an international independent commission.681 In August 1997 an 
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) was 
established to oversee and execute the decommissioning of arms and to report 
to the British and Irish governments. Throughout the years, the commission 
met with individuals from all the armed organisations to determine the terms 
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and methods under which decommissioning would be executed. 
The first act of decommissioning, as mentioned earlier, was carried out 
by LVF members in December 1998. Interestingly, it was executed in public 
with media present. All other acts were done in private with verification by the 
Commission. The IRA's first decommissioning act was announced in October 
2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, and others acts followed months later. By 
the end of 2005, the Commission announced the completion of IRA arms 
decommissioning.682 Four years later, in June 2009, the UVF agreed to 
surrender all arms under its control to the Commission.683  
Certainly, dealing with the weapons was both critical to the success of 
the peace process as well as difficult to handle. However, Lord Alderdice argues 
that it became 'far too big of an issue and it held things up for a long time.' In his 
view, the IICD tended to be reactive to events in Northern Ireland and they 
never took initiative, 'they just sat and waited...[whilst] they could have pushed 
the process along.'684 Despite the criticism, the appointment and the workings 
of the IICD were essential for addressing the contending constitutional and 
political issues. In hindsight, it is clear that the IICD served as a confidence-
building mechanism that generated cooperation from both republican and 
loyalist paramilitaries.685 In effect it played a leading role in eliminating the 
military instrument of the Northern Ireland conflict. 
Undoubtedly, the UVF owes at least some of its acceptance as an integral 
actor within the Northern Ireland political system to events and dynamics that 
had a global impact. Of course, the organisation did not control any of them and 
at times it was unwillingly influenced by them. Yet, it would be unjustified to 
ignore the fact that the UVF's decision to open up towards the international 
dimension was valuable to its transformation from a violent movement into a 
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political actor.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Despite the common idiom phrased by John Whyte that 'in proportion to 
size, Northern Ireland is the most heavily researched area on earth,' the UVF, 
which was, by all means, a central actor in the loyalist apparatus, has been 
largely ignored.686 Due to some of the unique characteristics that have been 
outlined throughout this chapter, that eventually led to the abandonment of 
violence and the adherence to strictly peaceful means, the UVF should have 
attracted more academic attention as well as tactical and strategic analysis.  
First and foremost, since the UVF was defined as a pro-state 
organisation it was bound to operate under distinctive security, political and 
social constraints which often do not apply to anti-state terrorist organisations. 
This uniqueness entails different sets of organisational, domestic and 
international factors that eventually led to a transformational change in the 
UVF's strategy, which in essence preferred political integration over the 
continuation of violence.  
Indeed, the UVF was a vicious terrorist organisation that fought to 
preserve the constitutional and ethnic link of Northern Ireland to Britain, 
without benefiting from the state's security and legal protection or the popular 
support of the Protestant community as a whole. Additionally, it consistently 
expressed its disenchantment with the mainstream unionist leadership, whom 
it blamed for mishandling the Protestant interests. More distinguishable was 
the UVF's scepticism that there is a military solution to the Northern Ireland 
conflict and support in the peace process. The close relations between the UVF 
and the standalone PUP had a further moderating effect on the UVF's 
application of violence and led to its positive involvement in promoting a 
negotiated settlement. It is, indeed, an unusual case when a terrorist 
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organisation that killed more than 500 people in its murderous campaign, 
displays a political understanding that a deep-rooted conflict can only be 
resolved peacefully. 
The evolution of the UVF from a radical terrorist organisation to an 
influential actor in the Northern Ireland power struggle is somewhat 
convoluted and at times difficult to follow. However, the methodological 
approach adopted in this chapter is meant to assist in clarifying the UVF's 
roadmap that culminated in its abandonment of violence and adherence to a 
civilianised political process. Yet, it was not always clear that the UVF would 
take this path.  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the prospects for a peaceful 
resolution were unimaginable, the UVF was committed to ferociously defending 
the Protestant community against republican violence. Ordinary Catholics as 
well as republicans were executed without hesitation and the policy of "no 
surrender" was used to justify the UVF's sectarian killing campaign. At that 
time, the UVF showed little interest in becoming a credible political force and 
instead maintained a strong military capability in order to play a significant 
role and pose as the savior of Ulster and not slide into obscurity.687 Evidently, 
some of the most horrific terrorist attacks in the history of the Northern Ireland 
conflict are attributed to the UVF and therefore its members are 'placed outside 
the honourable tradition, and firmly in the terrorist mould.'688  
However, a closer look on the application of UVF's violence reveals some 
behavioural features that could indicate an instrumental approach. The UVF 
displayed restraint and discipline, especially during the ceasefires in 1973, 
1991 and 1994. When unauthorised attacks did occur, the UVF demonstrated 
decisiveness in battling such actions, such as banishing senior and popular 
commanders like Billy Wright. Although not always successful, the UVF 
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genuinely attempted to allow political dialogue to continue without the 
interference of violent actions that could destabilise the peace process.  
Moreover, the UVF believed in maintaining law and order in the 
territories under its control, not only for the benefit of the community but also 
to win the hearts and minds of Protestants who were courted by the rival 
loyalist terrorist organisations. Ultimately, the UVF was always aware of its 
public standing among the Protestant community and was careful to adjust its 
actions according to the security and political developments in Northern 
Ireland. As such, when personal security in the streets of Northern Ireland 
improved, the IRA laid down its arms and many of the loyalist objectives had 
been accomplished, the UVF was mindful that there was little demand and less 
tolerance for violence among working-class Protestants.689 In light of these 
factors, the UVF's decision in May 2007 to assume a non-military civilianised 
role is comprehensible. 
Among UVF members, the recognition that politics is as important as 
violence infused back in the early 1970s when British governments invested 
greater political and security resources in resolving the Northern Ireland 
conflict. At times when effective political representation was most needed, the 
UVF was convinced that the constitutional unionist leaders could not be trusted 
and that their actions have been 'highly detrimental to the aspirations of the 
Unionist community in general, and working class loyalism in particular.'690 
Even the status of Ian Paisley, who established himself as an alternative to the 
mainstream unionist politicians and largely shaped loyalist thinking, 
deteriorated dramatically in the eyes of UVF members.  The early broad 
sympathy towards Paisley's political ideas turned into outright hostility.691  
Clearly, the UVF's disappointment in the unionist leadership together 
with the increase of Britain's military involvement in the province gave way to 
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lawful party politics. The establishment of the VPP in 1974 was a direct 
outcome of the UVF's desire to better represent the loyalist cause. Although the 
UVF's flirtation with political action failed miserably, it reinforced the need to 
find a credible channel for political expression as a means to advance its 
ideological thinking and mobilise public support. The association with the PUP 
in 1977 enabled the UVF to concentrate on promoting social and economic 
issues that bolstered an image of a responsible organisation that has more to 
offer than violence. Edwards concludes that the relationship between the UVF 
and the PUP 'has been an important factor in undermining the UVF's use of 
military instrument.'692   
 Alongside the consciousness of the shortcomings of violence and the 
merits that accompany political participation, the fact that the UVF since its 
inception operated in a competitive environment contributed significantly to its 
decision to renounce violence and concentrate on peaceful politics. For years 
the UDA was the UVF's main rival, and at times it was the largest loyalist 
terrorist organisation. The UVF and the UDA were rarely on good terms and 
battled against each other for territory, money, weapons and recruits.  
In 1996 the UVF encountered a split in its ranks when Billy Wright 
formed the breakaway faction LVF that opposed the UVF's moderate politics. 
Operating within a tri-polar balance of power resulted in an internal loyalist 
feud that on many occasions escalated into armed clashes and casualties. 
Clearly, competing with strong and popular adversaries forced the UVF to 
modify its strategy in a way that would match the socio-political setting in 
Northern Ireland. Consequently, as the peace talks intensified the UVF 
tightened its relations with the PUP and allowed it to take the lead in the peace 
process to distance itself from its rivals that rejected any political solution and 
accused the UVF of betraying loyalism. The fact that the UVF was the loyalist 
terrorist organisation that best kept its ceasefires and most committed to the 
peace process was, to a certain extent, connected to the intense competition 
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over the Protestant public support. This rivalry contributed to the UVF's 
decision to embrace a non-military strategy and the concept of conflict 
transformation. 
Finally, the link between the need to mobilise public support and being 
defined as a pro-state terrorist organisation proved itself as crucial in the UVF's 
decision to join politics. In principle, the UVF encountered difficulties attracting 
public support and developing a coherent role within the Northern Ireland 
power-struggle 'because the people they claim to serve are not by-and-large 
alienated from the state and from major social institutions.'693 Since the UVF 
never enjoyed the support of the masses, being a pro-state organisation meant 
that it would always be secondary to the state, that could propose better 
incentives and legal framework to those who wished to act on behalf of the 
union.  
The UVF's efforts to offer Protestants substitute institutions increasingly 
failed as the level of violence dropped and the British military presence and 
political involvement intensified. Subsequently, Protestants began to denounce 
the UVF's indiscriminate sectarian murders and rendered the terrorist 
organisation's public support and active cadre in a diminishing spiral.694 The 
UVF's attempts to find popular support and financial assistance outside Britain 
were even less successful, as the only political forces that agreed to join hands 
with the Marxist-oriented terrorist organisation were right-wing racist and 
fascist groups in Western Europe – not exactly the international network that 
the UVF had in mind. 
In dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland, British governments 
executed three security-cycles that overall had 'achieved a considerable 
amount of success in apprehending terrorists and containing the violence in 
Northern Ireland.'695 The aggressive military approach joined with tough legal 
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measures had taken their toll on the UVF, and consequently its status within the 
Protestant community had been progressively weakened since the 1980s 
onwards. The large number of members, who were either killed, injured or in 
jail, put the UVF in a state of shock and paralysis. It also gave rise to a new 
leadership 'who wished to reduce the amount of ill-directed and random 
violence and increase the amount of community work and political action,' thus 
planting the first seeds of serious political thinking.696  
With the advance of the peace process since the mid 1980s, the UVF 
preferred to join the bandwagon rather than trail behind, as described by Bill 
Rolston: 'most UVF men saw themselves as irregulars. When the war ended 
that was it. They went back to being plumbers, welders or whatever their trade 
was.'697 Consequently, the number of attacks against Catholics decreased 
drastically (instead the guns were pointed against loyalist rivals) until it 
stopped completely with the 2007 announcement. Facing the British 
comprehensive security policy, the UVF wished to save some of its public 
stature and looked for other ways to do so. The only available way was to 
increase the organisation's political appearance through its legal arm, the PUP. 
The UVF found that when peace became a viable option, the British and Irish 
peoples, and republicans to some extent, were more susceptible to its political 
messages than to its violent ideology.  
The second pillar of Britain's policy towards Northern Ireland was based 
on political instruments aimed at bringing the conflict to an end and the rival 
communities to accept peaceful co-existence. The two primary themes that 
dominated the British strategy were consent and compromise. Based on these 
grounds, several attempts were made, since the early 1970s, to reach a 
negotiated settlement, all encompassing some version of a power-sharing 
coalition. Ultimately, a peaceful resolution between unionists and nationalists 
was reached in April 1998, and later reaffirmed by the St. Andrews Agreement 
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in October 2006. The British intensive efforts and commitment to end the 
conflict, were summed up by Tony Blair, who argued that 'for British 
governments of whatever persuasion, the drain on resources and military 
manpower which Northern Ireland required made any prospect of peace 
extremely attractive.'698   
In formulating several peace initiatives, British governments compelled 
the UVF to respond and to become an active participant in the political 
discourse should it strive for influence and responsibility. Indeed, the UVF was 
not always receptive to political dialogue that would put an end to its violence. 
In the 1970s, the British government used political exclusion as a mechanism 
designed to attract the UVF into a legal framework that would allow it to enjoy 
the benefits of a legitimate partner. Although the initial prospects were 
positive, it seemed that the general public opinion, and even the British 
government itself, were not ready to accept an authentic loyalist party. Had the 
experiment been successful at that time, and loyalism granted a voice in the 
Northern Ireland political system, many lives would have been spared.  
Finally, on the domestic level, British governments recognised the 
importance of the PUP to bring the UVF and its loyalist supporters to the 
negotiation table. Above all, the PUP was perceived as a legitimate political 
partner, despite several key UVF commanders at the party's helms. The PUP 
had been instrumental in restraining the UVF's violence and maintaining the 
ceasefires in the 1990s. The party's effort did not go unnoticed, and British 
governments (as well as Irish governments for that matter) allowed the party 
to operate on the political scene and welcomed its involvement in the peace 
process. The fact is, according to Dawn Purvis, that the PUP condemned the 
UVF's violence and never made apologies for its attacks. What the PUP tried to 
create, was an understanding within the loyalist psyche for the reasons why 
things were happening and how they could be stopped.699 British governments 
did not stand in the PUP's way, realising that the party was about transforming 
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the situation from violence to peace while addressing the root causes of the 
conflict peacefully and democratically. Clearly, the party's ideology and strategy 
were ultimately successful and the UVF followed the democratic course paved 
by the PUP since its foundation.  
The last element that guaranteed that the UVF would take the 
unavoidable path towards civilianised politics was the effect of the 
international dimension on its fundamental strategy and outlook of the 
organisation's role in the Northern Ireland conflict. This proposition is often 
overlooked by academics and professionals, as illustrated by M.L.R. Smith, who 
suggests that 'studies which seek to illuminate the Northern Ireland conflict 
with reference to the wider world remain few in number and rarely connect 
with international relation thinking.'700 
Surely, the international effects on the UVF were somewhat indirect, but 
they were strong enough to receive the attention of the loyalist terrorist 
organisation, the PUP and their supporters. The international atmosphere in 
the post-Cold War era that was dominated by peaceful roadmaps, multilateral 
dialogue and intervention, culminated in resolution of several protracted 
conflicts in Africa and the Middle-East. The people of Northern Ireland 
demanded the same stamina, decisiveness and determination from their own 
leaders to do their utmost to resolve their all-encompassing conflict. The fact 
the American president Bill Clinton elevated the Northern Ireland conflict to 
the top of his foreign policy agenda, and defined the Irish issue as 'one of the 
great passions of my presidency,' certainly played a key role in ending the 
violence.701        
Clinton's tenacity over the Northern Ireland conflict affected all the 
parties involved, including the UVF. The international attention and the benefits 
that it carried were bequeathed to the IRA, and the UVF did not sit by idly. In 
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order to receive similar proceeds, the UVF had to adjust its strategy to match 
the peaceful climate that characterised Northern Ireland in the 1990s. 
Consequently, the UVF declared and maintained a long-standing ceasefire and 
allowed the PUP to become the most fervent voice of the loyalist camp.  
It should not be assumed that the American political power was the only 
international element that had a moderating effect on the UVF. The global 
consequences of the 9/11 atrocities that were carried out by Islamic terrorists, 
did not pass by the Christian terrorists in Northern Ireland. In an international 
environment that pledged zero tolerance towards any kind of violence that has 
political objectives, it was very difficult for the UVF to maintain its armed 
campaign aimed at defending the Protestant community. In a world where the 
republican enemy becomes less relevant, the personal security of your 
constituency is significantly improved, and violence is associated with blood-
thirsty irrational Islamic murderers, for UVF men it seemed perfectly 
reasonable to prefer words over violence.      
Another contributing factor that stemmed from the international 
dimension was the operation of the IICD. The setting of an international 
mechanism, that was headed by respectable and neutral figures, to provide 
assurances to the republican and loyalist armed organisations, was a primary 
instrument that assisted in assuaging the levels of hostility. Although loyalist 
terrorists 'at no point came under similar pressures as did republicans to 
disarm', in the end, it was the IICD that enabled each side to trust that the other 
had submitted its weapons.702  Long after peace prevailed in Northern Ireland 
and the international players left the scene, it was the IICD that remained on-
site and continued to carry the burden of scrutinising the decommissioning of 
various paramilitary organisations. The Committee's work was not only 
important for the present time, but even more so for the future. In case violence 
would erupt again, at least the republican and loyalist organisations would 
have fewer weapons available in storage. 
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 In conclusion, the peaceful resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict, 
whose origins could be traced back to the 12th century, provides hope that 
other conflicts, perhaps not as old but certainly as complicated, could also end 
in a similar outcome. A variety of forces and players have been actively 
involved in escalating the conflict, and even more in trying to resolve it. In his 
memoires, President Clinton, rightfully, gives the credit for the resolution of the 
Northern Ireland conflict to the people of the province 'who had chosen the 
promise of peace over a poisoned past.'703 At least some of these people were 
members of the UVF and the IRA, who for years fought against each other and 
killed and injured thousands of innocent Protestants and Catholics. These 
people demonstrated their greatness by willing to put behind the hostility, the 
hatred and the politics of fear, and setting out a vision of the way forward. 
Above everything they realised that what Northern Ireland needs the most is 
stability, prosperity and peace within itself, and they were willing to pursue this 
with full force. Ultimately, they proved to themselves and to the world, that a 
shared vision of the future could transcend the dividing history and turn a war-
struck province into a livable and prosperous society.  
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CHAPTER 4: HIZBALLAH 
No comprehensive discussion of the integration of 
terrorist organisations into political systems would 
be complete without a detailed examination of 
Hizballah (in Arabic "The Party of God") – a Lebanese 
organisation that started its life as a terrorist and 
guerrilla movement and developed into a social and political party.704 Over the 
years, Hizballah has become the dominant actor in Lebanon's power system, 
whilst maintaining independent armed capabilities outside the reach of the 
official institutions of the state. Although many experts and scholars have 
written abundantly on Hizballah, its history, ideology, military and political 
strategies, there is no in-depth analysis of the specific duality of using violence 
while serving as a legitimate actor in Lebanon’s political system. 
Nowadays, Hizballah is recognised as one of the most formidable and 
ruthless terrorist organisations in the world. David Phillips famously wrote that 
Hizballah literally 'exploded onto the scene as one of the world’s deadliest 
terrorist organisations,' referring to the series of suicide attacks against 
American and French targets in Lebanon in the early 1980s.705 Magnus 
Ranstorp, a leading scholar on militant Islamic movements, argued that 
Hizballah 'has been the main terrorist nemesis of Western governments and 
Israel, inflicting blow after blow against its self-proclaimed enemies of Islam 
through suicide-attacks, hostage-taking, and other forms of terrorism.'706 Due 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
704 There are various transliterations for spelling the name of the Shiite organisation. For 
uniformity purposes this study will use the name Hizballah. 
705 Phillips, David. From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), p. 35 
706 Ranstorp, Magnus, Hizbollah’s Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and 
Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 6 No. 3 




to its record of bloodshed and lethality, Hizballah was branded by an American 
State Department senior official the 'A-team of terrorists.'707  
However, Hizballah is certainly not just a terrorist organisation. Earning 
a reputation as a ruthless violent organisation did not cause Hizballah to 
deviate from its ideological, social and political objectives. Although it is still 
formally committed to establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon and ridding it 
off foreign occupation, Hizballah has invested great resources to expand its 
influence among both the Shiite and the non-Shiite communities in Lebanon. 
Hizballah relies heavily on a well-organised system that provides social and 
welfare services to the Lebanese people to increase its support base, which 
often take over the role of the state. Although Hizballah's Secretary-General, 
Hassan Nasrallah sounds apologetic when he said that 'we [Hizballah] are not 
an alternative to the state, but where the state is absent we must be present,' 
the situation of a "state-within-a-state" is the organisation's strongest and most 
effective tool to consolidate its control over the Lebanese people.708 The 
popularity of Hizballah was translated into remarkable political achievements 
and its representatives have been elected to both parliamentary and 
governmental positions.  
Besides Hizballah's charitable functions, it maintains the largest and 
most advanced weapons arsenal in Lebanon, which has been regularly used 
against Israel and other Lebanese groups in several military confrontations 
since 1982. Hizballah would not be able to attain such weapons and capabilities 
without the close assistance and support of its state sponsors – Iran and Syria. 
Although Hizballah is regularly used as a proxy by its patrons, it has been 
adjusting its identity and interests to the political and social circumstances in 
Lebanon and the region. Evidently, the participation in the electoral process in 
Lebanon, and the responsibilities that come with political success, have led 
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Hizballah to express a more pragmatic approach and demonstrate greater 
commitment to the Lebanese nation and people. Nonetheless, the issue of 
disarmament still remains a taboo, and Hizballah continues to hold arms that 
are not under the control of Lebanon's army.  
Ranstorp wrote that despite Hizballah's prominence it is one of the 'least 
understood terrorist organisation' in the world today.709 The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a coherent explanation for how Hizballah transformed 
itself from a terrorist group into a powerful and influential political actor, and 
which uniquely for Lebanon, maintains exclusive control of an independent 
armed militia.  
 
THE RISE OF HIZBALLAH  
To a large extent Hizballah is a product of the political and economic 
imbalance that has dominated Lebanon since the 1930s, and which climaxed in 
the mid-1970s when civil war broke out between the country's various ethnic 
communities. During this period, the Shiite community underwent a social 
transformation that laid the foundation for the establishment of Hizballah. 
In the beginning of the 20th century, the Shiites, the second-largest 
denomination of Islam, were considered an insignificant and oppressed 
minority in Lebanon. In the state's ethno-confessional society, the Shiite 
community, which was in large measure de facto disenfranchised, was despised 
by the elite Maronite Christians as well as by the Sunni Muslims. Moreover, in a 
state in which political capital is allocated on the basis of religious sect, the 
inferiority of the Shiites meant relatively powerless positions.  
The division of government positions in Lebanon’s confessional political 
system was determined in the 1943 National Pact, and was based on the 
population ratios drawn from the 1932 national census. According to the 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
709 Ranstorp, Magnus. Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (London: 




National Pact, the most powerful political positions of President and Prime 
Minister were given to the Christians and Sunnis respectively, while the Shiites, 
who comprised the third largest population at that time, were assigned the 
position of chairman of parliament.710 This hierarchical distribution of political 
positions characterises Lebanon’s political system until today, despite the fact 
that the Shiites have by now become the largest religious sect in the country, 
outnumbering both Christians and Sunnis.711 This anomaly is the source of 
discrimination toward the Shiites in Lebanon, expressed not only in political 
under-representation but also in poverty and social deprivation. 
The Shiite Islamic resurgence in Lebanon was inspired by the 
accelerated modernisation process that swept the country in the early 1960s. 
Facing the widening socio-economic gaps between the Shiites and other ethnic 
communities, modernisation stimulated the Shiites' political awareness. 
Consequently, they began to challenge the traditional political and socio-
economic structures, and formed a Shiite council to represent their interests in 
Lebanon’s brutal power game. In 0969 the council elected the Iranian-born 
Imam Musa al-Sadr as a leader, and he soon became 'the symbol of the new, 
politically aware Shiite presence in the multi-religious sectarianism of 
Lebanon.'712 
Sadr, a charismatic and religiously devoted figure, sought to empower 
the Shiites and believed that as long they 'could speak through their religion 
they could overcome their condition.'713 In 1974 he established the first Shiite 
grassroots organisation, known as the "Movement of the Deprived", which was 
instrumental in mobilising the Shiites to proactive political action. The new 
organisation was aimed at reforming the traditional political system and 
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seeking social justice. Furthermore, Sadr also propagated the religious notion of 
martyrdom and change through violent revolution. During a massive political 
rally in June 1975, he told his supporters: 'military training is a duty like prayer, 
and bearing arms is a duty as having a Qur'an.'714  
An important manifestation of Sadr's desire to provide the Shiites with 
means to achieve their political goals was the creation of a military wing, 
known by its acronym Amal, shortly before the outbreak of the Lebanese civil 
war in 1975.715 At first Amal played a minor role in the fighting, but in time it 
became a violent armed militia that took an active part in the sectarian 
hostilities. When Israel invaded South Lebanon in March 1978, Sadr formally 
declared Israel as an enemy of Lebanon and one of Amal's objectives was to 
defend Lebanon's sovereignty against Israel's attacks.716 Sheikh Naim Qassem, 
Hizballah's Deputy Secretary-General, wrote in his autobiography that it was 
Sadr who phrased the slogan "Israel is an utter evil" and that he 'never ceased 
to call for waging war on Israel and freeing the land from its occupation.'717  
On 31st August 1978, on an official visit to Libya to meet with its leader 
Muammar Gaddaffi, Sadr mysteriously disappeared. Since then, he is commonly 
referred to as the "Vanished Imam" and was elevated to the status of a 
martyr.718 Sadr's political directives to his followers, which outline the Shiites' 
claim to social and political justice, rightful role in the governance of Lebanon 
and duty to defend the homeland against any external enemies, continue to be 
faithfully followed by his successors, both in Lebanon and elsewhere in the 
region. 
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 Nonetheless, with Sadr's enigmatic disappearance, the Shiites in 
Lebanon encountered an identity crisis and there was a risk that they would 
lose their new political and social status in Lebanon’s confessional system. 
However, the Iranian revolution of 1979 both became a source of sectarian 
pride and facilitated the entry of a powerful regional actor into Lebanon’s 
internal affairs. These developments enabled the Shiites to rise again, and in the 
following decades to translate their demographic power into political 
prominence, and to become the dominant ethnic community in Lebanon. 
Political and religious relations between Lebanon and Iran in the early 
1970s were maintained by Sadr himself, who had close personal ties to the 
leaders of the Iranian opposition to the Shah, headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini. The 1979 Iranian revolution instilled new spirit and hope among the 
Shiites in Lebanon, who felt solidarity and sympathy towards the new regime in 
Tehran, which in some manner represented their political and social 
aspirations. Similarly, the new Iranian religious leadership saw in the Lebanese 
Shiites a prominent sectarian community with a developing political 
consciousness.  
Taking the Shiites under the auspices of the Iranian regime also 
provided an opportunity to spread the latter's principles beyond its territorial 
borders, which was one of the principal stated objectives of the Islamic 
revolution. The Iranian Supreme Leader, Khomeini, strongly believed that he 
could establish a united global Islamic revolutionary force, while disregarding 
the religious differences between Sunnis and Shiites. This view provided him 
with the justification to interfere in the internal affairs of Muslim societies and 
states. In accordance with his doctrine, Khomeini was keen to export his Islamic 
beliefs using new state apparatuses.719 In the summer of 1982, Iran sent 
thousands of volunteers and advisors, all members of the elite Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to Lebanon to bring a new religious and 
political message to Lebanon's Shiites. Furthermore, Khomeini was interested 
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in Lebanon since it provided a foothold in the Middle East as well as perceived 
as a stepping stone to Jerusalem.720  
The emergence of the new Iranian regime also split the ranks of Amal. 
On the one hand, Sadr's successor as the movement's leader, Nabih Berri, 
supported entering a coalition with Christian and Druze parties and working 
together to restore Lebanon while diminishing Amal's Islamic tone. On the 
other hand, Berri's deputy, Hussein al-Musawi, a pro-Iranian cleric who held a 
more radical stance, rejected any political dialogue and supported the 
implementation of a more Islamic agenda. Khomeini weighed into this 
discussion by stating that under Berri's leadership Amal could no longer 
promote Iran's revolutionary doctrine, and therefore decided to back Musawi. 
Consequently, Musawi broke away from Amal and established in the summer of 
1982 a new Shiite movement, known as the Islamic Amal, which would serve as 
an alternative and be loyal to Khomeini.721  
Shortly after, Iran took the new movement under its wings. In contrast 
with the original Amal, whose objective was to change the Shiites social and 
political status within the Lebanese state, the purpose of Islamic Amal under 
Khomeini's inspiration was to create an Islamic revolutionary society in 
Lebanon that would serve Iranian interests.722 Many of its members were 
radical clerics, scholars, and volunteers who previously attended Shiite 
religious madrasas in Iran and Iraq. Additionally, Iran granted substantial 
financial assistance to Shiite centres in Lebanon, to be used for reconstruction 
and development of civilian infrastructure, religious education system, 
healthcare and social services. Moreover, the IRGC were responsible for 
providing military training and indoctrinating the new pro-Iranian militant 
members, who supported martyrdom and self-sacrifice against the enemies of 
Islam. Undoubtedly, the Islamic Amal was the framework on which Hizballah 
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was built, and Iran provided the ideological background that served as the 
catalyst for the ideology underlying Hizballah.723  
Over its history Hizballah has been remarkably successful in the realm of 
militant organisations, particularly 'given the short time span and narrow 
geographic confines' in which it had to operate.724 In its early days, Hizballah 
encompassed various Islamic-Shiite organisations that recognised Khomeini as 
their religious and political leader, yet in essence were small groups of devoted 
clerics without a clear hierarchy and organisational mechanisms. Thanks, 
however, to Iran's direct military and financial aid as well as religious and 
ideological guidance, Hizballah's hierarchical and organisational structure 
became increasingly formalised starting in the summer of 1982. Following a 
crystallization process it soon became an operational and logistical centre for 
the Shiite radical movement in Lebanon and provided Iran with an entry-point 
into the politics of the Levant and Arab-Israeli conflict.725  
In June 1982 Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, aiming to 
expel fighters from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), who operated 
in an area of South Lebanon over which they exerted such control that it 
became known as Fatah-land.726 Following the invasion, tens of thousands of 
Lebanese were killed, injured and displaced. Consequently, an international 
peacekeeping force landed in Beirut to secure peace in Lebanon and to oversee 
the withdrawal of PLO fighters and evacuation of Syrian forces.  
Although Hizballah's roots predate Israel's invasion, its impact on the 
organisation's violent ethos cannot be underestimated. The presence of foreign 
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forces on Lebanese soil provided Hizballah with the opportunity to define itself 
as an Islamic resistance organisation whose primary objective is to wage a Holy 
War (Jihad) against the military "occupation" of Lebanon. Hizballah’s bloody 
history began with a series of suicide attacks against Israeli, American and 
French military compounds in Lebanon that took place between November 
1982 and October 1983, and cost the lives of more than 600 people. Hundreds 
of attacks followed in subsequent years.     
Along with its militant ideology, Hizballah has 'shown an ability to learn 
from its past experiences and to adapt to the political climate.'727 The death of 
the Iranian leader Khomeini in June 1989, and specifically the acceptance of the 
National Reconciliation Accord (also known as the Taif Agreement) that 
provided the basis for ending the civil war and the return to political normalcy 
in Lebanon, presented an opportunity for Hizballah to become involved in 
Lebanon's political system.  
In the new political order, Hizballah demonstrated a pragmatic approach 
and willingness to concede on short-term objectives in order to achieve 
essential long-term goals. After receiving Iran's approval to participate in the 
1992 parliamentary elections, Hizballah succeeded in translating its 
demographic power into electoral influence, and claimed its appropriate place 
in Lebanon's political system. Nowadays, Hizballah enjoys substantial popular 
support and serves as an active member in the Lebanese government with a 
veto power in the cabinet, and is worthy of the title: 'the most powerful single 
political movement in Lebanon.'728  
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
727 Jaber, Hala. Hezbollah: Born with Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 
71 







ROLE OF VIOLENCE 
Violence has played a central role in Lebanon since the breakout of the 
civil war in 1975. Sectarian attacks resulted in the death of thousands of 
Christians, Shiites, Sunnis, Druze and Palestinians. However, the establishment 
of Hizballah in the early 1980s was, undoubtedly, a "tipping point" that 
accelerated the degree and frequency of resort to violence in Lebanon's 
political conflict. Hizballah’s violence was more skilful, innovative, 
sophisticated and daring and it changed dramatically the boundaries of 
asymmetrical warfare, not just in Lebanon but in the entire Middle-East. 
Violence has been an integral principle of Hizballah's ideology and 
strategy for many years. Throughout the years, violent attacks have been 
carried out by the organisation whose military strength is far greater than any 
other state and non-state apparatuses in Lebanon. In fact, according to General 
(ret.) Amos Yadlin, former head of Israel's Military Intelligence, Hizballah's 
operational capability and weapons arsenal match those of a medium-size 
state.729 Indeed, alongside using typical terrorist methods, Hizballah maintains 
'robust conventional and unconventional military capabilities,' that usually can 
be found in the hands of a national army. In that sense, it is unique among 
terrorist organisations, since it controls thousands of long and short-range 
rockets, land-to-sea anti-ship missiles and a wing of unmanned aerial 
vehicles.730  
Acquiring, maintaining and deploying such military power successfully 
to achieve political goals by a non-state actor, requires a detailed and coherent 
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ideology, discipline and objectives that would justify the existence and use of 
such capabilities. Hizballah's Iranian-inspired ideology was first outlined in 
February 1985 in an open letter to "The Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the 
World".731 Two main religious narratives are dominant in the manifesto: the 
first is adherence to the message of Islam and subordination to the governance 
of the supreme jurist (Wilayat al-faqih).732 This absolute religious supremacy 
was supported by Nasrallah in 1987: 'The faqih is the guardian...and the extent 
of his authority is wider than that of any other person...disagreement with him 
is not permitted.'733 Ahmad Hamzeh refers to this doctrine as the nerve centre 
of Hizballah and his quote of Nasrallah (in a 1997 speech in Beirut) signifies the 
magnitude of Islamic rule to the organisation's political and religious functions: 
'the spinal cord of Hizballah is wilayat al-faqih. Take out wilayat al-faqih and 
Hizballah becomes a dead body.'734  
The second narrative is the obligation to carry out a violent Jihad against 
occupation forces, specifically Israel and the US. The strategy of Jihad is 
adamantly portrayed by Hizballah as a necessity to fight against oppressors and 
the injustice of the strong, as articulately explained by the organisation's 
spiritual leader, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah: 'We are not advocating violence 
because we like to kill people. When other people impose violence, when they 
occupy my country, I have to use violence to fight violence.'735 In the case of 
Hizballah, violence is justified by an ideology that represents a shift from the 
traditional Shiite passive attitude towards activism against the enemies of 
Islam. Furthermore, religious principles, such as martyrdom, serve to legitimise 
Hizballah's violence against external enemies, as stated clearly in the 1985 
manifesto:  
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We have no alternative but to confront aggression by 
sacrifice…[Our people] decided to oppose infidelity – be it French, 
American or Israeli – by striking at their headquarters and 
launching a veritable war of resistance against the Occupation 
forces.'736  
The ideological imperative of resistance is paramount in Hizballah's 
discourse and often used to provide violence with more positive and legitimate 
connotations. In November 2009, Hizballah released its new ideological 
platform in which armed resistance is portrayed as a national necessity and 
linked to military power intended to fight against occupiers.737 Although, 
observers may argue that the new manifesto represents Hizballah's moderation 
stemming from its integration into the Lebanese political system, Benedetta 
Berti points out that the strong Islamic identity and the radical attitude and 
opposition to Israel remained unaltered.738 However, Nicholas Blanford, a 
prominent Beirut-based correspondent, argues that although resistance 
remains a top priority, the manifesto does omit references to an Islamic state in 
Lebanon and clearly states that consensual democracy is the fundamental basis 
for governance. In his view, the updated manifesto is an 'exercise in 
pragmatism and tact in which Hizballah's unyielding worldview was tailored to 
conform to the prevailing political reality in Lebanon.'739   
On a broader level, Hizballah's violence is justified regardless of whether 
the victim is a combatant or a civilian as long as it is a member of an occupying 
force, and especially when it is carried out against Israeli targets. According to 
Nasrallah 'there is no difference between a[n Israeli] soldier and a[n Israeli] 
civilian, for they are all invaders, occupiers and usurpers of the land.'740 
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However, when carrying out suicide attacks, Hizballah demonstrated a more 
pragmatic approach distinguishing between military personnel and civilians; 
while the first is considered a legitimate target, the latter is largely regarded as 
unjustified. Accordingly, its view of suicide attacks is more reserved and 
consequently the organisation carried out relatively few suicide attacks, when 
compared to Palestinian and other Jihadist terrorist organisations.741 Although 
between 1982 and 1994 Hizballah carried out dozen of suicide attacks against 
Israeli, American and French military targets on Lebanese soil, it refrained from 
deliberately targeting civilians.  
Yet, on at least two occasions Hizballah deviated from its policy and 
intentionally attacked civilians outside of Lebanon. In March 1992, Hizballah's 
operations commander, Imad Mughniyah, masterminded the suicide bombing 
of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 civilians and injuring more 
than 250.742 Again, in July 2012 a Hizballah cell in Bulgaria carried out a suicide 
attack against a bus carrying Israeli tourists in the city of Burgas, killing 5 
people and injuring more than 30.743 Both attacks can be explained as 
retaliatory actions for Israel's military escalations. While the first was a 
response to the 0992 assassination of Hizballah’s Secretary-General Abbas al-
Musawi, the second was a long-overdue revenge for the assassination of 
Mughniyah himself in Damascus in February 2008.  
Clearly, Hizballah realised that the virtue of martyrdom is instrumental 
in evoking fear among the nations it regarded as "oppressors", and therefore 
was the pioneer in using this modus operandi in the Middle East. To a large 
extent, Hizballah’s attacks against the Multi-National Force in Lebanon and the 
subsequent heavy casualties were the catalyst for the decision to evacuate 
American and French troops from Lebanon in early 1984. Daniel Byman argues 
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that other terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, learned from Hizballah's 
experience that a 'dramatic strike against US forces and facilities would lead the 
United States to withdraw military forces from the Middle East.'744 Evidently, 
the suicide attacks that were executed by Hizballah's terrorists are still 
embedded in the hearts and minds of Israelis, Americans and Europeans and 
are used to reinforce its deterrence capability. 
Another form of terrorism carried out by Hizballah was hostage-taking, 
which was prevalent in Lebanon in the 1980s and early 1990s. This campaign 
included abduction of foreign nationals, most of whom civilians, residing or 
stationed in Lebanon, and also the hijacking of a TWA airliner in June 1985. 
Although Hizballah denied responsibility for the hostage-taking campaign, 
Ranstorp argues that the organisation is 'undisputedly responsible for the 
hostage-crisis in Lebanon, despite its attempts to shield its complicity through 
the employment of cover-names.'745 
Hizballah is also infamous for deliberately using indiscriminate rocket 
attacks against Israeli civilian population; acts that were described by Amnesty 
International as war crimes and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.746 Hizballah first used this method in 1992, as another 
response for the assassination of its leader by an Israeli helicopter gunship. 
Since then, this tactic served Hizballah in two military conflicts with Israel in 
1993 and 1996, and most recently in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, during 
which it launched more than 4,000 rockets killing 42 civilians and injuring 
more than 4,500.747  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
744 Byman, Daniel. A High Price: The Triumphs and failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 210 
745 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, p. 108 
746 Amnesty International, Israel/Lebanon: Hizbullah’s attacks on Northern Israel, report no. 
MDE 02/025/2006 (September 2006), p.8; 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE02/025/2006/en/8b297b53-d3f6-11dd-
8743-d305bea2b2c7/mde020252006en.pdf (accessed 13/4/2011) 
747 Data taken from the Israeli Medical Association website (Hebrew); 




Since the 2006 war, Hizballah has undertaken a substantial military 
build-up, and it is currently believed to stockpile more than 40,000 rockets 
covering entirely Israel's territory.748 Former American Defence Secretary, 
Robert Gates, warned in April 2010 that 'Hizballah has far more rockets and 
missiles than most governments in the world, and this is obviously destabilising 
for the whole region.'749 Gates' warning followed Israeli and American claims 
that Hizballah received from Syria Scud tactical ballistic missiles, with 
increased range and warhead and improved guidance system and accuracy (See 
figure 4 for Hizballah's missiles and rockets arsenal).750 More recently, 
Hizballah admitted that it was behind the drone that flew over Israel in October 
2012 and was eventually shot down. Nasrallah rightly stated that 'possession of 
such an aerial capacity is a first in the history of any resistance movement in 

















Source:  White, Jeffrey. If War Comes: Israel vs. Hizballah and Its Allies, Policy Focus 106 
(Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2010)
 
Figure 4: Reported Hizballah rockets and missiles 
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Despite the unprecedented firepower in the hands of Hizballah, there 
are hardly any known incidents of unauthorised attacks. The organisation has 
put in place impressive command and control mechanisms, which ensure strict 
obedience and allow little room for errors. As a quasi-military organisation, 
Hizballah maintains a rigid hierarchy and it is governed by a structured, 
centralised and accountable political-religious leadership. Every member is 
assigned to a designated unit, tasked with a specific duty and receives clear 
instructions as to when and whom he is supposed to report. New members 
undergo field training, usually in Lebanon but at times also in Iran or Syria, and 
after serving in the ranks they are divided to reserve units that can be drafted 
in emergency situations.752 Blanford adds that self-discipline and obedience 
together with religious and ideological values create a well-trained and 
motivated fighter who is, in Hizballah's eyes, far superior to his Israeli 
enemy.753   
Interestingly, Hizballah does show some remorse and offers condolences 
when it serves its interests or jeopardises those of Lebanon or its Iranian and 
Syrian patrons. After a Hizballah rocket attack killed two Arab-Israeli children 
during the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah accepted responsibility, apologised 
to the family and stated that he considered the fallen children to be 'martyrs for 
Palestine and martyrs for the nation.'754 Also, when confronted with the claims 
that the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers led to the outbreak of the 2006 
war, that cost the lives of more than 1,000 Lebanese and devastated the 
nation's infrastructure, Nasrallah candidly responded: 'We did not have a one 
percent probability that the capturing operation would have led to a war on 
this scale,' and added that he would not have ordered the attack 'for 
humanitarian, moral, social, security, military and political reasons.'755  
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This behaviour stands as a stark contrast to Hizballah's radical image 
and is often under-appreciated when examining Hizballah's more pragmatic 
tone after the 2006 war. 
   
PERCEPTION OF THE OPPONENT 
 Since its establishment in 1982, Hizballah has been using an aggressive 
approach against its political rivals in the domestic, regional and international 
arenas. Internal clashes with political adversaries, military campaigns against 
Israel, and pin-point operations combined with radical rhetoric against western 
countries, prove that Hizballah is determined to carry out its ideological 
objectives on all fronts. Yet, Hizballah mainly focuses on two arch-enemies – 
Israel and the US – which are respectively branded the Little and Great Devil. 
 It seems that the immutable enemy that defines Hizballah the most and 
provides legitimacy for its existence as an armed organisation is Israel, which is 
a target for a multifaceted effort aimed at promoting the organisation as the 
leading non-state actor in the Middle-East. Ideologically, Israel is consistently 
portrayed as the archenemy 'that must be fought until the hated ones get what 
they deserve,' and considered as 'the greatest danger to our future generations 
and to the destiny of our lands.'756 Several months after the publication of the 
0985 "open letter", Sheikh Fadlallah outlined Hizballah’s attitude towards 
Israel: 
Israel cannot be viewed as a state with the right for security and 
peace just like any other state in the region. We cannot see Israel 
as a legal presence, considering that it is a conglomeration of 
people who came from all parts of the world to live in Palestine 
on the ruins of another people.757 
This imperative sets the tone to the inflammatory discourse that urges 
Hizballah members to take up arms. In a 1998 televised rally in Beirut, 
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Nasrallah said that the tragic, painful and bitter event of the Muslim nation is 
'the establishment of the state of the Zionist Jews, the descendants of apes and 
pigs,' who through their fanaticism 'are celebrating their victory over the nation 
of 1.4 billion Muslims.'758 Ascribing to Israel imperialist motives and 
aspirations to expand the territory under its control beyond its borders is 
another narrative repeatedly used in Hizballah’s rhetoric. In the same speech, 
Nasrallah referred to Israel as an 'entity without borders' that equals a 
'cancerous growth and harmful microbe.'759  
In accordance with this ideological indoctrination, Hizballah objects to 
any political settlement with Israel. The organisation perceives negotiations 
with Israel as an impure act that borders on blasphemy.760 In accordance with 
this view, Hizballah opposes any peaceful agreement, regards Israel as an 
occupier of Palestinian lands and refuses to recognise Israel's right to exist. 
When asked by a journalist from the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram (in 
February 2000) about the prospects of a future compromise with Israel, 
Nasrallah replied that 'Israel will remain, in our minds and plans, an 
illegitimate, illegal, aberrant, and cancerous entity, which we therefore cannot 
recognise.'761 A few months later Nasrallah admitted that Hizballah's objective 
is the destruction of Israel and the liberation of Palestine. He claimed that 
'Israel is the root of all the crises and wars and cannot be a factor in bringing 
about a true and just peace in this region.'762 
 Most surprisingly, despite the anti-Israel ideology and discourse, on the 
issue of honouring the dead Hizballah praises Israel. In January 2004, Nasrallah 
spoke about Israel's savagery and barbarism, yet he acknowledged that the way 
it treats dead soldiers and their bodies and its readiness to pay the price to 
recover them is worthy of Hizballah's respect.763 Nevertheless, the humanistic 
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perception does not extend beyond words and despite the implicit optimism, as 
several observers have tried to suggest, Hizballah remains committed to 
undermine the legitimacy of Israel's existence.  
Moreover, Hizballah directly links Israel's regional supremacy to its 
strategic relations with the US, and specifically the political, financial and 
military support that it provides to the Jewish state. As such, the organisation 
follows the belief that 'Israel exists to execute American policy and that US 
foreign policy in the Middle East is often undertaken with Israel’s prime 
interests in mind.'764 In Hizballah's view, the US is also the main impediment to 
Israel's defeat. In his elegy for Musawi in February 1992, Nasrallah blamed the 
US for 'Israel's massacres and all the destruction, murder, and displacement it 
wreaks,' and determined that Israel 'would not have been able to stand on its 
own in the region had it not been for Western and American support.'765 
Furthermore, Sheikh Qassem firmly argues that the American foreign policy is 
dedicated to terminate Hizballah, by supplying Israel with advanced weapons 
to be used against it as well as intervening in Lebanon’s political life and 
pressuring some factions to act aggressively against the leading Shiite political 
party.766 
Yet, even without the American commitment to Israel's security, the US 
would have been regarded as the Western nemesis of Hizballah, mainly due to 
its super-power status and global interests in the Middle East. The US is 
perceived by Hizballah as 'an arrogant power possessing a clear plan of action 
for oppressing and subordinating the region's peoples,' and regarded as 'the 
cause of all our catastrophes and source of all malice.'767 Direct American 
military involvement in the Middle East, specifically in Lebanon in the early 
1980s, in the Persian Gulf in the 1990s and 2000s and in Afghanistan since 
2001 until today, reinforced Hizballah's outlook towards the US as the source of 
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all evils in the region. Consequently, Hizballah has been a fierce opponent of the 
American military and political involvement in the Middle East. The 
organisation's opposition to the US is evident in Nasrallah's words from March 
2003: 'Death to America is not a slogan. For us, death to America is a policy, a 
strategy, and a vision.'768  
Hizballah also believes that the American policies in the Middle East, and 
particularly the attempts to enforce democracy by military means, corrupt 
Muslims of the region and contradict Islamic principles. In April 2003, a month 
after the American invasion of Iraq, Nasrallah predicted that 'the continuation 
of American policy will make enemies of all Arabs and Muslims around the 
world. Lots of groups will surface, not necessarily al-Qaeda, and they will be 
impossible to bring to justice.'769 
Despite its position in the Lebanese government, which would be 
thought to entail behavior consistent with Lebanon's foreign and domestic 
policies that are generally favorable towards the United States, Hizballah 
remains committed to its radical views of Israel and the US. Although it 
recognised that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there is a new reality that 
poses significant obstacles to resistance organisations in the Middle East, 
Hizballah continues to advocate violence and hatred towards the west.770 It 
seems that although the pragmatism that Hizballah has been gradually 
displaying since it first entered politics, incitement and radical perceptions 
continue to be instrumental for maintaining the support of Lebanese Shiites as 
well as the sponsorship of Iran and Syria. 
 
SPLIT IN THE RANKS 
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 Like many other terrorist organisations, Hizballah is also an offshoot of a 
bigger and more institutionalised grassroots movement. Although in its early 
days, the Amal movement, the largest Shiite-Lebanese organisation at that time, 
failed to significantly impact the lives of its constituency and 'was fading into 
obscurity after the eruption of the civil war,' it ultimately came to prominence 
due to the 'intense Shiite outcry after al-Sadr’s enigmatic disappearance.'771 
Israel’s first invasion into Lebanon in 0978 also contributed greatly to Amal's 
political awakening, and afterwards it had become an established political 
organisation with an Islamic character and enjoyed substantial popular 
support. 
However, after al-Sadr’s vanishing, a secular leadership, headed by 
Nabih Berri, took control of the movement and decided to 'cease resisting the 
Israeli advance and join a “National Salvation” government grouping 
representatives of most political parties and sects.'772 Berri's leadership 
disenchanted many local Shiite leaders and Amal members, amongst them were 
Hassan Nasrallah and Naim Qassem. They supported an aggressive response to 
Israel’s incursions, and decided to break away from Amal and subsequently 
formed Hizballah.773 In a 1993 interview Nasrallah outlined the circumstances 
under which he decided to leave Amal and to join the nucleolus of Hizballah 
founders: 
The way Amal dealt with the invasion [of Israel in 1982] gave rise 
to several internal problems…at the same time, we were very 
politically involved in thinking about the need for military 
operations against the occupation. This was when we decided to 
leave Amal…at least as far as we were concerned, the Movement 
was no longer up to the task required…and we were seeking an 
alternative that would allow us to operate the way we wanted.774    
Subhi al-Tufeili, Hizballah's first Secretary-general, expressed in 1989 
the conflicting viewpoints between the two organisation: Hizballah carried out 
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operations against Israel to liberate Palestine, while Amal adopted a passive 
policy towards Palestine; Hizballah rejected any reconciliation with Israel, 
whereas Amal supported coexistence with it; Hizballah wished to end the 
existing leadership structure, as Amal opted to cooperate with the Lebanese 
government.775 
Hizballah’s rapid growth threatened Amal’s position as the preeminent 
representative of the Shiites in Lebanon, and brought the two organisations 
into conflict. Similar to other cases of organisational splits, Amal and Hizballah 
were competing for the resources and loyalty of the Shiite constituency, and 
therefore it quickly developed into a fierce intra-communal dispute that 
resulted in bloody battles between 1982 and 1990.776 In the duel between the 
two central movements of the Shiite community, Hizballah had the upper hand 
and began its ascendancy towards becoming a significant military and political 
power. Amal suffered heavy losses not only on the battlefield, but its status was 
lowered 'in the eyes of both the [Shiite] community and the powers active in 
Lebanon,' which in turn 'led to the further erosion of its power and internal 
unity.'777     
 Nonetheless, the rivalry between Hizballah and Amal was atypical in at 
least one important aspect – the involvement of other states in the contest for 
Shiite hegemony in Lebanon. Hala Jaber argues that the local conflict ‘became a 
reflection of a power-struggle between Tehran and Damascus for domination in 
Lebanon.’778 While Iran backed Hizballah, Syria sponsored Amal and both states 
went to great lengths to defend their protégés. The violence was enhanced 
dramatically by the influx of weapons that Iran provided to Hizballah and Syria 
to Amal. However, the small-scale war between the two rival movements, 
which was just another front in the full-scale civil war ongoing at the time, 
caused great concern in Iran and Syria. Fearing that their interests in Lebanon 
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would be severely damaged if the conflict was prolonged, the two states took 
steps to restore order and security.779 In 1989 they brokered the Ta'if 
Agreement, which was aimed at ending the internal war and disarming the 
militias, and pressured both Hizballah and Amal to sign it.  
Before the implementation of the Ta'if Agreement began, it was clear 
that Amal lost its military foothold in Lebanon and its popular support 
decreased significantly. Augustus Norton, a renowned Hizballah expert, argues 
that the Shiites 'grew sceptical of the Amal movement and its corruption, and 
came to admire Hizballah’s relative integrity.'780 Although Hizballah was among 
the victorious side, it also faced a growing concern: the accords stripped the 
legitimacy of its military wing and called for its termination.  
However, Hizballah interpreted the agreement differently and viewed 
resistance activities against Israel as legal. Thus, it adamantly argued that its 
weapons were intended for use strictly against Israel, therefore entitling it to 
keep them. Unlike Hizballah, Amal saw in the agreement the opportunity to 
disarm its weapons and to integrate into Lebanon's new political system and 
the Lebanese army.781 Since Amal's disarmament it has become a political ally 
of Hizballah in the Lebanese government, and both organisations represent the 
Shiite community in the "March 8 Alliance", which was the ruling coalition in 
Lebanon's political system from June 2011 until March 2013. 
Although Hizballah has been operational for three decades, and became 
a recognised political party, an internal split that characterises other cases of 
terrorist organisations that abandoned violence and opted for peaceful means, 
failed to take place. Perhaps organisational disagreements over ideology and 
strategy do exist nowadays, but it seems that the current leadership is capable 
of preventing them from surfacing. Should the unified front towards the outside 
world be breached, it could be a significant development indicating that 
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Hizballah is on a course to becoming a full-fledged political party without a 
separate armed wing.  
It is important to note the only time that internal differences threatened 
to split Hizballah. The catalyst was the initial decision to participate in the 
political system trough elections in 1992. On one hand, the hard-liners led by 
Secretary-General, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufeili opposed the decision to participate 
in the elections, arguing that ‘extreme radicalism and total secrecy were vital 
for its [Hizballah's] survival.’782 Furthermore, they argued that taking part in 
the elections would legitimise the non-Islamic Lebanese government and that 
the legacy of Supreme Leader Khomeini must be preserved.783 
On the other hand, Hizballah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Fadlallah, 
advocated in favour of participating in Lebanon's politics, explaining that it 
served an Islamic interest whilst not harming the resistance operations. In the 
ensuing vocal struggle over ideology and strategy, Fadlallah defeated Tufeili, 
who was first isolated then expelled from Hizballah and replaced by Abbas al-
Musawi at the organisation's helms.784  
It seems that the internal feud threatened to tear apart Hizballah and 
weaken its political and popular strongholds. Learning from its mistakes, the 
organisation became strict about playing down and resolving internal 
differences whilst presenting to the wider population a cohesive and consistent 
agenda that is expressed exclusively by Hizballah's Secretary-General.   
   
LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT 
Undoubtedly, one of Hizballah’s greatest achievements is its ability to 
maintain an overwhelming and continuous public support, not only among its 
natural Shiite constituency, but also among other potentially rival sectarian 
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groups in Lebanon. Simon Haddad explains this anomaly by the fact that 
Hizballah has proved that its 'agenda does not exclusively rest on political 
violence and warfare but retains a political and social dimension to its activities 
in post-war Lebanon.'785 Indeed, Hizballah masterfully utilises its broad 
popularity to achieve political power, which makes it today the most significant 
and influential actor in Lebanon. The electoral success of the organisation 
stems primarily from its policy of promoting resistance operations while 
downplaying its pan-Islamic ideology, which has enabled it to establish a 
legitimate political voice.786    
Like other Islamist terrorist organisations, some of Hizballah’s 
operatives and supporters come from low socio-economic classes. However, 
the bulk of its membership comes from educated and secular backgrounds. 
Norton explains this unusual phenomenon by the fact that Hizballah’s 'social 
base is not exclusively the monopoly of the poor but some of the party's 
operatives are middle class or even affluent.'787 The broad-based popular 
support stems from a combination of two principal elements: the group's social 
and welfare projects (Da’wa) aimed at assisting the downtrodden regardless of 
their religious denomination, and Hizballah's self-proclaimed role as the 
protector of Lebanese sovereignty against Israeli aggression. The successful 
convergence of the two elements is the fundamental pillar in Hizballah's 
political campaigns since 1992.788  
Following the decision to participate in national politics, Hizballah 
allotted vast resources to promote both its resistance and social activities. The 
organisation viewed politics as means to grow and expand its stability, 
autonomy and power. By creating a political wing, Hizballah was granted a legal 
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platform to translate its public support into political power.789 Evidently, 
Hizballah’s first encounter with the political domain in the 0992 parliamentary 
elections was a remarkable success. Since then, it has enjoyed a trend of 
constantly increasing popular support that eventually culminated in a Hizballah 
candidate – Najib Mikati – being elected as the head of Lebanese government in 
June 2011.790  
To a large extent, Hizballah owes its popularity to several factors. First 
and foremost is its leader over the last two decades, Hassan Nasrallah. He is 
perceived by many Muslims worldwide as a 'shrewd militia leader and political 
strategist', who was able to lead an armed campaign that ultimately resulted in 
Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon.791 In a 2006 public poll conducted by 
the Egyptian Quranic Center, Nasrallah was ranked at the top among Middle-
Eastern leaders (with 82% approval rating), while Osama Bin-Laden trailed 
behind with 52%.792 Under his leadership, Hizballah capitalised on its military 
triumph to become Lebanon’s protector, and Nasrallah himself has been 
regarded as one of the most prominent figures in Lebanon.  
Aside from Nasrallah's charisma and leadership abilities, Hizballah also 
skillfully uses the power of media to capture, attract and influence public 
opinion. To this end, it maintains a range of autonomous communication 
outlets to convey its messages to different audiences, from internet websites 
and newspapers to radio and a television stations.  
One of the main instruments in Hizballah's media arsenal is the 
television station al-Manar (Beacon in Arabic), which is often regarded as the 
‘jewel in Hizballah’s media crown.'793 It is one of the most widely viewed 
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satellite stations in the Arab world, and its 'stance can be interpreted as the 
frames or messages of a social movement, geared to encourage attitudes which 
spur action and involvement.'794 Al-Manar is funded by Hizballah, operating in 
its service and is committed to promote its objectives as well as political and 
social agendas. A study of its broadcasting content determines that from its 
establishment in 1991 until the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, 'the 
bulk of the station’s programming was aimed at sustaining and, if possible, 
strengthening the Lebanese public’s support for Hizballah’s campaign of 
resistance against the IDF in south Lebanon.'795  
Furthermore, al-Manar is widely considered a tool used by Hizballah for 
psychological warfare aimed at 'pressuring Israeli viewers to push their 
government for a unilateral withdrawal,' and from September 2000 onwards to 
support the Palestinian armed resistance in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
(also known as the Second Intifada).796 For these reasons, the station was 
proscribed by the American Treasury Department in March 2006 as a 
"Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity", and therefore is subject to US 
sanctions. According to the economic and trade policies, al-Manar is subject to 
sanctions because 'any entity maintained by a terrorist group whether 
masquerading as a charity, a business, or a media outlet is as culpable as the 
terrorist group itself.'797 Many European countries followed the American 
sanctions and banned al-Manar’s broadcasts, accusing the station of 
programming content that could incite hatred and violence.          
The last driving force that brings Hizballah worldwide admiration and 
support is its public backing and assistance to the Palestinian struggle for 
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independence, which is perceived by many Muslims and non-Muslims as a just 
cause. In September 2000, a week after the hostilities began in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, Nasrallah said in an interview that Hizballah is: 
Committed to supporting this [Palestinian] intifada and standing 
side by side with the Palestinian people...we have a moral, 
humanitarian, religious, patriotic, and national duty towards this 
people, and believe it is our collective duty to stand by its side.798  
Hizballah has consistently shown solidarity with the Palestinian armed 
campaign, and at times also praised the use of suicide terrorism against Israelis. 
Nasrallah’s deputy, Naim Qassem, claimed that 'the weapon of martyrdom is 
the main and pivotal weapon on which we can rely, one that has proven its 
effectiveness and that prompts the enemy to reconsider its objectives.'799  
Undoubtedly, Hizballah benefited from its uncompromising support of 
the Palestinians. Indeed, by collecting money for the Palestinians and supplying 
weapons to their armed groups, Hizballah was able to attract many Sunnis in 
Lebanon and reinforce its consensus as a legitimate political actor. However, 
Hizballah's active involvement in the Palestinian conflict with Israel had other 
objectives rather than only mobilising public support. David Hirst claims that 
Hizballah's support of the Palestinians was also intended to project the 
organisation 'as the spearhead of the whole Arab/Muslim struggle against the 
historic Zionist foe.'800 Furthermore, promotion of the Palestinian agenda 
served as a powerful instrument in Hizballah's ability to continue the conflict 
against Israel while limiting the risks to itself and to its patrons. Byman 
cynically notes that Hizballah's support energised the Palestinians, and enabled 
it 'to fight to the last Palestinian and suffer few costs of its own.'801  
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Israel's security strategy is mainly derived from its inferiority in 
population and territorial size compared with its Arab neighbours. Therefore, 
the principal pillar of its national security doctrine is deterrence, which is 
aimed at avoiding military conflicts. However, if an armed conflict is forced 
upon it, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) is expected to strike a massive and 
decisive attack, preferably while carrying the war to the enemy's territory, as 
quickly as possible.802  
Often, Israel is praised for its military triumphs since 1948, both against 
Arab states and Palestinian terrorist groups. However, it seems that Israel's 
military confrontation with Hizballah stands out as mostly inconclusive as to 
which side has the upper hand. Byman argues that Israel largely failed in 
dealing with Hizballah and that 'the Lebanese group has won both military and 
especially political victories, and today is more formidable than ever.'803 This 
notion is popular among Israeli public opinion who perceives Hizballah as the 
leading protagonist in making Lebanon 'Israel's very own Vietnam.'804  
The primary reason why the conflict with Hizballah did not end with a 
clear-cut military victory on Israel's part is the inability of its government and 
military to articulate attainable goals and strategies for dealing with the Shiite 
organisation. To understand this incoherence, it is necessary to divide Israel's 
security objectives and actions in Lebanon into three distinct time-periods: the 
first starts in 1982 with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the establishment 
of the "Security Zone" and ends in the 1999 parliamentary elections, during 
which the conflict intensified and the "rules of the game" were settled; the 
second begins with Israel's unilateral withdraw in 2000 and ends on the eve of 
the Second Lebanon War in July 2006, during which Israel mistakenly believed 
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that its security policy successfully deterred and contained Hizballah; and lastly 
from the 2006 all-out war against Hizballah through today, when the 
organisation has become more involved in Lebanon's political system and has 
put less emphasis on challenging Israel.  
 
1982-2000: ISRAEL'S (IN)SECURITY ZONE 
In June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon, an act that is still widely viewed by 
Israelis as a whim of its determined, yet uncontrolled, Defence Minister at that 
time, Ariel Sharon. According to Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, whose book on the 
1982 Lebanon War is considered as one of the most accurate and credible 
accounts of the events, an entire delusional nation was dragged into the 
"Lebanese mud".805 After an arduous and bitter military campaign that cost the 
lives of more than 670 servicemen over a period of 3 years, Israel could claim 
only limited accomplishments.  
In the aftermath, Israel's belief and confidence in its army were severely 
undermined. For the first time the IDF was unable to use its military superiority 
to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield against the terrorist 
organisations.806 Consequently, the government could not present to its public 
and the world any tangible political benefits that were gained from a costly 
military campaign. Even the attempt of the Likud-led government, headed by 
Menachem Begin, to sign a peace agreement with the Christian leadership in 
Lebanon ended in a humiliating debacle.807   
When the war finally ended in 1985, Israel found in Hizballah a new and 
dangerous rival that adopted the strategy of asymmetrical warfare, which cost 
the lives of many Israeli citizens. From its outset, Hizballah's operations were 
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primarily directed against the Multi-National Force in Beirut, initially sent to 
oversee the evacuation of PLO forces from Lebanon and later to secure peace 
and stability. However, when the international force withdrew from Lebanon, 
Hizballah shifted its focus towards direct confrontation with the IDF forces.808 
Facing a mounting number of casualties and growing public unrest, the Israeli 
government voted for a unilateral withdrawal from most of Lebanon's territory. 
In doing so, Israel admitted that it could not eradicate the terror threat from 
Lebanon, despite its overwhelming military advantage. Therefore, it had to 
settle for a lesser objective – to minimise the threat and the casualties to a 
tolerable level. 
In an attempt to prevent the continuation of cross-border incursions and 
rocket launching onto Israeli civilian centres, the Israeli government decided to 
maintain a military presence on Lebanese soil. By creating a barrier between 
Israel and Lebanon, the government believed that it would prevent infiltration 
of Hizballah (and the other Palestinian terrorist organisations operating from 
Lebanon) terrorists into Israel and reduce artillery fire against its population. 
The land strip, that became known as the "Security Zone" consisted of 45 
heavily fortified outposts manned by 1,500 IDF soldiers. Initially, the "Security 
Zone" was a great success and 'for fifteen years, Israel's north was relatively 
secure, and its residents could maintain a relatively normal life style.'809 Israel 
also paid, trained and equipped the closely allied South Lebanese Army (SLA), 
which conducted military operations on behalf of Israel inside the "Security 
Zone" (see map 4). 
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Map 4: Israel's "security zone" in Lebanon (1985) 
The establishment of the "Security Zone" represents Israel's most 
ambiguous policy towards Lebanon at the time. On one hand, Israel publicly 
recognised Lebanon's formal sovereignty and thus held the Lebanese 
government responsible for stopping Hizballah's terrorist and guerrilla 
operations and dismantling its weapons. However, at the same time, it was also 
sceptical of Lebanon's effective sovereignty, and therefore felt obliged to 
become directly and indirectly involved in internal Lebanese affairs to stem the 
growing power and influence of Hizballah.810 General (ret.) Eitan Ben-Eliyahu, 
former commander of the IDF air force, attributes this inconsistency to Israel's 
general difficulty to define war-time military objectives, since its security 
doctrine is predominantly-oriented to prevent or postpone wars. Therefore, 
crucial issues such as the conditions and time-line for ending a war and the 
necessary pace and intensity for future military maneuvers were often ill-
constructed. It also made the work of the politicians much harder, as they 
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encountered problems in mobilising public and international support for the 
fighting.811  
A stark example of Israel's lack of a clearly-defined strategy towards 
Hizballah, which would have an immense future impact on the conflict, was the 
targeted assassination of Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi in February 1992. 
Supposedly at that time, Israel maintained fierce and unyielding security 
approach against Hizballah. A day before the assassination, three IDF soldiers 
were brutally murdered by Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters. Israelis 
responded with shock and anger, and demanded a proper retaliation. Among 
IDF senior ranks the name of al-Musawi immediately came up as a fitting 
target.812  
A military action against al-Musawi was considered months before the 
murder of the Israeli soldiers. Initially, the plan was to kidnap al-Musawi and 
use him as a bargaining chip for the release of Ron Arad, an IDF pilot who was 
shot down over Lebanon in October 1986 and believed to be held in Hizballah's 
captivity.813 Israel's intelligence community learned that al-Musawi was 
scheduled to visit the village of Jibshit to speak at a Hizballah annual political 
rally. However, the exact details of his visit were still unclear, and the 
commander of the Intelligence Directorate ordered a postponement of the 
operation for the following year. However, he instructed Apache attack 
helicopters to be sent to gather more intelligence on al-Musawi and study his 
routine while at the rally. Clearly, the understanding among senior officers was 
that taking offensive action against al-Musawi was not an option. Since IDF 
intelligence analysts and Hizballah experts were under the impression that the 
kidnapping was not imminent, they did not undertake any risk assessments and 
evaluate the implications for the "day after".     
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However, the killing of the soldiers changed the plans for the al-Musawi 
operation. On the day of the rally, the helicopters were ordered to locate al-
Musawi's motorcade and to wait for further instructions. While in the air, 
driven by what seemed like a one-time opportunity to eliminate him, IDF 
commanders suggested this alternative to the Minister of Defence and asked for 
his confirmation. They later briefed the Prime Minister, Yitzchak Shamir, for not 
more than a minute, and he immediately approved the assassination of al-
Musawi. The pilots received the order and seconds later al-Musawi, his family 
and bodyguards were killed by guided missiles. It was the first time that Israel 
targeted, in broad daylight, a religious figure who was also a leader of a political 
organisation.  
The lack of in-depth planning led to strategic blindness regarding the 
effects and ramifications of such an operation. Additionally, no professional 
discussions were held about al-Musawi's potential successors. Hours after al-
Musawi's death, Hassan Nasrallah was appointed as Hizballah's new Secretary-
General and the representative of the Iranian Supreme Leader in Lebanon. 
Hizballah's response was prompt and lethal; rockets were fired onto northern 
Israel for the first time since 1982 and a month later a car bomb was driven 
into the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. Israel learned the hard-way that 
instant decisions have deadly effects when it comes to Hizballah. Nasrallah still 
serves as leader of Hizballah and is widely viewed by many as 'one of the most 
resourceful adversaries Israel has ever faced.'814         
Under Nasrallah's leadership, Hizballah intensified its attacks against 
Israeli targets in the "Security Zone" and against the civilian population in 
Israel. The sequence and lethality of the attacks resulted in a week-long military 
incursion by the IDF, titled "Operation Accountability", in July 1993. Three 
years later, on April 1996, Israel launched a second operation, "Grapes of 
Wrath". Both operations involved aerial bombardments and artillery shelling 
that inflicted heavy damage to civilian infrastructure in Lebanon. Wishing to 
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avoid both casualties and the potential political and military entanglements, the 
IDF refrained from significant ground maneuvers against Hizballah targets. The 
Shiite organisation on its part retaliated with massive rocket attacks against 
northern Israel.  
The operations ended after American and French officials brokered oral 
and written agreements between Israel and Hizballah. Israel could claim only 
limited political gains, and was criticised for its human rights violations. One 
important outcome was the Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Understanding that was 
signed in April 1996 by both governments, in which the parties mutually 
agreed not to fire at civilian targets. Also, an international monitoring group 
was established to supervise the implementation of the understandings.815  
Although Hizballah was not officially a signatory to the understandings, 
it was clear that the Lebanese obligation was incumbent upon it. Despite the 
massive damage caused by Israel's bombings, Hizballah emerged from the 
operations 'relatively intact and with newfound popularity in Lebanon.'816 In 
Israel, on the other hand, the understandings were unpopular not only among 
the public but also among IDF senior officers. General (ret.) Moshe Tamir, a 
senior IDF commander at that time, wrote that the agreement that followed 
operation "Grapes of Wrath" was incomprehensible, as Israel gave legitimacy to 
Hizballah to target its soldiers, and under some circumstances, its civilians, 
while dismissing the Lebanese government from its responsibility to take a full 
control over south Lebanon and disarm Hizballah.817 In fact, the ceasefire 
understandings granted Hizballah an unprecedented advantage – it deterred 
Israel. According to Prof. Yehezkel Dror, one of Israel's leading strategic 
thinkers, the fear of terrorist attacks against Jewish targets outside of Israel and 
the launching of rockets onto Israeli civilian population, undermined its 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
815 "Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Understanding (April 1996)"; 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/grapes_eng.htm (access 15/6/2012) 
816 Eisenstadt, Michael. "Hezbollah operations: past patterns, future prospects", Policy Watch 
197, The Washington institute for Near East Policy, (7 May 1996): 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1076 (accessed 15/6/2012) 





capability to capitalise the military superiority as deterrence against 
Hizballah.818  
The focal point that changed the Israeli consensus towards a unilateral 
withdrawal from the "Security Zone" was the year 1997. Until then, majority of 
Israelis believed that the military presence in Lebanon was an unfortunate 
necessity for the protection of northern Israel. The domestic debate on the 
"Security Zone" was sparked in February 1997, after two Israeli transport 
helicopters carrying troops to the Lebanese front collided with each other in 
midair and 73 soldiers were killed. Five months later, 12 Israeli elite soldiers 
were killed in south Lebanon on their way to a Hizballah target. After these 
national traumas, citizen groups emerged that were publicly opposed to the 
continued presence in south Lebanon.819 For the first time since 1985, the price 
for Israel's presence in Lebanon was too high to pay and the 'conventional 
wisdom on the "Security Zone" began to shift.'820  
The most influential citizen pressure group was the Four Mothers 
movement, founded by mothers of IDF soldiers who served in Lebanon. Their 
narrative: 'our husbands were fighting this war when our boys were still 
babies. We don't want our grandsons to still be fighting it,' received extensive 
media and public attention.821 Although military commanders and politicians 
dismissed the women as 'overly emotional and ignorant of security concerns,' 
they were embraced by the Israeli public for they dared to challenge the IDF 
ethos and demanded answers from the government.822 In fact, the withdrawal 
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became the main issue in the 1999 national elections, and the Labour party 
leader, Ehud Barak, promised to 'bring the boys home from Lebanon' if elected 
prime minister.823 Soon after Barak won the polls, he formally announced that 
Israel would unilaterally withdrawal its forces from Lebanon no later than July 
2000.    
Clearly, at the dawn of the 21th century Israel was not winning the war 
against Hizballah. The ability of the Shiite organisation to endure and respond 
to the IDF's military incursions became one of the primary catalysts for its fast-
growing popularity among the residents of South Lebanon. In light of Israel's 
military presence in Lebanese territory, Hizballah was not required to disband 
or even to disarm, as it was perceived by the public as Lebnon's sole defender. 
Under such circumstances, abandoning violence and integrating into Lebanon's 
political system was entirely unnecessary since Hizballah was able to maintain, 
without encountering any significant pressure, its dual-strategy of armed 
campaign whilst participating in the state's legitimate political system.  
 
2000-2006: THE FOLLY OF CONTAINMENT 
On 24 May 2000, IDF forces hurriedly evacuated their last outposts in 
south Lebanon. After 18 years and more than 1,000 casualties there was no 
longer an Israeli presence on Lebanese soil. The unilateral withdrawal was 
intended to break the existing status-quo and to stabilise a new line of defence 
along the internationally recognised border between the two states. Israeli 
decision-makers hoped that by not violating Lebanon's territorial sovereignty, 
Hizballah would be stripped of its pretext to attack Israel. Also, if Hizballah did 
attack targets within Israel, a counter-offensive would be deemed legitimate 
and justified under international law.824  
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However, Hizballah had different plans. It claimed that a small 
agricultural land still under Israel's control, known as the Shebba farms, was 
Lebanese occupied territory and therefore remained disputed. Despite a UN 
confirmation that Israel fulfilled its obligation in compliance with UNSCR 425, 
Hizballah declared that until the Shebba farms issue is resolved, the area will be 
a legitimate target for resistance operations.825 In his victory speech just days 
after Israel's withdrawal, Nasrallah declared that Hizballah does not 'much care 
about international resolutions; all we know is that there is Lebanese territory 
under occupation that should be returned to Lebanon.'826 The significance of 
the farms for Hizballah was explained by Timur Goksel, former spokesperson of 
the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), who argued that the area 
provided the organisation with both the justification to continue to bear arms 
and the capability to attract new devoted recruits. He concluded that in order to 
become an influential political power in Lebanon, Hizballah required an armed 
militia, and that the Shebba farms was the reason to maintain it.827        
Source: www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/unifil  
Map 5: South Lebanon and the Shebba Farms (2000) 
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Soon after Israel's unilateral withdrawal, Hizballah bombed IDF 
outposts adjacent to the Shebba farms. From June 2000 until July 2006, ten IDF 
soldiers were killed and dozens were wounded in this region.828 Because of the 
volatility of the Shebba farms, Thomas Friedman of the New York Times 
described in December 2000 the area as 'the most dangerous spot in the world 
today.'829 International calls to stop Hizballah's attacks on the Shebba farms 
were met with more fire. In April 2002 the Quartet announced in Madrid that 
'attacks at any point along the Blue Line [marking the internationally-certified 
border], including in the Shebba farms area in the occupied Golan Heights, are 
violations of Security Council resolutions.'830 Three years later, when the 
attacks did not stop, the UN Security Council announced that: 
The continually asserted position of the Government of Lebanon 
that the Blue Line is not valid in the Shebba farms area is not 
compatible with Security Council resolutions. The Council has 
recognized the Blue Line as valid for purposes of confirming 
Israel’s withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425.831 
After the withdrawal, the IDF redeployed along the northern border and 
adopted a strategy of low intensity warfare aimed at minimising the friction 
with Hizballah and thus reducing the threat of Israeli casualties. This strategy 
was derived directly from the government's instruction to implement a 
containment policy towards Hizballah through selective and measured 
responses to its provocations. The primary rationale for Israel's containment 
strategy was to prevent local armed clashes with Hizballah from deteriorating 
into a full-scale war, which did not serve Israel's strategic interests in the 
region. Its manifestation was portrayed on one hand in Israel's attempt to deter 
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Hizballah, while on the other the IDF was ordered to act and responded to 
provocations in a manner that would not escalate the ongoing conflict.832  
One of the main reasons for choosing such a strategy was Israel's desire 
to refrain, at all costs, from a "second military front" while the IDF was fighting 
the Palestinian terrorist organisations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The 
escalating struggle with Palestinian terrorism overstretched the IDF forces and 
wore out the Israeli public, thus the government sought to avoid any forceful 
retaliation to Hizballah's aggravations.833 Another important reason for 
containment was the prosperous economy (mostly from tourism) and the 
significant improvement in the sense of security among the citizens living in 
northern Israel. Defence commentators criticised the government basing its 
security policy on 'a strategy of bed-and-breakfasts and skiing, according to 
which it is best not to really respond to harm, kidnappings and provocations 
lest it endanger the tourism.'834   
The containment strategy characterised by the slogan "let Hizballah's 
rockets rust on their own", was meticulously implemented across the Israel-
Lebanon border from May 2000 until the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War 
in July 2006.835 Although a reasonable strategy in the existing geopolitical 
environment, the costs would prove to be detrimental for Israel's deterrence 
image and military reputation in the region. Clearly, the tactical consequences 
for the IDF were severe: the military presence in the Northern border was 
sparse, operational activity was reduced to a minimum, and intelligence 
gathering was neglected. Overall the Israeli army refrained from initiating 
contact with Hizballah fighters and did not actively seek to destroy its armed 
capabilities. At the same time, Hizballah underwent a massive build-up of its 
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armed capabilities, with help and funds from Syria and Iran which provided 
long-range rockets, advanced anti-tank missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. 
It also fortified its bunkers, dug underground launch pads and improved its 
command and control as well as intelligence gathering capabilities along the 
Israel-Lebanon border.836    
The first test of the containment strategy occurred five months after the 
withdrawal. In a well-planned and coordinated attack, that is often regarded as 
the most complex and sophisticated attack carried out by the organisation until 
then, Hizballah guerillas infiltrated Israel and kidnapped three IDF soldiers who 
were on patrol (on the same day, Hizballah also abducted an Israeli citizen 
abroad).837 Instead of "going up in flames", as Prime Minister Barak threatened 
if Hizballah would attack Israel after the withdrawal, the response was 
reserved and symbolic, and it did not deter the organisation from kidnapping 
Israelis again.838 Evidently, Israel's warning that any violation of its sovereignty 
would be met with an immediate and fierce response and that the governments 
of Lebanon and Syria be held accountable for Hizballah's actions, proved an 
empty one.  
Israel's self-restraint and minimal responses to Hizballah's armed 
attacks continued even after six Israelis were killed in a kibbutz near the 
northern border in 2002, a 16-year old boy was killed by a rocket in 2003 and 
another attempt to kidnap soldiers was foiled in 2005. All together, since the 
unilateral withdrawal until July 2006, twenty Israelis were killed by Hizballah, 
without any significant Israeli retaliation. It seemed that the politicians were 
focusing on the benefits of the containment strategy, while the costs were 
mostly overlooked. The Winograd Commission of Inquiry concluded in 2007, 
that it did not find any evidence that the government held discussions on the 
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long-term effects of the containment, and the lack of it reflected a failure in the 
strategic, political and security decision-making process of successive Israeli 
governments.839  
Interestingly, among the IDF High Command there were generals who 
disapproved of the containment strategy, but considered it a political directive 
and did not attempt to challenge it. However, they also did not order a 
comprehensive study that systematically analysed the long-term advantages 
and disadvantages of this strategy and offered the decision-makers alternative 
options.840 General Tamir wrote in his memoirs that 'Israel cannot disregard 
the numerous tactical failures, and most certainly not the systemic catastrophe, 
that stemmed from the IDF's unilateral withdrawal without any security or 
political agreement with Lebanon.'841 The most profound criticism of the 
containment strategy came from the IDF commander of the northern front 
during the Second Lebanon War, who argued that the actual meaning of this 
strategy is 'renouncing Israel's sovereignty and giving Hizballah a permission to 
act freely along the northern border.'842 A declassified parliamentary report of 
the second Lebanon War concluded that apart from damaging the IDF's 
readiness and activity in the northern front, the containment strategy did not 
provide appropriate operational and intelligence responses to the level and 
variety of threats posed by Hizballah.843 Lastly, the Winograd Commission 
determined that the containment policy allowed Hizballah to choose the time 
and place for its attacks, which gave it a significant strategic and tactical 
advantage on Israel. Hizballah's weapons build-up was unhindered by Israel, as 
were the relations between the organisations and its patrons in Syria and Iran. 
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This created a balance-of-power that for the first time in its history was not in 
favour of Israel.844 
Clearly, Israel's containment doctrine, which was promoted by the 
highest military and political echelons, failed to deter Hizballah or prevent the 
shipments of advanced weapons systems from Iran and Syria from reaching 
their destination in Lebanon. In fact, the containment strategy did not pose any 
threat to Hizballah's existence, and it allowed it to concentrate its efforts on 
expanding its power to control the Lebanese political system. At times when 
containment was dominating Israel's strategic thinking, Hizballah's electoral 
popularity significantly increased and its 'status became more legitimate 
despite its continued control of an armed militia.'845         
     
2006-PRESENT: "ISRAEL HAS GONE CRAZY" 
One of Hizballah's justifications to maintain its armed capabilities, after 
Israel's unilateral withdrawal, was its self-proclaimed responsibility for 
releasing Lebanese nationals who were imprisoned in Israel. On behalf of these 
"bleeding wounds", Nasrallah openly declared that liberation of Lebanon could 
not be complete until the last remaining Lebanese prisoner was released. In 
January 2004 he stated that Hizballah's armed campaign against Israel 'was 
simply a legitimate reaction, and we [Hizballah] shall continue to act in this way 
as long as the enemy continues to commit acts of aggression and kidnap our 
people.'846  
True to its words, Hizballah did not give up its attempts to abduct IDF 
soldiers from Israel's territory to be used as negotiating cards in future 
prisoner exchanges.847 In April 2006, Nasrallah provided a preview of 
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Hizballah's future plan when assured the Lebanese prisoners in Israel that 'the 
coming days and the spilled blood will prove me right'.848 On a clear morning in 
July 2006, a Hizballah elite unit infiltrated Israel and kidnapped two IDF 
soldiers who were on patrol and killed eight others.849 The combination of 
dreary atmosphere among Israelis and the desire of politicians and army 
commanders alike to revenge the death and humiliation, led the government to 
issue belligerent declarations and make hasty decisions that ultimately led to 
the Second Lebanon War.850  
Contrary to the hesitancy and restraint towards Hizballah provocations 
in accordance with the containment strategy, Israel decided to react differently 
and far more aggressively to the ensuing hostage situation in the summer of 
2006. The IDF Chief of Staff during the war, General (ret.) Dan Haloutz, was 
quoted saying that in retaliation 'Israel will put Lebanon back 20 years.'851 In 
his memoirs, General Haloutz explains that the response was intended to 
change the status-quo by acting beyond Hizballah's expectations. The rationale 
of the Israel-has-gone-crazy strategy was to enhance its regional deterrent 
image.852 
The powerful response eventually led to a full-scale war. However, at 
that point, no one in the Israeli government or the IDF High Command realised 
that this would be the outcome. After the war, government ministers admitted 
that a resolution on a war was neither presented nor authorised, and that they 
were asked to approve a number of limited operations. Strikingly, one senior 
politician claimed that the government never had a full understanding of the 
events. When confronted with such allegation, General Haloutz replied that the 
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responsibility of the political echelon was not to know the details but to ask the 
right questions.853    
Consequently, the IDF attacked numerous Hizballah targets in south 
Lebanon and Beirut using standoff high-precision ammunition from air, land 
and sea. Yet, the IDF still refrained from ground maneuvers fearing heavy losses 
in close-encounter battles with Hizballah guerillas. Although most of 
Hizballah's long-range missiles were destroyed in an Israeli preemptive strike, 
thousands of medium and short-range rockets remained intact. Hizballah 
reacted with heavy rocket barrages that landed farther south than Israel 
expected. Almost one million Israeli citizens were in range of the rockets, and 
the shelling continued until the last day of the war, with Israel proving 
incapable of preventing it.  
Hizballah had other important victories during the war; for the first time 
it hit an Israeli warship with an Iranian version of land-to-sea missile and a 
heavy transport helicopter using an anti-aircraft shoulder missile, killing a total 
of nine soldiers. Despite the astonishing achievements of Hizballah, the Israeli 
government did not reassess the military and political situation according to 
the developments in the battlefield and the international front. Angered and 
frustrated by the lethality of Hizballah's attacks, the government ordered to 
intensify the aerial attacks. By the end of the first week of fighting, the IDF had 
run out of targets and for the next two weeks the attacks continued without 
significant objectives and brought neither results nor change.854  
By the end of July 2006, when the war continued without any apparent 
achievement, the government faced a dilemma – to begin a major ground 
offensive and risk heavy losses, or to push for a ceasefire without resolving the 
rocket threat while knowing its devastating effect on Israel's deterrence 
capability.855 Ultimately the government decided to deploy more than 60,000 
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reservists. General Haloutz candidly admitted in his biography that the he made 
a critical mistake by not recruiting the reservists necessary for a ground 
maneuver at an earlier stage.856 The reservists that arrived to the Israel-
Lebanon border were highly motivated, yet their late arrival meant that they 
were untrained and ill-equipped.     
Three days before the end of the war, when a UN-brokered ceasefire was 
imminent, the government finally decided to send ground forces into the 
battlefield. Officially, the reason was to pressure the international community 
to reach a more favorable agreement to Israel, and in case the negotiations fail 
the IDF will be in a better tactical position to act.857 The much-anticipated 
ground maneuver had devastating results for the IDF. In the fierce fighting with 
Hizballah guerillas, 33 soldiers were killed and dozens were injured. On the 
morning of 14 August 2006, a ceasefire took effect after 34 days of war. A total 
of 169 Israelis and 1,100 Lebanese were killed. Several IDF senior commanders, 
including General Haloutz, took personal responsibility for mismanaging the 
war and resigned from service, yet none of them admitted personal 
wrongdoing or collective failure. 
Essentially, the Second Lebanon War was the epitome of Israel's 
unsuccessful decision-making process and strategy towards Hizballah since 
1982. Despite Israel's apparent strategic advantages, mainly its military 
superiority, international support and strong public consensus, the majority of 
its decisions were not a result of a systematic, well-researched and 
comprehensive analysis. The strategic and tactical implications of Israel's 
actions were often overlooked if not completely ignored. This weakness was 
thoroughly discussed by General (ret.) Giora Eiland, former head of Israel's 
National Security Council, who attributed the flawed decision-making process 
to the unstable environment that stemmed from Israel's political structure, and 
the lack of a professional and authoritative advisory body responsible for 
conducting a methodical evaluation of Israel's strategic position on all fronts. 
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Consequently, during the Second Lebanon War, the government was not 
presented with additional alternatives (besides the ones suggested by the 
military), the politicians were unaware of the events that happened in the 
battlefield and the international arena in real-time, the military was 
disconnected from the government's decisions, and finally there was no 
strategic initiative regarding ways to resolve the conflict, but rather intuitive 
conflict-management decisions.858   
A stark example of the severe disconnect between the government and 
the IDF was projected in Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, speech a few days 
after the war began. In the speech, later described as "Churchillian", he outlined 
the reasons why Israel went to war and set the objectives for ending it: return 
of the abducted soldiers, unconditional ceasefire, deployment of Lebanon's 
army along the Israeli border and the removal of Hizballah's presence from 
south Lebanon and its disarmament.859 Although Olmert's approval ratings 
peaked, the IDF understood immediately that the prime minister stipulated 
goals unattainable by military means only.860 When asked by the Winograd 
Commission why he presented the return of the soldiers as a condition for 
ending the war, Olmert replied: 'some things are said because they have to be 
said…it is a moral issue…and I need to instill hope in the public.'861 Due to the 
unrealistic objectives to end the fighting and its misconduct of the war, the 
commission concluded that Prime Minister Olmert was personally responsible 
for the flawed decisions and decision-making process leading up to and during 
the war. He was also accused of taking a stand without demanding a detailed 
plan to be presented by the IDF and failing to discuss other non-military 
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alternatives. In this respect, the prime minister did not act in the necessary 
manners that are critical for initiating and managing a war.862    
 The fact that Israel did not win the war is evident from its results: the 
soldiers were not released, Hizballah remained heavily armed and its political 
power and influence in Lebanon increased dramatically. Nonetheless, it is also 
not clear that Hizballah came out of the war victorious. Indeed, internal 
criticism was pointed against Hizballah blaming it for dragging Lebanon into a 
second war with Israel that resulted in an overwhelming destruction to civilian 
infrastructure. Nasrallah himself, who was often perceived as one of the 
shrewdest leaders in the region, was being treated as a gambler who lost after a 
long winning streak. Eyal Zisser, a renowned Hizballah expert, argues that after 
the war: 
Lebanon is a divided country teetering on the verge of a civil war 
that is largely a result of Hezbollah's bellicosity toward Israel and 
its refusal to submit itself to the domain of politics with the rest 
of Lebanon. Hezbollah itself is a battered and bruised 
organisation struggling to regain its standing inside Lebanon.863 
Ali al-Amin, a prominent Shiite scholar, warned in October 2012, that 
Hizballah's military moves might drag Lebanon again into a 'needless war 
which Lebanon cannot afford.' He stressed that the organisation's entire 
weapons arsenal must 'be put under the Lebanese state authority to be part of 
Lebanon's defence network.'864 A western diplomat stationed in Beirut argues 
that Nasrallah did not foresee the war 'not even in his worst nightmare.'865 
Clearly, Hizballah was surprised by Israel's game-changing retaliation and 
expected another short and limited confrontation that would lift its prestige 
and remove the discourse in Lebanon about disarming the organisation. 
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The aftermath of the war found Hizballah beaten but not defeated. The 
losses suffered forced the organisation to invest its resources and energy in re-
building its military, social and political infrastructures. To achieve this, 
Hizballah had to keep the Israel-Lebanon border more peaceful than ever 
before. Fearing that the organisation and Lebanon would not be able to 
withstand another war with Israel, Nasrallah promised that there will not be 
another round of armed confrontation.866  
Evidently, Israel's desire to demonstrate that it "has gone crazy" proved 
itself, as Nasrallah disappeared from the public eye and is believed to stay in an 
underground bunker, re-surfacing only on special and heavily guarded 
occasions. His need to remain hidden most of the year is not only a personal 
blow to Nasrallah's prestige and image, but it also 'reinforces the perception of 
Hizballah's vulnerability to assassination and sabotage.'867 Facing a new 
balance-of-power with Israel, Hizballah chose a political struggle for its next 
battle, aiming at bringing the Shiite community to the helms of the Lebanese 
state. Additionally, it invested tremendous resources to rebuff the calls for 
Hizballah's disarmament by gaining veto power in the Lebanese cabinet. 
Ultimately, the new status-quo with Israel enabled Hizballah to become more 
embedded in Lebanon's political system while maintaining its armed 
capabilities. 
 
HIZBALLAH: THE UNWELCOMED POLITICAL PARTNER 
Ever since Hizballah first showed its interest in a deeper political 
engagement in the early 1990s, it was clear to Israel as well as to the Lebanese 
government that due to its domestic popularity and prowess on the battlefield 
it could not be ignored. However, at that time, Israel perceived Hizballah as a 
terrorist and a guerilla organisation and therefore was bent on destroying it 
using exclusively military means. The Lebanese government, for its part, saw in 
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Hizballah a threat to the secular republic and was looking for ways to minimise 
its political influence. The rival Israeli and Lebanese governments commonly 
saw in Hizballah an unwelcomed political partner, and went to great lengths to 
undermine it.   
The appointment of Nasrallah as Secretary-General in 1992 represented 
a shift in Hizballah's Islamist vision towards a more moderate and conventional 
national agenda that included opening up Lebanese society and politics to a 
more tolerant approach. After receiving the approval of Ali Khamenei 
(Khomeini's successor as Iran's Supreme Leader) to participate in the elections, 
which would enable Hizballah to promote further its ideological agenda and 
resistance operations, the organisation's political party fared well, winning 
eight seats in the parliament. An additional four seats were won by Hizballah's 
independent sympathizers. Indeed, the threat of being excluded from the circles 
of power in Lebanon and the changing domestic and regional circumstances, 
led to a careful analysis that proved successful. Becoming a legitimate political 
actor contributed to Hizballah's reputation as the representative of the 
marginalised Shiite community, but also placed the organisation in a complex 
position as its armed operations could drag Lebanon into an unwanted military 
conflict with Israel.868  
Hizballah's electoral successes in 1992 and again in 1996 confirmed 
Israel's fears that the Shiite organisation "is here to stay". Consequently, Israel 
formulated a political strategy that would hold the Lebanese government 
responsible for Hizballah's armed provocations. The practical import of this 
strategy was to view any attack by Hizballah as an act of war by the state of 
Lebanon, as the organisation was a legitimate member in the Lebanese 
parliament and from 2005 also part of the government.869 Accordingly, Israel 
would retaliate with heavy attacks on Lebanese civilian infrastructure aimed at 
punishing the Lebanese state and people. In doing so, Israel hoped to urge the 
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Lebanese government to disarm Hizballah in compliance with several UN 
resolutions.  
Since Israel officially refuses to negotiate with Hizballah directly, in its 
eyes the resolution for the "Hizballah problem" lies in a separate peace 
agreement with Lebanon, or as a part of a comprehensive agreement with 
Syria. In 1996 an opportunity emerged for Israel to sign a peace treaty with 
Syria and Lebanon. The importance of this is often overlooked. In the aftermath 
of Israel's military operation "Grapes of Wrath", Israeli, Syrian and Lebanese 
delegates had a chance to meet in person through the monitoring group that 
was established to supervise any breaches of the written understandings. 
General Tamir, who was the Israeli delegate to the meetings recalls that despite 
the hostility, a constructive dialogue was established between the rival parties, 
practical discussions were held and understandings were reached.870  
Building on the relative success of the mutual understandings, together 
with Israel's desire to further promote the peace process (following the Oslo 
Accords that were signed with the Palestinians in 1993), Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu launched in July 1996 his "Lebanon-First" initiative. Israel 
proposed to withdraw its forces from Lebanon in return for Lebanese and 
Syrian guarantees that they would disarm Hizballah. This far-reaching offer 
was rejected by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, since it did not include a 
similar Israeli commitment to withdraw from the Golan Heights (occupied from 
Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War). The Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Al-Hariri, 
also turned down the offer because he did not want to defy al-Assad or to 
confront Hizballah without Syrian backing.871 Facing both Syrian and Lebanese 
refusals, Netanyahu wondered at the irony that an Israeli prime minister 
'announces he wants to get out of the territory of an Arab state – Lebanon. And 
the Syrian government, together with the Lebanese, are opposing this 
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withdrawal.'872 The political stalemate soon led to the collapse of the fragile 
"Grapes of Wrath" understandings, and Israel and Hizballah returned to a low-
intensity warfare that lasted until July 2006, and no direct negotiations were 
held between Israeli and Lebanese governments since.  
However, a dialogue between Israel and Syria did take place and despite 
the relative optimism for a successful conclusion, it also proved futile in 2000. 
In an attempt to emphasise the consequence of the failure of the Israel-Syria 
track, Blanford describes what could have happened if the talks had concluded 
in a peace treaty: 
Lebanon would have followed Syria's lead and signed a deal with 
Israel, Hizballah would have been disarmed under Syrian fiat, and 
quiet would have prevailed along Israel's northern border. There 
would have been no Shebba farms campaign, no military buildup 
by Hizballah in south Lebanon from 2000 on, and no war in 2006, 
nor would the Lebanese and Israelis continue to be living under 
the unremitting threat of a fresh conflict that promises to be even 
more destructive than the last.873 
Without a peace agreement with Lebanon, Israel was left with indirect 
negotiations with Hizballah through German mediators, which were limited 
only to a tactical dialogue aimed at promoting several prisoner exchanges (in 
1998, 2004 and 2008). Blinded by its wounded pride and inability to defeat 
Hizballah on the battlefield, Israel refused to recognise Hizballah as a potential 
political partner, although it is clear to IDF commanders as well as decision-
makers that the "Hizballah problem" cannot be resolved through exclusively 
military means. The Winograd Commission criticised, once again, Israeli 
governments who sought a solution to the conflict with Hizballah, yet failed to 
understand its position within the internal Lebanese balance-of-power. 
Furthermore, Israel did not consider the impact of military operations against 
Lebanon on Hizballah's standing and the interests of international actors in 
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Lebanon, as the primary factors that can encourage or hinder a peaceful 
resolution.874 
Even more complex than Israel's political approach to Hizballah, was the 
dilemma that Lebanese governments were faced with when dealing with the 
organisation as a legitimate member of the state's political system. Hizballah's 
far-reaching social and welfare activities, serving both Shiites and non-Shiites, 
bolstered its public support and at the same time undermined the authority of 
the Lebanese government, which failed to provide similar services for its 
people. Consequently, Hizballah's attempts to capitalise on its popularity to win 
key political positions and to continue promoting its Islamist agenda, in which 
social predominance would shift towards the Shiite community, were long 
perceived by Lebanese decision-makers and public opinion leaders as a threat 
to the state.875 Yet, because of its status among Lebanese, Hizballah could not be 
ignored and successive governments formed a political dialogue with the 
organisation hoping that it will moderate its views and objectives.   
Being an integral part of Lebanon's parliament, although taking an 
opposition role at first, led many to believe that Hizballah was undergoing a 
"Lebanonisation" process that would eventually transform the organisation 
into a full-fledged conventional political movement renouncing its long-term 
objectives to establish an Islamist regime in Lebanon.876 Surprisingly, Hizballah 
leaders insinuated before the 1992 elections that the organisation would 
consider supporting an Israel-Lebanon peace agreement, halt its armed 
resistance against Israel and focus on objecting to normalization with Israel.877 
But Nasrallah was quick to dismiss the hopes of Hizballah shedding its Jihadist 
agenda when he said after the 1992 elections that: 
In reality, we were, and will always be, the party of resistance 
that operates from Lebanon in reaction to [Israeli] occupation 
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and daily aggression…our participation in the elections and entry 
into the National Assembly do not alter the fact that we are a 
resistance party; we shall, in fact, work to turn the whole of 
Lebanon into a country of resistance.878    
Indeed, Hizballah was successful in integrating itself into the Lebanese 
political system, and at the same time maintaining its status as an armed 
resistance organisation. Hizballah's popularity grew stronger as a result of its 
political, social and welfare activities, but its prestige, glory and uniqueness 
came from its struggle against Israel. Nonetheless, after Israel's unilateral 
withdrawal in May 2000, which stripped Hizballah of its legitimacy to attack 
Israel, Lebanese politicians called to disarm the organisation and hand its 
weapons over to the state's army. Facing such vocal criticism, Blanford explains 
that Hizballah came up with a new reasoning for its need to keep the weapons; 
it now had to ensure that Israel would not come back to Lebanon. In his 
conversation with Nasrallah in 2003, Hizballah's leader argued that a popular 
resistance in south Lebanon, and not Lebanon's regular army, was necessary 
for Lebanon's national defence, and therefore 'any disarming of Hizballah or 
removing it from the south will mean that the Lebanese arena will be left open 
for the Israelis to do whatever they want.'879  
Hizballah encountered an even greater challenge to its status as an 
armed militia after Prime Minister Hariri's assassination by pro-Syrian 
elements in February 2005. The murder was the result of a crisis in the 
Lebanon-Syria relations that stemmed from Syria's meddling in Lebanese 
internal affairs. Apparently, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad pressured 
Lebanon to change its constitution to allow a three-year extension of the pro-
Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud. Prime Minister Hariri objected to 
such an amendment and was reportedly threatened by the Syrian President in a 
meeting that took place in August 2004: 'President Lahoud is me. Whatever I 
tell him, he follows suit. This extension is to happen or else I will break Lebanon 
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over your head…so you either do as you are told or we will get you and your 
family wherever you are.'880  
A UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004), which called for free and 
fair presidential election in Lebanon, for all remaining foreign forces to 
withdraw from Lebanon and for the disbanding and disarmament of all 
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, further escalated the already volatile 
atmosphere in Lebanon.881 Hariri's determination to stand against Syria's 
interventions in Lebanon as well as his support in UNSCR 1559 was the 
primary reason for his killing. The assassination generated domestic and 
international pressure on Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, and 
subsequently president al-Assad announced in early March 2005 Syria's 
disengagement from Lebanon.882 
With the Syrian's evacuation from Lebanon, Hizballah lost its political 
tutelage and questions were raised over its insistence on keeping its weapons. 
Lebanese prominent Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, became a fierce opponent of 
Hizballah's armed militia and a vocal representative of those who argued for its 
disarmament. In a call to Nasrallah in April 2005 he said that the 'war of 
liberation is over,' and therefore Hizballah 'should turn in [its] weapons and 
dismantle [its] "state-within-a-state", for no country in the world allows an 
irregular militia to take law and order duties along with its regular forces.'883 
Hizballah's reply was swift and clear. In a speech in May 2005, Nasrallah 
admitted that the organisation is 'eager to have peace, stability and national 
unity in Lebanon; we do not wish to attack anyone, and never have, and will 
also not allow anyone else to attack Lebanon.' However, he warned that if 
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anyone 'tries to disarm the resistance, we will fight him...[and] we will consider 
any hand that tries to seize our weapons as an Israeli hand and will cut it off.'884  
Despite Nasrallah's threats, without Syrian support to prevent Lebanese 
political parties to make decisions that could negatively affect Hizballah, the 
organisation was 'forced to move one step closer toward becoming an ordinary 
political party, by joining the executive cabinet.'885 In the 2005 parliamentary 
elections, Hizballah consolidated a partnership with its political rival Amal, 
known as the "March 8 Alliance", and together they won 35 seats in the 
National Assembly. The new Prime Minister, Fuad Siniora, who was leading the 
anti-Syrian "March 14 Alliance", appointed five ministers who owed their 
allegiance to Hizballah and Amal. Joining the government was seen as the final 
stage in the process of moderation. However, Sheikh Qassem explains that after 
the Syrian withdrawal Hizballah was 'directly responsible for providing the 
domestic protection in a better way than before,' and therefore could rely only 
itself now.886  
Clearly, Hizballah's increased involvement in the political system did not 
put an end to its armed conflict with Israel, as the outbreak of the Second 
Lebanon War in 2006 proves. Lebanese public opinion was outraged and 
blamed Hizballah for making a war and peace decision, traditionally the most 
fundamental right of a sovereign state, without consulting the government of 
which it was formally a part. Jumblat famously wrote that "Lebanon has been 
taken hostage by Hizballah", and that the organisation's unilateral decision to 
declare war with Israel 'put the Lebanese state, the only Arab democracy in the 
region, at risk.' He further noted that after the war there is an opportunity to 
dismantle Hizballah and 'to enhance Lebanese authority in the south, then all 
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over the country. This will deprive the Israelis of any pretext to attack us 
because of Hizballah.'887  
The calls against Hizballah's claim to hold weapons independently 
further invigorated the organisation to restore the pre-Hariri assassination 
consensus regarding its military apparatus. Consequently, Hizballah stepped up 
its political activism to force the elected government to resign. Berti asserts 
that in doing so, Hizballah's real objective was revealed: 'to obtain veto power 
in the cabinet so that it might block any decision that would compromise its 
military interests.'888 Recognising that its base of support comes from the 
streets, Nasrallah called on the masses to attend demonstrations in favour of a 
national unity government. At the same time, he toned down charges that 
Hizballah's weapons would be directed against the Lebanese people. In an 
interview held in August 2006, he said:  
Have we ever threatened the Lebanese? Have we ever used these 
weapons to wage a battle inside Lebanon? Have we ever used our 
weapons as a source of strength in municipal or parliamentary 
elections, or to impose certain shares or conditions? Never!889   
Soon after his calming words, Nasrallah acted differently when he 
initiated a political crisis in November 2006, after the government decided to 
call for an international tribunal for the investigation of Hariri's assassination. 
This was the first step in a political campaign to delegitimise the Lebanese 
government. As a result, Lebanon deteriorated into a crisis, during which the 
government was paralysed and could barely manage the state's affairs. 
Simultaneously, an inter-ethnic cycle of violence began with the assassinations 
of individuals from both camps.890 After months of failed attempts to elect a 
new president, the state drifted into a political deadlock. The tension and 
hostility climaxed in May 2008, after the government decided to shut down 
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Hizballah's independent telecommunication networks and dismiss Beirut's 
airport security chief, who was affiliated with Hizballah. Nasrallah responded 
that this step was equal to a declaration of war, and warned that 'we have a 
right to defend our existence from whoever declares and begins war with us, 
even if they are our brothers.'891  
A military confrontation was inevitable. On 8 May 2008, Hizballah 
fighters took arms and conquered the Sunni western parts of Beirut, while the 
Lebanese army stood aside unable to challenge Hizballah on the streets. Berti 
describes the the bloody clashes and scores of dead as 'the worst episode of 
violence since the civil war.'892 After a few days of armed engagement between 
the different sectarian groups, Hizballah gunmen were ordered to stand down 
and the army took control over the streets. Zisser concludes that Hizballah's 
move was calculated and proportionate, but the message was clear – Hizballah 
was able to crush the Lebanese system including taking over Beirut, but 
willingly refrained from doing so.893 Rival Lebanese leaders reached a 
reconciliation agreement, known as the "Doha Accord", which led to the 
election of Michel Suleiman as president and the creation of relative political 
stability.  
Although the deployment of its gunmen against the Sunni and Druze 
rival communities broke the taboo of not using its weapons against fellow 
Lebanese, Hizballah became the dominant political force in Lebanon. In the next 
parliamentary elections in November 2009, the "March 8 Alliance", headed by 
Hizballah, won 57 seats and although the rival alliance formed a government 
headed by Sa'ad Hariri (Rafik Hariri's son), the opposition received 15 
ministerial posts that gave Hizballah a de-facto veto. Azani argues that even 
though Hizballah-led opposition did not win a majority of votes, it 'had 
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succeeded in consolidating its power base within the Lebanese political system 
and had moved one step closer to its goal of taking control of Lebanon.'894  
In 2011 Hizballah ultimately succeeded in its mission, when Prime 
Minister Hariri's government was toppled after opposition ministers resigned 
over the intention of the international tribunal to name Hizballah members 
who were involved in his father's assassination. The shift in the political 
balance-of-power within the Lebanese parliament, gave the Hizballah-led 
alliance, for the first time, a majority of seats (68 out of a total of 128), which 
resulted in the appointment of Najib Mikati as the new prime minister. Mikati, a 
pro-Syrian Sunni businessman and former politician, was in effect Hizballah's 
candidate. In his first cabinet statement, held in July 2011, Mikati announced 
that his government adhered to Lebanon's right to use the army and the 
resistance – namely Hizballah – for ending Israel's occupation and to disarm 
Palestinian groups – and not Hizballah – residing in Lebanon.895  
Hizballah's policy of "walking on the edge" has proved itself successful in 
a way that it was able to transform its status from a terrorist and guerrilla 
organisation that rejects Lebanon's political system, into a legitimate political 
party that led the governing coalition since 2011. Hirst best summarises 
Hizballah's current status when he writes that the organisation continues to re-
arm, recruit and train on an unprecedented scale, remains the most capable and 
powerful military and political force in Lebanon.896 
 
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 
 Hizballah is a terrorist and guerrilla organisation that has been affected 
by international factors, and these greatly influenced its actions and behaviour. 
Evidently, pivotal events that impact the world order, most notably the 9/11 
attacks, had minimal effect on Hizballah. However, state sponsorship, namely 
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from Iran and Syria, and the involvement of international institutions with 
Hizballah and Lebanon-related matters, had significantly affected the 
organisation's strategy and attitude towards political integration.  
 In the aftermath of 9/11, the US implemented a neo-conservative 
strategy that was intended to transform the political, economic, religious and 
cultural environments of the Middle East. The raison d'être was that assisting 
Muslim states to adopt freedom and democracy, market capitalism, the rule of 
law and human rights, would turn them into peace-loving nations that no 
longer posed a threat to the US and its interests in the region.897  
A complementary strategy, known as the "War on Terror" was declared 
by American President George W. Bush, just days after the attacks: 'Our war on 
terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every 
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.'898 
Although Hizballah fits Bush's criteria, and has long been on the US list of 
terrorist groups, American military powers were directed neither towards the 
Shiite organisation nor its state sponsors, Iran and Syria.899 The 9/11 attacks 
did, however, emphasise Hizballah's terrorist nature, and additional states such 
as Canada, Australia, and several European nations, classified the organisation 
as a terrorist entity.900  
 In fact, the US welcomed Hizballah's participation in Lebanese politics. 
Byman explains that after the 9/11 attacks, the American administration hoped 
it: 
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…would set off a virtuous cycle, as Hizballah's continuing political 
success would depend on its ability to bring stability and 
prosperity to its Lebanese constituents instead of on its violent 
efforts against Israel and the United States.901  
The optimism demonstrated by the American desire to tame Hizballah 
through political participation, particularly in the post-9/11 period when 
unyielding counter-terrorism policy was implemented by states, had been 
shattered when Nasrallah said in an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper in 
November 2001:  
After September 11, the United States thought that we would be 
scared to death, so they sent us intermediaries with the hope that 
after September 11 we would be willing to give up what we had 
previously refused to…we need to stress that our options and 
positions have not changed after September 11, and will not 
change in the future from they were prior to September 11.902 
 Nonetheless, Hizballah was fully aware of the risk of being labeled as a 
terrorist organisation in the post-9/11 international environment. 
Consequently, it tried to shrug off accusations of its involvement in the attacks, 
by condemning al-Qaeda and strongly denying any links to attacks against 
American interests. Instead, Hizballah highlighted that its military actions are 
confined to the Israel-Lebanon-Palestinian conflict.903  
But in reality Hizballah did not limit its operations to Israel and the 
Palestinian territories. In its eyes, the American invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, in 2001 and 2003 respectively, and the Israeli re-conquering of the West 
Bank in 2002 under US tacit approval, confirmed Hizballah's convictions that 
the US and Israel 'are preparing for a showdown against the Muslims in the 
region,' and therefore 'this conspiracy calls for a maximum effort of resistance 
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and Jihad.'904 Evidently, Hizballah remained loyal to its ideology and long after 
the 9/11 attacks it continued its military conflict with Israel and provided 
assistance to the Jihadist movements in Iraq that were fighting the American-
led forces. Hizballah embarked on these missions when it was already part of 
the Lebanese executive cabinet, a fact that according to American analysts 
should have moderated Hizballah's objectives and strategy.  
  While the 9/11 attacks did not significantly affect Hizballah's attitudes 
towards military confrontation, any change in the geo-strategic position of its 
sponsors, Iran and Syria, has a direct impact on its behaviour inside and outside 
Lebanon. Both states, which are considered as part of a radical alliance, 
perceive Hizballah as a strategic asset and an effective tool to achieve their 
national security and political objectives. Since Hizballah has been used for 
years as their proxy, its ability to make independent decisions is limited and it 
had to coordinate its policy and actions with its state-sponsors.905 In return for 
its services at the behest of its patrons, Hizballah enjoys financial assistance, 
strong political backing, logistical and training support and supply of advanced 
weapons that allow it to maintain its superiority within Lebanon and to 
seriously challenge Israel's qualitative military advantage.  
 The symbiotic relations between Hizballah and its sponsors have been 
comprehensively investigated and discussed. However, in an era when the 
phenomenon of states that sponsor terrorism is significantly declining, the 
question of what would become of Hizballah without its Iranian and Syrian 
support is under-researched. In the Middle East's current political atmosphere, 
famously known as the "Arab Spring", it is not unimaginable that Hizballah's 
ties with Iran and Syria will be severed. Iran and Syria, together and separately, 
are facing tremendous challenges to the nature and existence of their regime 
that remove Hizballah from their list of top strategic priorities. 
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 Commonalities between Iran and Hizballah have been thoroughly 
studied, namely strong religious ideology combined with radical strategy that 
uses violence and political manipulation to achieve their objectives. The robust 
and durable relations between the two Shiite entities led to impressive 
achievements that, according to Ely Karmon, could not have been materialised 
if not for American, European and Israeli 'lack of strategic vision and/or 
political courage and their resultant botched counter-terrorism strategies.'906 
Yet, no matter how strong and successful the relations are, in the case of Iran, 
there are at least two plausible scenarios in which the patron will stop 
sponsoring its client: either because it cannot do so anymore or Hizballah will 
decide to prefer the Lebanese over the Iranian agenda.   
Since 2003 the world's attention has been directed towards Iran's 
nuclear programme. As part of a broad effort to prevent Iran from developing 
an atomic bomb, numerous international sanctions have been imposed, aimed 
at pressuring the Iranian regime to suspend its enrichment and other nuclear-
related activities. The sanctions mainly forbid exports of petroleum products, 
sales of military equipment, proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, 
business dealings with several Iranian banks, as well as impose travel ban and 
asset freezing against key Iranian individuals and companies. Although in the 
past, Iranian leaders repeatedly denounced the sanctions 'as desperate 
measures doomed to fail or backfire,' by the end of 2012 government officials 
already admitted that sanctions are having an effect on Iran's economy.907 Also 
according to the International Monetary Fund, financial indicators suggest that 
'Iran's economy has gone into recession for the first time in two decades,' and 
consequently Iranian President Ahmadinejad 'seems terminally weakened by 
his handling of the crisis.'908  
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Now that it is clear the sanctions have taken their toll, the annual multi-
million-dollars aid that Iran has been providing Hizballah since the 1980s is no 
longer guaranteed. Reports from late 2011 suggest that Iran already informed 
Hizballah that due to its commitment to support the Syrian regime and its own 
failing economy, it will not be able to provide the annual financial backing to 
the organisation, which is estimated in approximately $350 million (other 
estimations are between $100-$150 million).909 Under such circumstances, 
Hizballah would be compelled to rely on its own sources of income, mainly 
extensive fundraising apparatus that includes both legitimate religious and 
social charities, illegal drug trafficking, currency counterfeiting and trading 
African "Blood diamonds".910  
Undoubtedly, the funding issue is an important pillar in the Iran-
Hizballah relationship. The generous financial support not only assisted in 
developing army-like capabilities, but also contributed amply to the steady 
increase of Hizballah's popularity.911 It is reasonable to argue that without 
similar Iranian investments in Hizballah, the benefits for the latter from the 
long-standing relations with Iran would be considerably diminished. Equally, 
Hizballah's level of commitment to Iran would be far less obligating.       
Another possible opportunity for Hizballah to renounce its loyalty to 
Iran is in the event that Lebanon's national interests contradict Iran's potential 
desire to use Hizballah. The most plausible scenario for Hizballah to launch a 
military campaign on behalf of Iran is in retaliation for an air-strike against its 
nuclear, military and strategic installations, either by the US or Israel. 
Currently, it seems that an American attack is probable should the diplomatic 
negotiations fail. American President Barak Obama threatened in March 2012 
that it would be 'a profound national-security interest of the United States to 
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prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon,' and warned that 'when the United 
States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what 
we say.'912  
Bearing in mind the lethality of a possible strike against Iran, it is 
reasonable to assume that Iran would be compelled to respond with every 
available means. In such a case, it is commonly believed that Hizballah would be 
ordered by Iran to retaliate on its behalf by launching massive barrages of 
rockets onto Israel. Blanford supports this argument pointing that the billions 
of dollars that Iran provided Hizballah was not an 'altruistic gift,' and that in 
return Iran uses Hizballah as 'a bridgehead on Israel's northern border, 
enhancing its deterrence posture and expanding its retaliatory options in the 
event of an attack on the Islamic Republic.'913 Hence, after an attack on Iran, 
Hizballah would be expected to abide by the Supreme Leader's request and 
justify, in actions, the many years of financial support and weapons deliveries 
from Iran.  
However, Hizballah in the second decade of the 21st century is a very 
different organisation than the one of the last decade of the 20th century. Due to 
its current political standing in Lebanon, it is not certain that it would 
automatically meet Iran's expectations. The Shiite organisation is no longer 'the 
ragtag Iranian proxy militia,' but has grown into 'the dominant political and 
military actor in Lebanon,' with distinct national and commercial interests.914 
Therefore, Hizballah is unlikely to sacrifice its future for Iran's political and 
regional aspirations and risk dragging Lebanon and its people, yet again, into 
another war with Israel, which would possibly inflict irrecoverable damage to 
the organisation. This notion was supported by a senior IDF intelligence officer, 
who stated in March 2013 that if Israel or the US would attack Iran's nuclear 
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facilities, Hizballah would not automatically retaliate against Israel. In his view, 
Hizballah is:  
A Lebanese-Arab-Muslim organisation operating in a multi-
religious state. It is not only a military organisation but also a 
political one, and therefore it never acts automatically. It is not 
subordinate to the Iranian Supreme Leader, and its portrayal as 
another Iranian division is wholly inaccurate.915     
The issues of Hizballah's loyalty and its Iranian identity have been a 
source of dispute for many years among the Lebanese people. As part of the 
"Lebanonisation" process that Hizballah underwent in the 1990s and the early 
2000s, it invested great efforts to convince the Lebanese public opinion that it 
is, first and foremost, an autonomous national organisation committed above 
all for safeguarding Lebanon's interests. Nasrallah told the Lebanese daily 
newspaper Al-Safir in 2006, that he does not 'need to make Hizballah more 
Lebanese than it already is,' since its members demonstrated the 'highest form 
of patriotism' when they shed their blood for the 'land, the motherland, and the 
people.'916 Nowadays, when Hizballah is a legitimate and influential member in 
Lebanon's cabinet, it holds certain responsibilities to promote the interests of 
the Lebanese people and state. No matter how deep Iranian ideology is instilled 
in its members, the organisation is comprised of Lebanese citizens, operates on 
Lebanese land, and is committed to Lebanon as its homeland. Even the 
historical ties with Iran cannot undermine Hizballah's loyalty to its 
constituency.  
The case of Syria's support to Hizballah is slightly different, yet it is no 
less important for Hizballah's current political and military dominance in 
Lebanon. Contrary to Iranian interest in having a Shiite proxy in Lebanon, 
Syria's claim to a foothold in Lebanon dates back to the Ottoman Empire. Once 
under single territory known as Greater Syria, with the fall of the Empire the 
territory was divided and Syria and Lebanon were turned into separate 
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countries that gained independence from France in the 1940s. Ever since, both 
states have had strained relations that were derived from Syria's refusal to 
recognise Lebanon's sovereignty. The fact that official diplomatic ties between 
the two states were established, for the first time, in October 2008, proves the 
turbulent affairs throughout the years.917  
In June 1976 Syria sent its troops into Lebanon, at the request of the 
Lebanese president, to assist in restoring law and order, after armed clashes 
between Christian and Muslim militias erupted a year before. Yet, soon 
afterwards Syria turned its allegiance against the Christians and allied with the 
Palestinians and Shiites.918 The Syrian presence in Lebanon remained for nearly 
30 years, and President Hafez al-Assad effectively controlled Lebanon, 
politically and economically, through his forces on the ground. During this time, 
Syria brokered the "Taif Agreement" which ended the civil war and established 
itself as the de-facto ruler of Lebanon. Although Hizballah initially objected to 
the agreement, it accommodated itself to the reality of the Pax Syriana. In 
return for its pragmatism it was exempted from being dismantled and was 
allowed to maintain its status as the only armed resistance organisation in 
Lebanon.919 Clearly, while Hizballah's loyalty to Iran lies in the shared ideology 
and strategy, its relations with Syria are a result of a rational concession born 
out of necessity.  
Unlike Iran, Syria has neither a revolutionary vision to export nor a 
wealthy economy that is based on oil and gas revenues. What it did have plenty 
of, at least until the mid-2000s, was political control over Lebanon and 
advanced weapons. In the developing relations, Hizballah offered Syria an 
effective and lethal low-intensity tool to be used as part of its intractable 
conflict with Israel, and in return Syria provided political backing and Russian-
manufactured advanced weapons. Also, Syria served as a strategic bridgehead 
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connecting Iran to Hizballah, and facilitated deliveries of more weapons, money 
and aid from the Islamic Republic.920  
Similar to Hizballah's problem with Iran's that stem from the latter's 
current geo-political situation, its relations with Syria are also in danger. 
Specifically, the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in mid-2005 and the 
on-going civil war in Syria that poses an imminent threat to al-Assad's regime, 
may leave Hizballah, for the first time, without the backing of a state-sponsor.  
Following the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005, 
domestic and international pressure forced Syria to pull out its forces from 
Lebanon. Hizballah mobilised its supporters to prevent such a move, knowing 
well that should Syria leave Lebanon it will lose its political and military 
backing. Just days after the assassination, Nasrallah spoke in a crowded rally 
and thanked the Syrian army for standing by Lebanon's side against Israeli 
invasions. He personally referred to President al-Assad: 'your presence in 
Lebanon is not material or military; you are present in our hearts and souls, 
and in our past, present, and future. No one can expel Syria from Lebanon, or 
from the Lebanese people's minds, hearts, and future.'921  
Despite Hizballah's efforts to maintain Syria's presence in Lebanon, the 
demand of anti-Syrian Lebanese and international pressure were stronger. 
Contrary to its fears, Hizballah benefitted from the pull out of Syrian forces 
from Lebanon: it became much more independent in planning its next moves 
and executing its actions; and it was free from Syrian efforts to limit its popular 
and political growth. The geographical distance between Beirut and Damascus 
not only allowed Hizballah more flexibility on the ground, but also removed 
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Syria's ability to put pressure on and threaten Hizballah if it goes astray from 
its regional strategy.922  
Evidently, Hizballah wisely used the absence of Syria to assimilate itself 
into Lebanon's power structure, and invested more resources to increase its 
base of support. It is not surprising then, that between 2005 and 2011, 
Hizballah was able to transform itself from an opposition party in the 
parliament, into the leading political force in the state that controls the 
executive branch.  
The recent Syrian uprising, which began in March 2011, is a more 
challenging problem for Hizballah since it might lead to a regime change that 
will cut off entirely the patron-client relations. The uprising, which by now has 
deteriorated into a full-scale civil war, is a result of popular unrest that spread 
across the Arab world since December 2010. The disappointment with the 
political, economic and social position of their states led protestors to take to 
the streets and demanded significant improvement in their quality of life. 
Thanks to Syria's strict security measures and the loyalty of the army, President 
al-Assad was able to keep its "kingdom at silence", at least during the first 
months.923 However, the people's will was stronger than its president's, and 
bloody armed clashes broke out that already cost the lives of more than a 
hundred thousand people. The number of casualties will grow exponentially if 
chemical and biological weapons will be used again by the Syrian army against 
the rebels.     
The situation in Syria puts Hizballah in a complex dilemma. On the one 
hand, to maintain its power in Lebanon it needs Syria's political assistance and 
supply of weapons. On the other hand, openly supporting al-Assad, particularly 
in a period that Arab citizens are protesting against the tyranny and corruption 
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of their autocratic regimes, could considerably reduce Hizballah's popularity 
among Lebanese. After carefully weighing his options, it seems that Nasrallah 
chose to prevent a sectarian anti-Shiite backlash and isolation of Hizballah, and 
implicitly called for al-Assad to lay down his arms, stop targeting civilians and 
seek a political solution.924 At the same time, it sent its combatants to assist the 
Syrian army against the rebels. Acknowledging the risks of being associated 
with al-Assad's ruthless campaign against his own people, Hizballah 
increasingly struggled to conceal the fact that it had been providing to the 
Syrian army training and extensive logistical support and that its fighters were 
part of the regime's "killing machine".925  
Under these circumstances, it would be reasonable for Hizballah to opt 
for saving its constituency at home and sacrifice its long-time Syrian ally who is 
perceived by Arabs and the world as a cruel dictator who is killing his people 
and his days in office are numbered. While Hizballah could afford losing Syria at 
its side, it cannot survive without its domestic political power and public 
support.   
Lastly, despite its formidable political and military powers, Hizballah is 
not immune to international intervention. As such, UN decisions that affected 
Lebanon's political stability and security situation, had also significant impact 
on Hizballah's standing and actions. Most notable is the issue of Hizballah 
disarmament, which is not only part of Lebanon's political discourse, but also a 
source for great international concern. Consequently, several UN Security 
Council resolutions called for the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and 
non-Lebanese militias, but were actually targeting Hizballah.926 Furthermore, 
UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, expressed in several occasions his concern 
that Hizballah still retains its independent armed capabilities, which by now far 
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exceeds those of the state. In January 2012, while visiting Lebanon, he said: 'I 
am deeply concerned about the military capability of Hizballah and the lack of 
progress in disarmament...all these arms outside the authorised state authority, 
it's not acceptable.'927 
Expectedly, Hizballah denounces the legitimacy of such resolutions and 
repeatedly claims that the decision to disarm the organisation should only be 
made through a national dialogue between Lebanon's community leaders, who 
will determine the state's national defence strategy. In a speech in March 2005, 
Nasrallah publicly declared, that:  
…we are here to reject resolution 1559 and defend the resistance, 
the option of resistance, and the duty and weapons of the 
resistance...If democracy is synonymous with majority opinion, 
then the majority here [in Lebanon] rejects Resolution 1559.928 
 Furthermore, Nasrallah exploits the fact that a weak and divided 
Lebanese government would not assume responsibility to implement any UN 
resolutions, which allows Hizballah to continue receiving weapons from Syria 
and Iran without any interference. Even the UNIFIL peacekeeping force 
stationed in south Lebanon since 1978 could not do anything to prevent 
Hizballah's re-arming. Although, theoretically UNIFIL holds the necessary 
manpower and means to stop the supply of weapons to Hizballah, this task it is 
not officially included in its mandate without the consent of the Lebanese 
government. Clearly, UNIFIL has no desire to confront Hizballah militarily, since 
it would probably lead to casualties, which the contributing states will not 
tolerate.929     
The second international decision that indirectly refers to Hizballah is 
the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (SLT), under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1595 (2005), to investigate the assassination of Prime 
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Minister Hariri.930 From its outset, it was clear to all parties involved that 
referring the investigation to an international body would cause political 
instability in Lebanon. The SLT came into effect after a preliminary UN 
investigative report published in October 2005, determined that 'there is 
converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this 
terrorist attack.'931 Following the report, Prime Minister Siniora requested the 
establishment of the international tribunal. 
Both the UN resolution and the establishment of the SLT pose a great 
risk for Hizballah. Besides the obvious public rejection, the organisation was 
forced to act to prevent any concrete effects on its status. The path that 
Hizballah chose was not to deal with the international actors responsible for 
the intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs, rather to deepen its political 
participation within the government to have a better control over decisions 
that might relinquish its power. However, when Hizballah realised that there 
are matters that it cannot influence even while in the government, it turned 
against the SLT. Clearly, Hizballah did not want international prosecutors 
asking questions that their answers might contribute to its demise.932  
In response to the SLT approval, in November 2006 Nasrallah ordered 
the five Shiite ministers to resign from their governmental positions. The 
resignation was the ostensible reason for Lebanon's deterioration into a 
political turmoil. For almost two years Prime Minister Siniora's government 
was dysfunctional and the institutional crisis led to growing tensions and 
hostility that eventually exploded in the armed clashes in May 2008. Although 
Hizballah proved its political power and ability to effectively control the 
government, the SLT's work continued to its dismay.933 In a last effort to stop 
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Lebanese cooperation with the STL, Nasrallah appealed to his public and asked 
them:  
…to boycott those investigators and refrain from cooperating 
with them because all that is presented is passed to the 
Israelis...Continued cooperation helps to desecrate the country 
and assaults the resistance.934  
Despite the efforts, in January 2011 the STL published its intention to 
indict several people in Hariri's murder. At that stage, their names remained 
confidential, but media speculations suggested that they might be of Hizballah 
members. Since Prime Minister Sa'ad Hariri refused to convene the cabinet to 
discuss the ways to deal with the indictments, Hizballah staged another 
walkout of its ministers that led to the fall of his government.935  
In June 2011 the names were finally revealed, and as speculated earlier, 
they were of Hizballah members. As expected, Hizballah refused to hand them 
over to the SLT 'not even in 300 years' as Nasrallah vowed. Yet, knowing that 
Lebanon is in a very fragile political situation, he promised that there will not 
be a civil war 'because there is a responsible government in Lebanon that will 
not act with revenge.'936 Nevertheless, the indictment of Hizballah members 
and the international pressure on the organisation to extradite them and to 
disarm its weapons put a heavy burden on its shoulders.     
For the above reasons, Hizballah is a source for great international 
interest. In several western states, mainly the US and its allies, Hizballah is 
considered as the main problem to the institutional instability in Lebanon in 
the past two decades. Nevertheless, no direct action has been taken to solve the 
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"Hizballah problem". Under the insightful leadership of Nasrallah, Hizballah 
recognises that the international battlefield should not be fought across the 
ocean, but rather inside Lebanon. As such, Hizballah is working tirelessly to 
increase its political stronghold and at the same time to boost its popularity 
among Shiites and non-Shiites in Lebanon. Hizballah realises that in the face of 
heavy international pressure, no decision that will harm its status could be 
made, if the Lebanese people would stand by its side.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Hizballah is, by all means, a fascinating example in the study of terrorist 
organisations' integration into political systems. Although its background, 
ideology and strategy have been heavily researched, an in-depth analysis that 
combines organisational, domestic and international factors, provides a 
coherent tale as to how and why Hizballah is enjoying the best of both worlds. 
On one hand, it gained enough legitimate political power to appoint a Lebanese 
Prime Minister, while on the other, there is no domestic or external power that 
is capable or willing to disarm its weapons. Nonetheless, since Hizballah 
remains heavily involved in the Syrian civil war, plays some part in Iran's 
dialogue with the international community (though mostly indirect) and is 
facing criticism from its political rivals over its separate armed capabilities, the 
next few years could be very significant for the organisation's future course of 
action. As such, the extent of the impact of these issues is difficult to foresee and 
thus, instead of making predictions this study will outline and analyse possible 
scenarios for future political integration.  
Examination of the organisational factors that affected Hizballah's 
transformation from violence to politics must be viewed in the context of 
Lebanon's political culture and the powerlessness of the Shiite community in 
the state's confessional government. The establishment of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran enabled Hizballah to find its voice and begin its life as a resistance 
organisation as well as an alternative route to power for the Shiites in Lebanon. 




revolutionary doctrine, and specifically the religious narratives of wilayat al-
faqih and violent Jihad, in the last two decades Hizballah undoubtedly 
underwent extraordinary changes.  
As part of its efforts to appeal to wider constituencies and tighten its 
grip on Lebanon's political system, since 1992 Hizballah downplays its 
fundamental Islamic conviction. Although the duty of establishing an Islamic 
state as 'the natural expression of allegiance for any committed Muslim' is still 
valid, practically Hizballah recognises that such a development requires a 
proper accommodating foundation that the Lebanese people lack, and therefore 
they are 'free to choose their governing system and bear the responsibility for 
such choice.'937  
Giving up one of its fundamental ideological narratives does not mean 
that Hizballah is wholeheartedly transforming its violent nature. Hizballah 
remains adamant to remind the Lebanese people that it is the only armed force 
in the state that can protect them from Israeli future attacks and deter Israel 
from invading Lebanon again. To that end, Hizballah perpetuates the territorial 
dispute with Israel that provides it with a rightful claim to stockpile and use 
arms. A peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel is probably Hizballah's 
worst nightmare, as it strips the Shiite organisation of its justification to 
preserve its exclusive resistance status and legitimacy to use violence against 
Lebanon's enemies.  
In its application of violence Hizballah demonstrated innovative, yet no 
less lethal, tactics that involve the use of advanced weapons. The use of 
coordinated suicide attacks against embassies, military barracks and public 
centres, massive barrages of rockets and missiles onto civilian areas, and 
abduction of foreign nationals inside and outside Lebanon, is certainly unique 
in the history of terrorism. At the same time, its fire power could not be 
compared to any other armed non-state actor. In a US Congress hearing held 
after the Second Lebanon War, one expert testified that 'perhaps more than any 
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other terrorist organization, Hezbollah is highly skilled at getting results using 
terrorism.'938  
Clearly, Hizballah recognises the potential destructive power of its 
weapons. Therefore, it maintains a rigid command and control structure aimed 
at avoiding any unauthorized attacks that might lead not only to unintended 
casualties, but mainly to political and international pressures that could 
jeopardise Hizballah's interests and objectives. The combination of careful 
planning and surgical execution of armed attacks with advanced weapons and 
well-trained and devoted fighters greatly contributes to Hizballah's deterrence 
capability.  
 In order to maintain its status as an independent armed organisation 
and not being forced to disband and to hand the weapons over to Lebanon's 
army, Hizballah needs to maintain some level of conflict with Israel. Any signs 
of rapprochement between Israel and Lebanon may risk Hizballah's distinctive 
status. Therefore, it uses every opportunity to remind the Lebanese people of 
the devilish nature of the neighbouring Zionist state and denies its right to 
exist. In Nasrallah's view, 'Israel is an illegal and usurper entity built on false 
pretence, on massacres, and on delusions, and has therefore no chance of 
survival.'939  
Similarly, Hizballah uses virulent rhetoric against the US. According to 
Matthew Levitt, Hizballah distributed video tapes in which men vowed to 
detonate themselves to cause the earth to shake under the feet of Americans, 
chanting "death to America" and promising that the spirit of Jihad still exists in 
their hearts.940 Contrary to the hopes of statesmen and the assertions of 
scholars, active participation in Lebanon's political process did not moderate 
Hizballah's views of Israel and the US. While in many other areas Hizballah 
accepts and adheres to the rules of the "political game", the incitement and 
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aggression towards the Little and Great Devils go beyond the mainstream 
discourse.  
Perhaps the one organisational factor that stands out as missing in 
Hizballah's integration process into Lebanon's political system is the lack of 
competition from other dominant and rival Shiite organisations. Hizballah itself 
was founded as a result of an ideological disagreement within the Amal 
movement that fragmented the Shiite community in Lebanon. Soon after it 
broke off, Hizballah became more radical and powerful and succeeded in 
gaining ground, political influence and members at the expanse of Amal.941 
Since then, Hizballah had not been seriously challenged by other Shiite factions 
that may pose a threat to its political and public prominence.  
Nonetheless, Hizballah cannot allow itself to sit idly by when facing such 
geo-political turbulences in Lebanon and the entire region. Should internal 
disagreements occur, for instance over the stand that the organisation adopts in 
relation to the Syrian civil war, it could possibly lead to a split in the 
organisation's ranks and the establishment of a rival group. Since Hizballah 
already faced the danger of an internal split, over the question of whether to 
participate in the 1992 elections, but managed to survive, its leaders are closely 
monitoring any signs that indicate ideological and strategic disagreements and 
may surface. Nowadays, it seems that Hizballah is bent on resolving such 
differences "in-house", while presenting a unified front and consistent agenda 
to its members and supporters. Yet, at the pace and intensity of the ongoing 
events and process in the Middle-East, it is difficult to predict if Hizballah would 
be able to retain its position as the most powerful Shiite grassroots 
organisation for long. 
Finally, it is clear that Hizballah's political prominence could not have 
been achieved without understanding the importance of public support. Almost 
every aspect of Hizballah's decisions and actions is viewed through the effect 
that it would have on its popularity. Soon after it was established, Hizballah 
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aimed at garnering the support, first and foremost, of the Shiite community 
(though not exclusively) in Lebanon by investing substantial resources in social 
infrastructure and welfare services.942 By offering and providing financial aid, 
medical care, education, vocational training and employment, services that the 
state was unable or unwilling to supply, Hizballah became the most effective 
and efficient political and social organisation in Lebanon.943        
Parallel to operating its vast social and public network, Hizballah uses a 
wide range of communication methods to reach out to audiences that are 
beyond Lebanon's geographic borders. The organisation operates several 
media outlets and internet websites that disseminate its ideology and 
messages, recruit new members, bolster public support and even raise funds. 
Such a communication network is one of the most important assets of Hizballah 
(alongside its weapons arsenal), and it would protect it at almost any cost as 
this is the organisation's main channel to promote and expand its influence.  
When it comes to the domestic level, it is clear that Israel's security 
policy had greatly influenced Hizballah's current political and military status. In 
fact, Israel's short-sighted strategy as well as operational and tactical blunders 
in dealing with Hizballah, contributed to its elevation to the status of Lebanon's 
most powerful organisation.  
Indeed, as much as Hizballah needs Israel to prolong its position as a 
resistance organisation, Israel wishes to remove it from its list of enemies. As 
long as the Shiite organisation exists it will be a constant reminder for Israel's 
colossal failure in dealing with the "Hizballah problem". First and foremost, 
Israel has been ineffective in designing an articulated policy framework as well 
as clearly defining its security and political interests that have to be preserved 
when contending with the Shiite organisation. Essentially, this led to a limited, 
reactive and ambiguous strategy towards Hizballah that mostly neglected 
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political solutions to the conflict.944 According to Dror, Israel’s policy in regards 
to Hizballah in particular and Lebanon in general, represents a systematic 
failure in which a set of actions leads to even worse ones. This stems from a 
lack of a grand-strategy that is the basis for significant decisions required to 
impact the processes that without any intervention, will harm Israel's interests 
and objectives.945 
Israel's strategic blindness began with the establishment of the "Security 
Zone", which served as its Maginot Line. Instead of implementing an aggressive 
approach, Israel conveniently chose the option of military entrenchment that 
provided Hizballah's stand-off weapons large, static and vulnerable targets. 
This approach represented the government's reluctance to actively pursue 
Hizballah fighters outside the "Security Zone" that could cost the lives of many 
soldiers.946 However, clustering behind fortified outposts did not prevent 
casualties. Hizballah's attrition and the mounting number of dead Israelis led, 
once again, to a misconception that a unilateral withdrawal would provide 
Israel both legitimacy to respond to Hizballah provocations and an opportunity 
to re-gain its deterrence.  
The idea of a withdrawal originated from the changes in the Israeli 
public consciousness that deemed the heavy death toll unnecessary when 
compared to the strategic value of Israeli presence on Lebanese soil.947 Despite 
the concerns that evacuating Lebanon without an agreement would leave 
northern Israel vulnerable to barrage of rockets, disrupt the citizen's daily lives 
and be perceived as if the IDF is running away or surrendering to terrorism, 
political considerations triumphed. 
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In May 2000 Israel unilaterally withdrew its forces from Lebanon, an act 
that was congratulated by the international community and was approved by 
the UN Secretary-General.948 In theory, Israel's move should have removed 
Hizballah's legitimacy to independently hold arms as there was no more 
Lebanese land to liberate from the hands of foreign occupation. However, 
instead of using the withdrawal to end the Lebanon-Israeli conflict, Hizballah is 
clinging to the disputed Shebba Farms as its primary reason for continuing its 
attacks on Israel, and for that the organisation has to maintain its weapons.  
In response to Hizballah's continuous attacks, Israel adopted the 
containment strategy, later heavily criticised by a parliamentary inquiry 
committee, which concluded that although a legitimate policy decision, 
containment could lead an army to a tactical and operational system paralysis. 
Evidently, the containment strategy failed to prevent the 2006 Second Lebanon 
War. Hizballah's audacious attack provided Israel with the opportunity to re-
shape its security strategy towards the organisation and to respond 
aggressively. Yet, the IDF's poor military performance raised doubts regarding 
the effectiveness of such strategy against Hizballah. The official inquiry 
commission set up by the Israeli executive branch, concluded in April 2007 that 
in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole 
range of options to achieve its declared objectives. By and large, this failure 
reflects a weakness in strategic thinking.949  
Many Israeli decision-makers, both politicians and senior ranking 
military officers, wish that Hizballah would somehow disappear off the face of 
the earth. However, their policies from the early 1980s onwards have directly 
contributed to Hizballah's current status. On one hand, Israel was unable to 
offer any political alternative to convince Hizballah, its supporters or the 
Lebanese government that their objectives could be better served through 
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peaceful means. On the other hand, refusing to deal with Hizballah politically 
and insisting on using strictly military power, provided it with the legitimacy 
and justification to acquire and operate independent armed capabilities outside 
the reach of the Lebanese state. Hizballah's achievements on the battlefield, and 
specifically Israel's unilateral withdrawal which was perceived as the single 
greatest military achievement of an Arab entity against the IDF, further 
reinforced its political status and popularity among the various ethnic 
communities in Lebanon and across the Middle-East. Undoubtedly, the 
thousands of advanced weapons ready-to-be-used on demand in the hands of a 
legitimate political party are evidence that past Israeli strategies to let them 
rust in storage had failed miserably. 
Lebanon's political approach towards Hizballah is similar to Israel's in 
the sense that it relies solely on one alternative – accommodating Hizballah 
without developing any effective leverage against it. Since Hizballah entered 
politics in 1992, successive Lebanese governments refused to truly challenge it, 
although the risk posed by its armed capabilities was visible to all. From the 
outset Hizballah understood that only a Lebanese government backed by the 
people and significant international pressure could force the organisation to 
give up its weapons and to totally adhere to political means. To make sure that 
this will not happen, Hizballah constantly attempted to increase its influence 
within the political system in order to be able to actively shape the decision-
making process.  
Until 2005 Hizballah felt relatively safe in the Lebanese balance-of-
power and was able to maintain its political power while keeping its weapons. 
However, the pressure mounted gradually after the Hariri's assassination and 
the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and peaked in the Second Lebanon War, 
which began with a Hizballah provocation and almost dragged the entire 
Middle-East into a regional war. Although it was not defeated militarily by 
Israel, a closer look suggests that the war may prove to be as a Pyrrhic victory 




disarmament, Hizballah was compelled to 'take another unwanted but 
necessary step into the unforgiving morass of Lebanese politics.'950  
The public criticism after the war and the fear of a governmental 
decision to disarm Hizballah were the most important factors that directly 
influenced the organisation's political perspective. Nowadays, Hizballah is more 
involved in Lebanese politics and has more responsibility, and therefore it 
would be much more difficult for it to drag Lebanon into another war against 
Israel. The significance of such a position is momentous as it could signal the 
beginning of the end of Hizballah as a resistance organisation.   
Investigation of the impact of the international system on Hizballah's 
political integration reveals that the decline in state-sponsorship and external 
intervention plays an important role in its decision and actions. First and 
foremost, Hizballah remains dependent upon Syria's and Iran's political, 
military, financial and logistical support. The collapse of the Syrian state is a 
devastating blow to Hizballah's strategic alliance, and the organisation is trying 
to salvage whatever it can from its ailing patron, namely advanced weapons 
and perhaps even chemical agents.  
Evidently, Hizballah's political power in Lebanon is currently 
diminishing since it has decided to support the Syrian President and to send its 
combatants to aid his army in its war against the rebels. Indeed, many Lebanese 
blame Hizballah for recklessness and for 'acting as a pawn of Iran and Syria,' 
and these could certainly lead to a loss of credibility and eventually to its 
desolation.951 Others in Lebanon wonder why Hizballah, which was established 
as a resistance organisation against Israel, is using its formidable power to 
suppress a popular rebellion of fellow Arab brothers against a tyrant.952 
However, the imminent fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime could also be an 
opportunity for Hizballah to strengthen its position as a Lebanese organisation 
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operating within a multi-religious state, and to reaffirm a more local and less 
externally-directed approach.  
Hizballah's relations with Iran are more complex and under different 
circumstances could pose a genuine threat to its survival. It seems that 
Hizballah was quick to analyse the geo-strategic situation in the Middle-East, 
and specifically the problematic position of Iran, and despite Iran's strong 
religious and operational influence, the Lebanese-Shiite organisation gradually 
blurs the Iranian authority and emphasises its commitment to Lebanon. 
Although Iran remains a central element in Hizballah's life, in the current 
organisational, domestic and international circumstances, it downplays Iran's 
role in its public statements and makes relatively scarce mention of it.953 
The most important issue that could jeopardise Iran-Hizballah relations 
is the former's nuclear ambitions and their implications. Many analysts and 
Middle East experts state their fears that should Iran build a nuclear weapon, it 
could implement an even more aggressive foreign policy, touch off a regional 
nuclear arms-race and also provide such a capability to its terrorist proxies, 
most notably to Hizballah.954 Therefore, an international campaign, headed by 
the US, was launched to delay, and hopefully halt, Iran's nuclear programme. 
Although Iran claims that the sanctions are futile, indicators prove that Iran's 
economic and financial stability is deteriorating. Clearly the sanctions greatly 
affect Iran's financial liquidity, and therefore in such an escalating economic 
crisis Iran would probably not be able to provide Hizballah with "boxes of cash-
money", as it previously did.955 Phillips points out that Hizballah has already 
taken steps to become more financially self-sufficient, thus acknowledging that 
Iran's material support would not last forever.956  
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Finally, it is apparent that despite its political power and popularity 
Hizballah is not strong enough to prevent international intervention in 
Lebanon's internal affairs. Even though Hizballah fiercely opposed the 
establishment of the special tribunal to investigate the assassination of Prime 
Minister Hariri, and attempted to mobilise its supporters to pressure the 
government to reject such a decision, it ultimately failed. Instead of using 
armed capabilities to prevent the implementation of the decision (as it did in 
2008), Hizballah took a different path and chose to deepen its political 
participation within the government. Such an action represents a political 
wisdom that may prove beneficial in Hizballah's transformation from violence 
to politics.     
In conclusion, a closer analysis of the impact of the factors, dynamics 
and circumstances leading to its political integration reveals that Hizballah 
skillfully managed to adapt to the surrounding reality and promote its political 
interests at any given point in time. Consequently, Hizballah succeeded in 
branding itself as a legitimate political party in Lebanon's democratic political 
system that maintains a resistance movement. It seems that there is a place for 
relative optimism that Hizballah will completely abandon violence if it 
continues to hold significant political power. As a member of the serving 
government, Hizballah is sharing the responsibility for the political and socio-
economic well-being of its electorate and therefore its daily activities are not 
directed at fighting Israel. Without the Lebanese public support, Hizballah will 
not survive for long only as a resistance organisation. Clearly the Jihadist 
element infused in Hizballah is a strong attracting feature, yet in order to 
maintain its prominence the organisation has to offer additional non-military 
incentives for its people.  
Becoming entwined in politics forced Hizballah to demonstrate a more 
pragmatic approach to violence. It believed that a degree of flexibility must be 
accepted in the face of the changing political environment in Lebanon and the 
region. In Hizballah's view, failing to participate in the political scene could lead 




ranks of Hizballah who opposed such a step, the pragmatist approach prevailed 
and 'instead of seeking to overthrow the system, however rotten it might be, 
Hizballah resolved to work and advance its cause within it.'957  
This strategic shift conforms not only with the will of the Shiite 
constituency, but also to Lebanon's national and international interests. 
Ultimately, Hizballah's new "Lebanon-First" agenda allows it to maintain a 
legitimate status as a pivotal political party whilst keeping an extraordinary 
weapons arsenal. It seems that there is no political or military power, either 
inside or outside Lebanon that has the will or the capability to disarm 
Hizballah, at least for as long as it continues to represent the Shiite political 
mainstream.   
Clearly Hizballah is still undergoing a "Lebanonisation" process, in 
which its interests are becoming more Lebanese in nature and less regional or 
global. Accordingly, the organisation is devoted to significantly promote its 
national interests through Lebanon's political institutions, and feels less 
obligated to serve the interests of Iran and Syria. It seems that only if Lebanon's 
interests would converge with those of its sponsors, then Hizballah would 
agree to act on their behalf. However, in the political situation that Iran and 
Syria are currently embroiled in, such a scenario is almost unfathomable. In any 
other scenario, Hizballah would not hesitate to prefer Lebanon and its own 
interests over those of Iran and/or Syria. 
 Finally, Hizballah is a remarkable example for a resistance organisation 
that was able to translate its violent strategy into the highest levels of political 
power, yet without succumbing to the pressure to disarm itself. Moreover, 
thanks to its popular support and its combat-proven military dominance, 
Hizballah was able to transform the Shiites from an invisible community into a 
rising political force. It would be reasonable to assume that Hizballah's success 
would embolden similar armed organisations with political aspirations to 
emulate it both in the Middle East and elsewhere.  
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Despite the relative optimism that accompanies Hizballah's current 
political situation, one must remember that it is still able, for more than 30 
years now, to deploy fearless fighters who are motivated by their radical 
ideology onto the battlefield. Tom Donilon, former National Security Advisor to 
US President Obama, recently warned against Hizballah's attempts to hide its 
true nature. In his view the Shiite organisation: 
…has worked assiduously to obscure its terrorist pedigree and 
convince the world that it is interested only in politics, providing 
social welfare services, and defending Lebanon. But it is an 
illusion to speak of Hezbollah as a responsible political actor. 
Hezbollah remains a terrorist organisation and a destabilising 
force across the Middle-East.958 
However, motivation alone cannot kill people unless it comes with 
capabilities. Indeed, the common idiom "If you introduce a gun in the first act, 
you should fire it in the third", applies perfectly in the case of Hizballah. 
Without a full dismantling of its armed capabilities or surrendering them to the 
hands of the Lebanese army, Hizballah would always be regarded as a potential 
culprit, and be a source for international concern and pressure. In the political 
instability that Iran and Syria are currently dealing with, it is in the best 
interests of Lebanon, Israel and the world to remove Hizballah's military option 
off the table. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
"The best way in which a democracy can deal with terrorism is to persuade the 
terrorists to choose the ballot box instead of the bullet and the bomb."959  
 
Political violence in the form of terrorism has become an important 
factor and a significant concern for world politics in the post-World War II era. 
Although the international community has come to accept that the tactic of 
terrorism will not abate anytime soon, the last 40 years have demonstrated that 
'terrorism is after all a tactic that groups may adopt but also abandon.'960 
Audrey Cronin, who specialises in the decline and demise of terrorist 
organisations, highlights the importance of understanding how terrorism ends. 
In her view, this is 'the necessary first step to fashioning an effective grand 
strategy against any terrorist campaign.' Yet, she argues that 'the historical 
record of how terrorist groups have met their demise has hardly been plumbed 
for patterns and insights for today.'961  
Identifying the importance of the demise of terrorist organisations, 
practitioners and scholars in the past decade have been investigating the 
reasons for a terrorist organisation to abandon its violent tactics, and the 
methodologies for persuading them to do so. Leonard Weinberg, a prominent 
expert on terrorism, lists three main considerations influencing the end 
terrorist campaigns: military defeat, success in accomplishing objectives and 
transformation to legitimate political means.962 Although this study deals 
exclusively with terrorist organisations that transformed 'into a political party 
contestant for power in a democratic setting,' it accepts the assertion that 
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defeat and success, although they have not been explored, may be equally 
important causes for ending terrorism.963  
Political integration is not just a theoretical option but rather a realistic 
path that terrorist organisations may choose to take if certain conditions apply. 
The primary challenge of this research was to identify the factors, dynamics 
and conditions that explain the rationale for the integration of terrorist 
organisations into political systems. Furthermore, the study aimed at 
discovering dominant patterns and tendencies that would assist in analysing 
other terrorist organisations that may choose integration into political systems 
as an alternative, or as a complement, to violence. At the outset, one should 
bear in mind that the opposite phenomenon of abandoning the ballot box in 
favour of bombs is more common. Nonetheless, under specific circumstances – 
that lie at the convergence of the organisational, domestic and international 
levels – there can be an advance towards the political arena. 
This study was based on a conceptual framework and carefully selected 
case studies aimed at testing the research propositions. In order to determine 
the most pertinent factors, the study undertook a comparative analysis of three 
terrorist organisations – the Irgun, the UVF and Hizballah – that underwent 
different levels of political integration. While the Irgun and the UVF completely 
abandoned violence and adhered to peaceful means, Hizballah still maintains 
its armed capabilities and in parallel operates a legitimate political party. Such 
an approach provides the opportunity to gain insight into the different 
relationships and processes at work. It also demonstrated that although in each 
case study the outcome was relatively successful, the set of calculations leading 
to the participation in politics was different. Moreover, to strengthen the 
empirical basis, the model that was presented in this study can be expanded 
through the addition of more case studies in the future. 
In general, decision-makers and practitioners should avoid historical 
determinism, since there is no guarantee that similar circumstances or 
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calculations would necessarily lead to successful political integration.964 
Weinberg points out that terrorist campaigns 'set in motion inherently unstable 
conditions...[that] lead the groups involved to undergo major transformations,' 
that their outcome, more often than not, cannot be predicted.965 Indeed, every 
terrorist organisation possesses unique characteristics. However, this research 
demonstrated that there are commonalities that allow for the identification of 
several factors under which organisations may abandon violence and 
participate in conventional party politics. It is important to emphasise that, on 
one hand, the lack of a single or several factors does not render the adoption of 
peaceful political activity impossible, though on the other hand, the more 
factors are relevant to a specific terrorist organisation, the greater the 
likelihood of transformation.  
When examining the organisational level, the first factor that was clearly 
dominant among the Irgun, the UVF and Hizballah was their strong dependence 
on public support. As such, significant fluctuations in the level of public support 
are critical determinants of the life cycle of terrorist organisations, as they can 
'create the necessary conditions for either a marked escalation or a significant 
de-escalation of violence.'966 It is commonly believed that terrorist 
organisations cannot survive as meaningful movements without the political 
and material support of their constituents or state-sponsors. Indeed, there have 
been terrorist organisations that were able to operate for many years with little 
popular support, but they usually failed to have an impact on the society in 
which they lived or the government against which they fought. Nonetheless, 
terrorist organisations that were able to influence significantly the policies and 
practices of societies, governments and, at times, also the international 
community, enjoyed mass support.     
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 The cases of the Irgun and the UVF clearly illustrate that loss of public 
support for the armed campaign led to an understanding that a different 
approach had to be taken in order to affect the lives of peoples or the affairs of 
state. Apparently, the fear of defeat that would undermine their achievements 
so far was a great motivator for these organisations to change both their 
strategy and tactics.  
David Ben-Gurion's determination to crush any opposition to his 
leadership, even at a risk of a civil war, convinced Menachem Begin, 
commander of the Irgun, to dismantle the organisation and renounce its 
territorial claim for Transjordan. Clearly, Begin recognised that most of 
Palestinian Jews opposed the existence of independent armed militias. As part 
of his unremitting attempts to prevent a fratricidal war (especially after the 
Altalena incident), Begin knew that he had no other alternative but to focus his 
efforts on establishing a political party.967 In his memoirs he explained that his 
decision to abandon violence was based on the understanding that 'there are 
times when the choice is between blood and tears…[now] it is essential that 
tears should take the place of blood.'968 Instead of violence, he chose to promote 
and lead a peaceful political party that would eventually garner the support of 
the Israeli public and win parliamentary elections in 1977.  
Similarly, the UVF found itself as the only loyalist organisation that was 
still committed to violence, when its republican rivals declared a ceasefire and 
adhered to the peace process, as stipulated in the Good Friday Agreement. 
When its supporters gradually became less tolerant of its violence, the UVF 
realised that the organisation's role as defender of the Protestants was quickly 
coming to an end. The only available alternative to maintain some of its power, 
popular backing and influence was to abandon violence and focus its efforts on 
political activity. 
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Perhaps this realisation came too late for the UVF. Although it attained a 
non-violent and civilianised role in 2007, the UVF's political representatives 
failed to play a part in the power-sharing government and its public support 
since has significantly diminished. Dawn Purvis, who stepped down as leader of 
the PUP in June 2010 (after the UVF killed a fellow loyalist activist), pointed to 
the links between the PUP and the UVF as the major hindrance for their 
political success: 'I believe there are elements within the organisation [UVF], 
that have absolutely no interest in politics or the future of their party and no 
interest in the PUP.'969 Despite the clear message that Purvis wished to express, 
in a meeting that took place three months later, the political party voted to 
maintain its links with the UVF, explaining that it was still 'committed to giving 
a voice to working class loyalists throughout Northern Ireland.'970 It seems that 
in the case of the UVF the excessive use of violence led to a rapid collapse of 
legitimacy for the PUP. Consequently, both organisations suffer from poor 
popular and political support – they are unrepresented in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, the British House of Commons and in the European Parliament.  
The case of Hizballah is essentially different from the previous two, and 
yet the outcome is comparable. In contrast to the diminishing public support 
for the Irgun and the UVF, the fast growing support for Hizballah was the 
primary catalyst that motivated participation in first municipal and later 
national politics. The basis of this decision was the will of Hizballah's leaders, 
backed by their state-sponsors, to translate the organisation's increasing 
popularity into electoral gains, and consequently to further promote its 
ideology and resistance campaign. Interestingly, the popularity of Hizballah 
was the main factor that allowed it to maintain its independent armed 
capabilities whilst serving in government. As long as it was free from any 
pressure to choose between violence and politics, Hizballah would surely 
prefer to hold the stick at both ends. However, since its popularity has been 
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plunging, as a result of its involvement in the Syrian civil war and alliance with 
Iran to assist President al-Assad, the political pressure on Hizballah to abandon 
violence is constantly mounting.  
It seems that in the current Middle-Eastern discourse, which is largely 
shaped by the spirit of the "Arab Spring", ideology is 'no longer the same 
driving force as in the past,' and specifically in Lebanon, the public 'no longer 
believe[s] that the violent struggle is an effective means of realising its social, 
economic and national aspirations.'971 This could be the most influential factor 
that could ultimately lead to Hizballah's decision to focus on political activity 
and abandon its resistance agenda. The opposition and outrage within 
Lebanese political circles towards Hizballah's part in the Syrian civil war, could 
provide the necessary incentive to follow its stated policy that it is first and 
foremost a Lebanese organisation committed to safeguarding the national 
interests of the Lebanese people. Failing to do so might result in its collapse.    
In sum, regardless of the level of popularity of a terrorist organisation, 
the support in itself is an important factor shaping its behaviour and actions. 
Public support can broadly determine whether a terrorist organisation 
abandons violence and totally adheres to political action, continues and at 
times even escalates its violent campaign or agitates in both politics and armed 
conflict. In reference to terrorist's political integration, the findings indicate 
that high levels of public support actually instill in the minds of terrorist 
leaders that the organisation's ideology is prevailing, and therefore in order to 
translate its popularity into electoral gains the organisation should further 
promote its political aspirations through peaceful means. Low levels, on the 
other hand, lead terrorist leaders to the realisation that the organisation's 
objectives and method have failed, and therefore encourage them to change 
their tactics if they still wish to attain their ideological goals.     
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The second organisational factor that had strong effect on the behaviour 
of the three examined case studies is the existence of a competitive environment 
in which they face dissident or competing factions. A profound ideological or 
strategic disagreement within a terrorist organisation, such as over a decision 
to negotiate with a government or the conditions to escalate the level of 
violence, often causes a backlash and splintering of some hardliners who adopt 
opposite or contradicting modus operandi.972 More often than not, the 
fragmentation is divided into one element that appears to be more radical and 
violent than the other, thus emphasising the differences between the two. 
Consequently, the more moderate element wishes to distinguish itself from the 
extremist one and thus be more prone to take the political track and abandon 
violence. 
Both the Irgun and Hizballah are examples for terrorist organisations 
that were established following an internal split. The Irgun became the militant 
opposition to the moderate Haganah, while the religious radical group 
Hizballah contested the secular ideology of the conformist Amal. However, 
whereas the Irgun was able to transform itself into a fully-fledged political 
party, Hizballah still carries out terrorist and armed operations whilst serving 
in a coalition government.  
The divergence between the two organisations in this respect lies in the 
fact that while Hizballah did not undergo another significant internal split, the 
Irgun was rivaled by the dissident fanatic Lehi, whose brutal methods and 
questionable morality outraged the Jewish community. Wishing to avoid "guilt 
by association" with the Lehi's extremism, the Irgun was compelled to 
demonstrate a more moderate thinking and restrained operational tactics. 
These were the building blocks that would later serve as the framework for the 
Irgun's decision to opt for peaceful politics. 
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The lack of an internal split within Hizballah serves as an explanation 
why it did not entirely renounce violence when it first decided to run for 
elections in 1992. The fact that Hizballah has not been significantly challenged 
by any major dissident group is the primary driving force that enables its 
continued commitment to violence while taking part in national politics. 
Indeed, over the years Hizballah was not seriously forced by its own members, 
the Lebanese government, its state-patrons or the international community to 
question the effectiveness of the duality of violence and politics. Should 
ideological or strategic disagreements occur in the near future within Hizballah, 
for instance over its support and direct involvement in the Syrian civil war, it 
could result in a split that might compel the organisation to re-think its strategy 
and tactics. In this case, Hizballah would potentially adopt a more moderate 
agenda and oppose the radical thinking of the dissident faction.  
The UVF is somewhat a different case study than the previous two, in the 
sense that it was not a product of an internal split but rather an original 
creation of a group of people that were brought together by an authentic 
ideology and strategy. However, the UVF did not operate in a void, and soon 
after its establishment it was challenged by a competing grassroots movement, 
the UDA. Although the UDA did not serve as a dominant factor in the UVF's 
decision to renounce violence, it did contest the UVF over the effective 
representation of loyalist political aspirations. The most significant event, 
however, that ultimately persuaded the UVF to lay down its arms and focus on 
political activity was, in fact, an internal split. The dissident LVF's hard-line 
policy and brutality forced the UVF to re-consider its strategy and position 
among the Protestant community. Indeed, the LVF served both as an incentive 
and an inspiration for the UVF to begin a quest to find new ways to increase its 
political power.       
 In conclusion, terrorist organisations that operate in a competitive 
environment are likely to review their strategy and tactics (in comparison to 
the challenging groups) and decide in favour of political integration. Dealing 




organisations' resources, but also encourages them to endorse substitute 
methods in order to distance themselves from their adversaries. States, on the 
other hand, should therefore focus their efforts not only on preventing terrorist 
attacks, but also on promoting a split between the organisation's most devoted 
and radical and its more moderate members and supporters.  
The third factor that proved critical for terrorist organisations' 
integration into political systems relates to the domestic level and particularly 
the counter-terrorism policies employed by the states that deal with them. 
Whether it is a policy that offers economic, social and legal incentives for 
terrorists to adopt peaceful means, an unyielding strategy that is aimed at 
eradicating terrorist organisations by military and punitive methods or a mixed 
approach that combines firm counter-terrorism tactics with commitment to 
dialogue and compromise, states' behaviour has a considerable impact on 
terrorist organisations' decisions in favour or against political participation. 
Gabriella Blum writes that in many incidents where terrorist organisations 
adopted peaceful politics, the governments who coped with them demonstrated 
some readiness to address their grievances and willingness to make 
concessions or tradeoffs.973 Undoubtedly, states that ultimately decide to open 
a dialogue with terrorists are willing to take risks and meet some of their 
demands in the hope that by defining new ground rules they could provide the 
organisations with incentives to cease their violent operations.  
In all the three analysed case studies, the policies of the states 
contributed greatly to the terrorist organisations' decision to choose politics as 
an alternative or a complimentary tactic to achieve their objectives. The Irgun 
was compelled to navigate between two poles, on the one hand, the British 
government, and on the other the Jewish Agency, which later became the 
newly-formed Israeli government. The British decision to terminate the 
Mandate for Palestine and bring the question of the future of Palestine to the 
UN, was a result of the failure to defeat or contain the Jewish armed campaign, 
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and was fundamental to the establishment of a democratic Jewish state. The 
establishment of the state of Israel undermined the Irgun's self-proclaimed 
position as defender of the Jewish people against the British occupation and de-
legitimised its right to bear arms. At the same time, the insistence of Ben-
Gurion to enforce the state's monopoly of the legitimacy to use force and to 
crush the rebelling Irgun at all costs forced the Jewish terrorist organisation to 
lay down arms and conduct its actions solely through its political wing. 
The case of the UVF brings to the fore a different approach that was 
taken by the British government, which eventually resulted in a shift to politics 
on the part of the loyalist terrorist organisation. Soon after the outbreak of the 
Troubles, the British security establishment realised that its military tactics and 
legal measures alone, no matter how effective, would not resolve the Northern 
Ireland conflict. Therefore, political ingenuity led to a series of proposals and 
roadmaps for cessation of violence in the province. The hopes that these peace 
plans instilled in the hearts and minds of Catholics and Protestants alike, were 
the most convincing argument against any kind of violence in Northern Ireland. 
The British success in promoting a dialogue that would ultimately lead to a 
political compromise, and in parallel deploying firm security procedures 
against those who wished to destabilise the peace process, proved not only 
successful in ending the Troubles but also continue to serve as a model for 
resolving other protracted conflicts.     
The case of Hizballah stands out in the field of terrorism studies as it 
demonstrates how powerful a terrorist organisation can become when it 
confronts a state that cannot formulate a coherent policy or clearly defined 
strategic objectives. During the 30 years that Israel has been contending with 
Hizballah, despite its military superiority, it failed to defeat the Shiite 
organisation, either on the frontline or in the political arena. Apart from a brief, 
yet futile, attempt to reach a political compromise with Syria that would 
indirectly involve Hizballah, Israel still believes that relying exclusively on its 
army is the only practical method to eliminate Hizballah. Israeli decision-




academic apparatuses new and creative strategies that would serve as an 
alternative to the battlefield.  
The direct impact of Israel's policy towards Hizballah has been a 
constant increase in its popularity among Shiites in particular and Muslims in 
general. Describing Israel as a usurper of Muslim territories and using this to 
bolster its image and role as defender of Lebanon has been the primary source 
of Hizballah's electoral success. Moreover, the premise among Shiites that there 
cannot be a political compromise with Israel is fundamental to Hizballah's 
claim to the right to maintain its highly-advanced weapons whilst its 
representatives hold ministerial and parliamentary positions. If Israel would 
offer a political alternative to the Lebanese people, there is a possibility that 
those in Lebanon who oppose Hizballah's independent armed capabilities, and 
more so when it is directly involved in the Syrian civil war, would become more 
vocal in their demand for disarmament. Consequently, it would be much more 
difficult for Hizballah to defend the legitimacy of its military wing. Such a 
scenario could set in motion a process that would ultimately lead Hizballah to 
renounce violence and promote its objectives through the legitimate political 
channels in Lebanon. 
Another prominent case of a terrorist organisation that was greatly 
influenced by a state's counter-terrorism policy, and should be briefly noted, is 
the Tamil Tigers. For nearly three decades the separatist organisation fought 
fervently for the establishment of an independent homeland for its people. 
Despite its formidable weapons and highly devoted members, the terrorist 
organisation was crushed by a massive and decisive military campaign 
launched against it by the Sri Lankan government.974 Although a peace process 
was underway for several years, it led to a deadlock and in 2006 the Tamil 
Tigers pulled out of the negotiations. The Sri Lankan government responded 
with a brutal crackdown that resulted in the organisation's demise, as 
expressed in its public admission of defeat in 2009: 
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This battle has reached its bitter end...It is our people who are 
dying now from bombs, shells, illness and hunger. We cannot 
permit any more harm to befall them…We need to do everything 
within our means to stop this carnage. If this means silencing our 
arms and entering a peace process, that is something that we 
have already agreed to...If this means saving the lives of 
thousands of people, it needs to be done.975 
The case of the Tamil Tigers further strengthens the assertion that 
terrorist organisations success and survival are much dependent upon the 
counter-terrorism policy exerted by the state. Cronin correctly argues that 
negotiations rarely end terrorism but they provide 'a means to manage violence 
and facilitate the longer-term decline of a group,' while achieving some of its 
strategic goals.976 It seems that more often than not, unwillingness to discuss 
and reach a political settlement is a major threat to the survival of any terrorist 
organisation, as it leaves the state with no other choice rather than employ an 
unyielding counter-terrorism strategy instead of an accommodating one.   
In conclusion, it is clear that terrorist organisations' decisions whether 
to continue or abandon violence are greatly influenced by the policies of the 
states that they are dealing with. When terrorist organisations sense that their 
existence is threatened by states' military might or determination to resolve the 
conflict peacefully, they are likely to opt for political accommodation. In such 
cases, the choice to transform into a peaceful political actor becomes not only 
rational but also natural. 
The last factor that stands out as critical to terrorist transformation into 
political party is the impact of the international system. More specifically, it is 
the direct or indirect effect of global events, state-sponsors or international 
institutions on the terrorist organisations' considerations, decisions and 
actions. This research demonstrated that there is significant and growing 
influence of the international system on terrorists' attitudes towards peaceful 
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settlements. Moreover, it generates processes and dynamics that often 
persuade terrorist organisations that violence is no longer useful (and even 
harmful), and therefore substitute strategies could better advance their stated 
objectives. However, the extent to which the international system affects 
terrorist organisations is usually underrated. The in-depth analysis clearly 
revealed that it has a profound impact on the decision to prefer peaceful 
settlements over armed struggles. 
 The case of the Irgun is an outstanding example of a terrorist 
organisation that was immensely influenced by international events. The 
Jewish Holocaust, which raised the issue of international responsibility to 
provide a settlement to the remnants of the European Jewry, spawned a series 
of processes that eventually led to the UN decision to partition Palestine and 
establish a Jewish State. The Irgun, although officially still committed to the 
ideology of Greater Israel, took an active role in the deliberations leading to the 
decision, which provided it with international legitimacy and recognition. This 
and the creation of a democratic regime in the newly-established Israel, forced 
the Irgun to give up its territorial aspirations and reinforced its need to 
surrender its weapons, join the Israeli army and participate in the state's 
political system.  
The Northern Ireland conflict is another excellent case that 
demonstrates the invaluable contribution of the international system to the 
reduction of the level of violence and promotion of a peaceful political 
settlement. It is commonly known that the conflict in Northern Ireland 
attracted immense international attention, and that its peaceful resolution is 
partially owed to third-party involvement. Also, the 9/11 attacks against the US 
can be regarded as a global event that influenced the terrorist organisations in 
Northern Ireland, Protestant and Catholic alike, to re-think their violent 
strategies. Another important issue that continues to contribute to the 
maintenance of the peace process in Northern Ireland is the workings of an 
independent international body responsible for overseeing the 




confidence-building mechanism that provided guarantees and incentives for all 
sides.  
Facing such a level of international involvement, the UVF, which was less 
popular outside Northern Ireland than its Catholic IRA rival, recognised the 
international system as a crucial battlefield and embarked on a campaign to 
mobilise worldwide support. Its efforts were relatively successful and after the 
loyalist terrorist organisation had received international legitimacy it became 
much more difficult to continue endorsing and executing sectarian attacks. The 
international recognition and the marginal public support among its 
constituency contributed to the UVF's decision to abandon violence and to 
concentrate its strategy and tactics on peaceful politics.             
The case of Hizballah is another example of the impact of the 
international arena on the behaviour and decisions of a terrorist organisation. 
This study illustrated that global events, such as 9/11 and the end of Cold War, 
had little influence on its militant ideology and strategy. However, state-
sponsorship and international involvement remain amongst the most 
important factors that determine its day-to-day actions. Clearly, any alteration 
in Iran's and Syria's political and security stability reflects directly on Hizballah. 
In a reality in which Iran is facing international sanctions and threatened with a 
military attack against its nuclear installations and Syria is entrapped in a 
bloody civil war, Hizballah is losing both political power and public support. 
Siding with the Syrian president and sending operatives to fight alongside his 
army could be detrimental to Hizballah, and more so in case the US and Europe 
decide on a military intervention of any sort.  
International involvement in Lebanon's internal affairs, manifested 
predominantly by UN Security Council resolutions calling for Hizballah's 
disbandment and disarmament and the Tribunal investigating the assassination 
of Prime Minister Hariri, is another element that significantly impacts 
Hizballah's decisions and limits its capability to act freely in Lebanon. Although 
international pressure has yet to persuade Hizballah to abandon violence 




another tool to undermine the organisation and to weaken its standing among 
the Lebanese people. Undoubtedly, Hizballah is currently facing several 
formidable forces, among which the international community is perhaps the 
most powerful. In such political and security realities, it is not unthinkable that 
Hizballah's only chance to survive as an influential political actor would be to 
renounce its violent tactics, disarm and adhere strictly to peaceful means. 
Evidently, conflicts between terrorist organisations and states in which 
the international community is heavily involved, have more chances to be 
resolved peacefully. Global events, international intervention and decline in 
state-sponsorship for terrorist organisations, serve as significant motivators for 
terrorist organisations that realise they are facing stronger forces and if they 
wish to remain relevant they have to make a significant change in their thinking 
and behaviour. These forces often have little tolerance for violence, and if 
terrorist organisations would not make the transition towards peaceful politics, 
they would risk their own existence. 
Interestingly, several factors that were examined throughout the 
research and which initially would have seemed essential for terrorist 
integration into political systems, proved to be less relevant when analysed 
separately. The research showed that the role of violence is important for 
characterising and understanding the terrorist organisation's ideology and 
strategy, however it does not play a significant role in understanding its 
likelihood to join party politics. Similarly, their perception of the opponent is 
fundamental in determining the level of extremism and political aspirations, 
however it does not point out which terrorist organisation is most likely to 
adopt peaceful means.   
The factors that have been highlighted above, and which were examined 
and presented in greater depth throughout the study, are more than just 
theory. In practice, in situations where the four dominant factors are present: 
(a) fluctuation in the level of public support for the terrorist organisation's 
strategy and tactics, (b) internal splits in the terrorist organisation (c) a mix of 




state, and (d) the level and impact of international involvement in the conflict, 
they have an accumulative and tangible effect on a terrorist organisation's 
decisions, behaviour and actions, and therefore the process of integration into a 
political system by the terrorist organisation is not only more likely, but also 
























Figure 5: Dominant factors that lead to terrorists' political integration 
Applying this theoretical model could provide a set of guidelines for 
decision-makers on how to instigate, encourage or enhance a transformation 
process within terrorist organisations that hopefully would end in leaving 
behind the militant strategy and accepting the political path as sole means to 
achieve their objectives.  
Although political integration may seem to be a natural step in the life of 
a terrorist organisation, history provides plenty of evidence that suggests 
otherwise. Many organisations remain loyal to their violent tactics until they 
disband, while others remain in the dual-stage of combining violence and 
politics for a long period of time. This study determined that the presence of 




– and preferably all at the same time – provide the necessary conditions for a 
successful integration to occur.  
On a final note, when analysing a terrorist organisation that holds 
dogmatic views, advocates radical ideology and employs violent means, it is 
essential to examine the surrounding environment, dynamics and events, and 
not rely on purely operational and tactical aspects to understand its thinking, 
mechanisms and behaviour. More important is to explore thoroughly the 
circumstances leading to its foundation and its political aspirations, and its 
readiness to take part in the governmental structure of the state in which it 
resides and/or operates. In the evolution of a terrorist organisation there 
comes a stage that it is forced to determine the course and nature of its future 
operation. Strategically, it will face two primary alternatives: either to maintain 
its clandestine and militant modus operandi to achieve its objectives or to 
declare an end to its revolutionary stage and integrate into a state's political 
system in order to attain the same objectives.  
In contemporary geo-political circumstances there could be greater 
probability for terrorist organisations to choose legitimate political integration 
if the appropriate factors and conditions apply. The meaning of such a decision 
is not that their objectives or demands are illegitimate, but rather that they 
have come to the conclusion that their efforts employing violence have been 
exhausted and so they are convinced that the best alternative to achieve their 
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